----------------------------------------------------                  CIVIL ACTION:  SJC-_________
Barbara C. Johnson 
                                                   Plaintiff 
v. 

Robert A. Cornetta, in his individual and 
 official capacities,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts
       Defendants 
----------------------------------------------------

INTRODUCTION 

This case arises out of a real estate case between Plaintiff, Barbara C. Johnson ["Mother"] and one of her sons and his wife [Marc I. Johnson and H. Yvonne van Bodengraven] in Essex Superior Court in Lawrence, Massachusetts.\ /  Johnson asserts that she is a citizen of Massachusetts residing in Costa Rica and entitled to the full sweep of due process and equal protection of all the laws.  Johnson has brought one cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, one under 42 U.S.C. §1985(3), and eight for declaratory judgments. 

The declaratory judgments that Johnson seeks are (1) a declaratory judgment that Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which is entitled, “A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His Activities,” and states, “A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,” is constitutional both facially and as applied and requires all judges to comply with Canon 2 as if it were common law, if not statutory in nature, (2) a declaratory judgment that Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which is entitled, “A Judge Should Perform the Duties of His Office Impartially and Diligently,” and states 

. . . His judicial duties include all the duties of his office prescribed by law. In the performance of these duties, the following standards apply: (A) Adjudicative Responsibilities. (1) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. He should be unswayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism. . . . (4) A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law. . . . ,

is constitutional both facially and as applied and requires all judges to comply with Canon 3 as if it were common law, if not statutory in nature, (3) a declaratory judgment that Article V of the Declaration of Rights, Part the First, Constitution of  the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, trumps the judge-made doctrine of judicial immunity, (4) a declaratory judgment that Article V of the Declaration of Rights, Part the First, Constitution of  the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, trumps M.G.L. c. 231A, §2, or vice versa, (5) a declaratory judgment that a declaratory judgment that M.G.L. 231A, §2, is unconstitutional both facially and as applied, (6) a declaratory judgment that, under 231A, if deemed constitutional, a judge acting outside or in excess of the scope of his jurisdiction is not protected by the umbrella of immunity, and may be liable for money damages, (7) a declaratory judgment that Massachusetts Superior Court Rules 9A, et seq., is constitutional and requires judges as well as parties to comply with them, and (8) a declaratory judgment that all parties to a lawsuit are entitled to the full sweep of due process and equal protection of all the laws.  The remaining causes of action are allege that there have been (9) a violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 (due process and equal protection clauses), (10) a violation of 42 U.S.C. §1985(3) (conspiracy), and (11) common-law conspiracy.

PARTIES 

1. Your Plaintiff, Barbara C. Johnson ["Mother"], is a citizen of the United States and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; was, prior to being wrongfully evicted at the age of 74 (two and a half years ago), a resident at 6 Appletree Lane, Andover, Essex County, MA 01810-4102; is currently residing in Atenas, Costa Rica, 4013-20501; will be 77 years old in mid-October 2011; is a publisher and author of the domain www.falseallegations.com and the books Behind the Black Robes: Failed Justice, and Why I Didn’t Sleep with Mitt Romney & Other Tales.

2. Defendant Robert A. Cornetta is a citizen of the United States and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, is a resident of Essex County, Massachusetts, and is employed as a judge.  He is a person\ / (1) who is obligated to adjudicate cases brought before him in Essex County District Court, (2) who from time to time appears to be randomly assigned to sit as a judge in the Trial Department of the Trial Court, (3) who has continued to improperly conduct the affairs of the Commonwealth, and (4) who is accountable to Johnson and the people of the Commonwealth.\ / 

3. Defendant Commonwealth of Massachusetts [Commonwealth”] is a body politic that is formed by a voluntary association of individuals, and "is a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each Citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain Laws for the Common good" [Preamble.  Massachusetts Constitution] and as an association, according to M.G.L. c. 4 §7, is a person for all purposes under all laws.\ /

FACTS 

4. The underlying action was appealed in Massachusetts Appeals Court, which re-manded it to Essex (MA) Superior Court, where it had been filed and where motions were heard primarily by two judges: Judges John Lu and Thomas Billings. 

5. Upon remand to Essex Superior Court at Lawrence, the underlying action was assigned to Judge Robert A. Cornetta.

6. The underlying action arose out of a dispute between a mother (Plaintiff) and her son Marc and his wife, Yvonne, over the residential property at 6 Appletree Lane in Andover, Massachusetts. 

7. Marc and Yvonne claimed they were the landlords and Mother was a tenant.  At the top of the real estate market in 2005, they decided both to evict Mother and sell the property and to give Mother notice of summary process in February 2006 by leaving a copy of the notice near her kitchen dish drainer. 

8. Mother claimed she had a life estate interest in the home.  She wanted specific performance or the return of the $360,000 (minus the value of a monthly rent for each month she was in residence) that she (a) deposited into the Pentaj Intervivos Trust (of which she had named Marc trustee), (b) gave Marc in hand, and (c) expended for maintenance, repair, and updating the real property since 1993, when she took occupancy of the subject property.

9. On 1 March 2006, the underlying action was filed in superior court.  The summary process action, filed in a local district court, was consolidated with the superior court action soon thereafter.

10. On 9 January 2007, Judge John Lu wrote, “The court has undertaken a detailed review of this case.  Given the claims and defenses, the requested relief is inappropriate absent, at a minimum, an evidentiary hearing if not a full-blown trial!” 

11. During the discovery process in the underlying State action, Marc and Yvonne produced no evidence, either documentary or testimonial, to support their position. 

12. During the discovery process in the underlying State action, Mother produced to defense counsel, Kenneth Rossetti, approximately 301 sets of documents supporting every facet of her case. 

13. Judge Billings denied two of Mother’s motions, mandatory ones—motions to determine the sufficiency of Defendants’ objections to Requests for Admission—before Mother had filed them: “Those motions, should they be filed, will be denied”\ / 

14. The lower court also failed to act on Mother’s motions to compel diverse interrogatories. 

15. On 1 February 2008, the parties' pleadings regarding the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment were filed. 

16. The summary-judgment motion was heard in March 2008.  Immediately at the end of the hearing, Judge John Lu attempted to mediate parties’ dispute.  Judge Lu suggested Mother settle for $250,000, an amount to which Mother agreed, but the defendants came up with no more than $45,000 – at which point Judge Lu walked off the bench. 

17. Mother had assumed then that summary judgment would not be granted Defendants, for otherwise the attempted mediation would have been senseless. 

18. On 12 March 2009, a year later, Judge Lu ordered the eviction of Mother and granted partial summary judgment for the defendants. 

19. Something sufficient to constitute circumstantial evidence of wrongdoing had clearly happened during the year to change Judge Lu’s thinking 180 degrees. 

20. Mother was evicted without a trial on her claims. 

21. The lower court gave no reason or authority for evicting Mother.

22. During the first week in August 2009, Judge Lu stayed the eviction after Mother had vacated the property during the previous month, and ordered the defendants to write a brief on an issue that should have been briefed prior to Lu’s granting partial summary judgment.

23. Because Mother had already vacated the Andover property and moved to Costa Rica in July 2009, the hearing held on 3 September 2009 [Event #21] was attended physically by Defense Counsel Kenneth Rossetti but telephonically by Mother.

24. On 14 October 2009, Judge Lu evicted Mother for the second time from her residence, although she had already vacated the subject property and moved to Costa Rica months earlier [Paper #111].

25. The act of 14 October 2009 provides significant circumstantial evidence that there was a discriminatory motive, specifically retaliation arising out of Mother’s political advocacy for court reform and the abolition of judicial immunity before, during, and after her 2002 gubernatorial campaign and, particularly, her participation in statewide televised debates during the campaign calling for judicial accountability.\ /

26. On 3 December 2009, knowing that Mother had moved out of the country a little over five months earlier because her monthly Social Security stipend was insufficient to sustain her living in Massachusetts, Judge Lu sua sponte issued his third order of summary judgment, which added the allowance of costs to the defendants. 

27. Mother then filed a new Notice of Appeal in order to consolidate the new issues with the old.

28. The issues Mother argued in her appellate brief were the following, which included the bizarre rulings, decisions, orders, all the facts of which appear in the addendum to her appellate brief :

(a) By denying two of Mother’s motions before Mother filed them – “Those motions, should they be filed, they will be denied” – a lower-court judge (Billings, J.) in a written order unlawfully threatened and frightened Mother, as well as effected a prior restraint of her First Amendment rights.  The lower court’s bizarre act constituted the intentional deprivation of Mother’s well-established fundamental constitutional rights, including but not limited to equal protection, e.g., the deprivation of the benefits of the procedural rules for discovery.\ /

(b) The court intentionally failed at all times to act on Mother’s motions to compel diverse interrogatories, another step in the semitransparent judicial plan to deprive Mother of her constitutional right to equal protection and the rights enunciated in Articles XI, XII, XV, and XXIX of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

(c) Where, on 12 March 2009, the court allowed Marc and Yvonne's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the erroneous grounds that Mother had no evidence and that Mother’s claim of specific or partial performance was barred as a defense to the Statute of Frauds, the court deprived Mother of fundamental fairness, the cornerstone of both due process and justice as well as her right to a jury trial, pursuant to Article XV of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.\ /

(d) When on 5 August 2009, after Mother, complying with the order of eviction, had vacated her residence and had moved to Costa Rica, the court’s belated order, curious and convoluted, to stay the eviction was an admission that there was no law supporting the court’s eviction of Mother. 

(e) On 11 September 2009, the lower court deviated from the Mass. Rules of Civil Procedure in a manner that prejudicially discriminated against Mother by allowing her son and daughter-in-law’s Request for Leave to File Reply Brief after the court had already decided their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and had evicted Mother, circumstantially and convolutedly evidencing a retaliatory motive for depriving Mother of her constitutional rights.

(f) The court, on 14 October 2009, (a) erroneously denied Mother’s 8-month-old Emergency Motion to Vacate Partial Summary Judgment, (b) re-instated the grant of the defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,(c) re-instated the Order of Eviction, and by so doing, denied Mother her right to a jury trial, guaranteed by Article XV of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and arguably the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (d) allowed Defendants’ Motion to Strike/Withdraw Their Counterclaims.  In so acting, the court denied Mother her constitutional due process right to have a jury trial to make a record by requiring the defendants to prove their disputed counterclaims in front of a jury.

(g) Invidious elder and political discrimination formed the basis of certain opinions, rulings, directions, and judgments of the Superior Court Department of the Trial Court and resulted in reversible error.

Therefore, we remand for the court to consider whether Johnson should recover under this theory. In order to recover any surplus, Johnson must prove at trial that she in fact conferred a measurable benefit on her son, a person in his position would have reasonably expected to compensate her for such, and that she conferred that benefit with the reasonable expectation she would be repaid. 

By the Court (Lenk, Brown, & Milkey, JJ.),
Entered: May 9, 2011.  [Exhibit A]

31. On 12 August 2011, a telephonic pretrial conference hearing was held [Event 28], and because the Lawrence court was allegedly unable to support a conference call and the office of Marc and Yvonne’s attorney, Kenneth Rossetti, was able to provide the technical support, Rossetti remained in his office at 2 o’clock, while Mother was in Costa Rica and Judge Cornetta remained in court.  Clerk Casey Arena was with the judge.

32. During the pretrial conference of August 12th, Mother informed the court that a friend was going to provide her with Frequent Flyer Miles (FFM) in order that she be able to fly to Massachusetts for the trial and that she needed sufficient time to get them.\ /  Without those FFM, Mother would be unable to afford the round-trip tickets.

33. Prior to and after the August 12th hearing, Plaintiff Mother filed a series of appropriate and timely motions:

(a) Plaintiff’s Assented-to Motion for Extension of Trial Date to a Date That Takes into Account Both the Time to Conduct Discovery and the Time an Attorney Would Need to Ready Himself for Trial [Paper #120]

(b) Plaintiff’s Assented-to Motion Seeking Permission for Hybrid Representation [Paper #120, combined with (a), supra]

(c) Motion to Amend WHEREFORE Clause of Verified Complaint [Paper #124]

(d) Emergency and Imperative Motion for Leave to Supplement Pretrial Argument with Incorporated Supplemental Argument to Pretrial Conference of 12 August 2011 [Paper #125]

(e) Emergency Motion to Reconsider and Vacate the Order of 12 August 2011 [Paper #126]

(f) Mother’s Reply to Defendants’ Opposition to Mother’s Motion to Amend WHEREFORE Clause of Verified Complaint [Paper #127]

(g) Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to Add Counts for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Fraud by Misrepresentation and Fraud by Nondisclosure [Paper #129]

(h) Amended Verified Complaint With Demand for Jury Trial Containing the Original Introduction, Counts 1-10 of the Original Complaint Plus Four New Counts: [not entered into docket sheet, although filed simultaneously with motion for leave]

• Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 
• Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 
• Fraud by Misrepresentation, and
• Fraud by Nondisclosure

(i) Mother’s Reply to Defendants’ Combined Opposition to Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Reconsider and Vacate August 12, 2011 [Sic] Order and Emergency and Imperative Motion to Supplement Pretrial Argument [not entered into docket sheet]

3. Pursuant to the decision of the Massachusetts Appeals Court in this matter, docket # 10-P-471 issued on May 9, 2011, this matter shall now be heard by this Court only upon summary judgment (Mass. R. Civ. P. 56) as to the issue of whether or not as a matter of law the case may proceed to trial upon the plaintiff's claim(s) brought under Quantum  Meruit. Thereafter, as is  necessary, the Court shall issue any further findings, rulings, orders or shall schedule any jury trial date as may be required. 

35. On 12 August 2011, Judge Cornetta has ordered, “All discovery in this matter is closed.”

36. On 12 August 2011, denying discovery after remand, Judge Cornetta exalted form over substance,\ / an act which is both fundamentally unfair and contrary to the common law.\ / 

37. On 12 August 2011, Judge Cornetta allowed Defendants to file a Motion for Sum-mary Judgment and ordered that the parties exchange their documents by the close of business 20 September 2011, but did not give a date by which defense counsel had to serve the brief on Mother. 

6. Summary Judgment briefs on the outstanding issue of plaintiff's Quantum Meruit claim(s) only shall be filed with this Court and exchanged between the parties by the close of business on September 20, 2011  (see paragraph #2 above).

38. As of the date of this writing, 13 September 2011, Mother has not received a copy of the motion for summary judgment, proving that Judge Cornetta’s order is extrajudicial, i.e., outside his authority and outside the protective umbrella of judge-made judicial immunity.

39. Judge Cornetta had an obligation under the Code of Judicial Conduct to know and comply with the law—in this case both to comply with the Appeals Court order and to know and rule in accordance with Superior Court Rules.

40. Also on 12 August 2011, Judge Cornetta issued his rulings on the motions [Exhibit C, email dated 16 August 2011 from Clerk Judith Brennan on behalf of Judge Cornetta]. 

41. Judge Cornetta summarily denied all of Mother’s motions, including the two motions to which Rossetti had assented—items (a) and (b), supra.

42. Also on 12 August 2011, Judge Cornetta summarily refused to allow any discovery, although Mother had supplied citations to cases that had allowed discovery after remand.

43. On 1 September 2011, Mother learned that Judge Cornetta had issued rulings on some motions [Exhibit D, email from Judith Brennan, Clerk for Judge Cornetta].

44. On 2 September 2011, Mother learned that although the notice read that the dispositions were made on August 12th, the motions were decided on August 30th, 2011.

45. It was clear that the dates of the decisions re the motions had been fabricated and possibly fraudulent.  For example, Paper #126 was dated 17 August 2011 and Paper #127 was dated 
13 August 2011.  It was impossible for Cornetta to have decided either of the motions before either was filed.  Plus the fact that Cornetta was not in court between August 13 and 29, 2011.  Judith Brennan said “he is unavailable until the 29th.”

46. When the order issued on August 30 (according to Exhibit D), but backdated to August 12th, it was clear that the judicial buzz in Lawrence was continuing—the judicial buzz about Mother’s disbarment,\ / explained infra, which was a retaliative action for running for Governor in 2002 on a platform of court reform and the abolishment of judicial immunity. 

47. Given that the underlying action is a family dispute over property and that Mother’s professional status had nothing to do with the superior court case, the first indication of invidious discrimination and retaliation for political ideas opposite those of the judiciary occurred on 27 June 2007 in footnote 2 of Judge Billings’ memorandum in which he wrote “The plaintiff, a recently disbarred attorney, is representing herself.  The defendants are represented by counsel.” 

48. A similar statement about Mother’s disbarment was, subsequently, footnoted also in United States District Court (Boston) No. 2001-10890-RBC (Robert C. Collings, Magistrate-Judge).

49. Judge Cornetta is not only continuing the bizarre and egregious conduct Judges Lu and Billings showed so clearly prior to the case being in the Appeals Court, Judge Cornetta has been acting outside the scope of his jurisdictional duties.\ / 

50. In her emergency motion, Mother sought the court to vacate his backdated August 30th order on several grounds, one of which was that her experience with defense counsel since 2006 demonstrates that he is neither timely nor zealous about complying with rules or being considerate.\ / 

51. As a result of Rossetti having  been aided and abetted by Judge Cornetta’s order to exchange and file the motion of summary judgment on 20 September 2011, so as to impede Mother from having the proper amount time to oppose Defendants’ summary judgment pleadings.

52. From a practical perspective, given that the summary judgment package is not due until September 20th, and the court shall have to take the time to read the package, less than a month will be available to book air flight tickets.

53. The scheme of Superior Court Rule 9A et seq. requires:

• that the movant write a motion (in this case, Rule 56(b), which requires a set of pleadings to accompany the motion), 

• that the movant serve the motion on the movee, 

• that the movee send two copies of the movee’s opposition (and all the other requisite pleadings accompanying the opposition) to the movant: one copy for the movant and one copy for the court,\ /

• that the movee may also file, pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), a Motion for Summary Judgment against the movant, and serve the original movant that 56(c) motion on the movant with the movee’s opposition package,

• that the movant then gather all the movant’s and all the movee’s pleadings and file them in court (this is called the Rule 9A package),\ /

• that the court set a date to hear the parties argue their positions.

55. The Cornetta court ordered Defendants and Mother to file their pleadings separately, that is, not in accordance with Rules 9A et seq. 

56. It is impossible for Mother to write an opposition to Defendants’ motion without seeing the motion before she writes an opposition to it.

57. Canon 2(A), entitled “A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His Activities,” reads: “A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”

58. Canon 3, entitled “A Judge Should Perform the Duties of His Office Impartially and Diligently,” reads: “. . . His judicial duties include all the duties of his office prescribed by law.”

59. Canon 3 also states, 

 “In the performance of these duties, the following standards apply: 

(A) Adjudicative Responsibilities. 

(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. He should be unswayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism. . . . 

. . .

(4) A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law. . . .

61. The Order does not set out the date by which Defendants must serve their Motion for Summary Judgment (MSJ) on Mother. 

62. Thus, the court did not abide by Canons 2 and 3.

63. The failure of the court to state the date by which Rossetti must serve his clients’ MSJ pleadings causes the October date or dates to become meritless. 

64. If the September 20th date is the date Rossetti must serve his clients’ MSJ on Mother, the date Mother’s opposition pleadings must be served on Rossetti by 11 October 2011. 

65. Therefore, the court order of 12 August 2011 is again flawed by commanding that the parties’ summary judgment package be filed in the court by 20 September 2011. 

66. Given that September 20th is the date that the summary-judgment pleadings of both parties are to be filed, Cornetta has violated his obligations re Rule 9A and is depriving Mother of her rights under the Massachusetts Superior Court rules, and her constitutional rights, including but not limited to her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.  [See Exhibit A, appellate order.]\ /

67. October 20th has been ordered to be both the hearing date on the summary judg-ment motion and if the MSJ is not granted, also the date of the first day of trial [Exhibit B].

68. Given that it has been ordered that October 20th date is the date of both the commencement of the trial and the summary judgment hearing [Exhibit B]:

(a) Mother will have incurred the debt for and wasted the 50,000 Frequent Flyer Miles she is being provided by a friend to cover the cost of travel from Costa Rica to Boston, and

(b) Mother’s constitutional (both state and federal) rights to due process and equal protection have been irreparably violated.

70. If there are material facts in dispute, the facts to be determined for the issue of whether the doctrine of quantum meruit is applicable must be decided by a jury.

71. Mother asked the superior court to allow a telephonic conference for the summary judgment hearing.  On several occasions prior to the appeal and on Friday, 12 August 2011, Mother’s telephonic appearance at hearings has been successfully achieved. 

72. Mother’s request for a telephonic conference for a summary judgment hearing— if one, indeed, is scheduled to occur—has been denied.

73. Canons 2 and 3 require that the law, including but not limited to the rules of Superior Court or the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, be followed.  To order no continuances to the hearing date means that this court would have to disobey intentionally Rule 9A.  There is no reasonable alternative route to evade Rule 9A when a motion for summary judgment is concerned. 

74. To not follow Rule 9A is provocative noncompliance by the court, and such action is also a catalyst for this petition pursuant to M.G.L. c. 249, § 4, which allows for a civil action in the nature of certiorari to correct errors in proceedings which are not according to the course of the common law.

75. To not follow Rule 9A is provocative noncompliance by the court, and such action is also a catalyst for a petition pursuant to M.G.L. c. 211, §3, to invoke the superintendence of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. 

76. Defense Counsel Rossetti admitted in writing that he was “compl[ying] with th[e] directive” of Assistant Clerk-Magistrate Judith Brennan, who, according to Rossetti, allegedly requested “that the parties submit separate memoranda consistent with how their respective side interpreted the Appeals Court’s order.” 

77. Because Madame Clerk is not a judge, she does not have the authority to advise Rossetti not to comply with the NOTICE TO APPEAR FOR FINAL PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE, dated 8 July 2011. 

78. Rossetti’s written declaration of his intention of not complying with Judge Cornetta’s order to file together the pleadings of all the parties is an admission of his intention to be in contempt. 

79. Further, given that on 14 September 2011. which it is now while Mother is writing this petition, Mother still has not received Rossetti’s motion for summary judgment, he absolutely will be in violation of both Superior Court Rule 9A and Judge Cornetta’s order to file the pleadings of all parties on the 20th of September.

80. If what Madame Clerk told Rossetti, according to Rossetti, is true, and Judge Cornetta does not sanction or punish Rossetti for contempt, then there will be proof of also a conspiracy between Cornetta and Rossetti.

81. As a licensed counsel, Rossetti is obligated to understand (a) that he could and can be deemed being in contempt for failure to follow Judge Cornetta’s order and (b) that to knowingly and voluntarily not tell Mother about his intended noncompliance with the court order was also in violation of Mother’s constitutional right to equal protection and fundamental fairness.

82. All relevant and material facts, including but not limited to the following, should be admissible at trial:

the money Mother provided to Marc personally since 1987,

the money ($298,999.89) Mother deposited into the trust of which Marc was trustee since 1993, 

the value of Mother’s maintaining, repairing, updating, and managing the property as she had been doing since 1993 (approximately $60,000),

any monthly rent, commencing in September 1993,

the factual allegations in Mother’s affidavits and exhibits,

the factual allegations in Defendants’ affidavits and exhibits,

the value of Mother's life estate interest, of which she has been deprived,

what the parties' rights were should a life estate have been recognized by the court,

the ongoing mortgage, tax, and insurance obligations on the subject property,

any necessary major improvements,

Mother's management responsibilities,

what expenditures would (and would not) qualify as maintenance, repairs, and updates

Marc’s admissions,

Yvonne’s admissions

84.  Judge Cornetta’s decision reeks of the absence of fundamental fairness and smacks of revengeful retaliation.\ / 

85. Using common sense, Mother cannot book tickets that will not be used.  She simply is not in a financial situation to incur such a debt—even to a friend—for possibly no reason. 

86. As a result of the circumstances, Mother’s wrongful eviction, i.e., eviction without evidence to justify it and without the trial required in landlord-tenant situations under Massachusetts common law, the trial date(s) must be continued despite Judge Cornetta’s repeated insistence that NO continuances will be granted.\ /

87. The last sentence of Judge Cornetta’s order revealed again that he is relying “on trial court time standards” to rule that no further continuances of said date shall be granted, which ruling is impractical and again exalts form over substance.

88. Johnson repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 87 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth.

89. There are actual controversies, which are set out below.

90. The first controversy is whether Canon 2(A,B) of the Code of Judicial Conduct  is constitutional both facially and as applied. 

91. The second controversy is whether Canon 2(A,B) of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires all judges to comply with Canon 2 as if it were a law. 

92. The third controversy is whether, assuming Canon 2(A,B) is deemed to be a law with which sitting judges must comply and a judge does not comply with the law of the canon, the judge must be deemed liable or culpable to those against whom he or she has done wrong.\ /\ /\ / 

93. The fourth controversy is whether Canon 2 trumps Article XV of the Declaration of Rights, Part the First, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which gives parties in all suits a right to a trial by jury, or vice versa.\ /

94. The fifth controversy is, when a judge does not comply with Canon 2, whether he may be sued for money damages for his culpability.

95. “Failure on the part of even a few judges to comply with the standards set forth in judicial rules serves to degrade and demean the entire judiciary and to erode public confidence in the judicial process.”\ / 

96. If this controversy is not resolved, there will be further litigation.\ /

97. Johnson repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 96 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth. 

98. There are actual controversies, which are set out below.

99. The first controversy is whether Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct  is constitutional both facially and as applied.

100. The second controversy is whether Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires all judges to comply with Canon 3 as if it were a law. 

101. The third controversy is, when a judge does not comply with existing statutes, rules, and regulations, whether the judge is acting outside the duties of his office prescribed by law.

102. The fourth controversy is, when a judge does not comply with existing statutes, rules, and regulations, whether he may be deemed as being faithful to the law as prescribed by Canon 3.

103. The fifth controversy is, when a judge does not maintain professional competence in the performance of the duties set out in Canon 3(A)(1-4), whether he may be sued for money damages for his culpability.

104.  The sixth controversy is whether Canon 3 trumps Article XV of the Declaration of Rights, Part the First, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which gives parties in all suits a right to a trial by jury, or vice versa.

105. If this controversy is not resolved, there will be further litigation.

106. Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 105 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth. 

107. The judge-made doctrine of judicial immunity violates article V of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and is thus unlawful.\ / \ / \ /

108. There are actual controversies, which are set out below.
\
109. The first controversy is whether Article V of the Declaration of Rights, Part the First, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, trumps the judge-made doctrine of judicial immunity.

110. The second controversy is whether judge-made doctrine of judicial immunity  trumps Article V of the Declaration of Rights, Part the First, Constitution of  the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

111. If this controversy is not resolved, there will be further litigation.

112. Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 111 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth. 

113. There is an actual controversy, which is set out below.

114. The controversy is whether Article V of the Declaration of Rights, Part the First, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, trumps M.G.L. c. 231A, §2.

115. The lack of accountability, afforded by the bestowal of immunity from liability, is violative of Article V of the Massachusetts Declara¬tion of Rights. 

116. If this controversy is not resolved, there will be further litigation. 

117.  Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 116 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth. 

118. Section 2 of M.G.L. 231A interferes with the parties’ constitutional rights to resolve their dispute in a manner acceptable to all the entities who are parties to the underlying action. 

119. The court has been unlawfully overriding Johnson’s diverse constitutional rights, e.g., under article I of our Mass. Declaration of Rights; the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and clause 1 of section 10 of article 1 of the U.S. Constitution.

120. If this controversy is not resolved, there will be further litigation.

121. Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 120 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth. 

122. There is an actual controversy, which is set out below.

123. By denying Johnson the right to trial by jury, she has been deprived of her right under the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and under article XV of the Mass. Decla-ration of Rights.\ / 

124.  If this controversy is not resolved, there will be further litigation.

125. Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 124 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth.

126. There are actual controversies, including but not limited to, those set out below:

(a) whether Judge Cornetta’s noncompliance with Massachusetts Superior Court Rules 9A, et seq., is actionable by the Commission of Judicial Conduct

(b) whether Judge Cornetta’s noncompliance with Massachusetts Superior Court Rules 9A, et seq., is actionable by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

(c) whether Judge Cornetta’s noncompliance precludes him from being protected by absolute or judicial immunity

128. Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 127 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth.

129. There are actual controversies, including, but not limited to, whether Mother has a right to the full sweep of rights, privileges, immunities, due process and equal protection, including the First Amendment rights to political speech and free expression, and the right to defend herself against adversaries.  U.S.C. Const.Amend. 1, 14; M.G.L. Const. Pt. 1, Art. 10. 

130. As a result, acting under the color of state law, Judge Cornetta has worked a de-nial of Johnson's rights, privileges or immunities secured by the United States Constitution or by Federal law\ / and guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

131. Defendants unlawfully and knowingly also breached the court rules, the judicial canons, the amendments to the U.S. and Mass. constitutions, the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, \ / to wit, 

• Judge Cornetta does not have the power and/or authority or the discretion to usurp the function and powers of a jury,

• Judge Cornetta has ignored the common law, 

• Judge Cornetta has knowingly impeded and hindered the due course of justice, with the intent to deny Johnson due process and the equal protection of the laws, which unlawful acts were expressly committed in the absence of jurisdiction.

133. As a result of the concerted unlawful and malicious action of Judge Cornetta, Johnson is being deprived of her rights to both due process and the equal protection of the laws, her right to the due course of justice is being impeded, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States.

134. If the above-identified controversies are not resolved, there will be further litigation.

135. Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 134 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth.

136. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff had a right under the due process and equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions not to be deprived by the government of her constitutionally protected interest in her property, to wit, her freedom from wrongful governmental interference with her right to contract, her home, her money, and  her First Amendment right to seek a remedy from the court.  U.S.C. Const.Amend. 14; M.G.L. Const. Pt. 1, Art. 10. 

137. At all times relevant herein, the conduct of all defendants were subject to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988.\ / 

138. Given that Cornetta has not provided a date by which Rossetti must serve Mother his motion for summary judgment, Cornetta has deprived Mother Johnson of her right under the Massachusetts Superior Court rules, her constitutional rights, including but not limited to her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.

139. Given that Cornetta has set the hearing date of Marc and Yvonne’s summary judgment motion on the same date as the trial date, Cornetta has knowingly and intentionally—also maliciously, but the common law holds that judges may be malicious, and voluntarily, if he has not been intimidated or coerced by those at a higher level in the judicial system(s) to find against Mother—deprived Mother Johnson not only of her right under Appeals Court panel’s order to allow a trial but also of her constitutional rights, including but not limited to her rights to due process and equal protection.

140. If Cornetta does not allow the facts needed to determine issue of quantum meruit to go to the jury, Cornetta will not only be in contempt of the Appeals Court panel’s order to allow a trial but also be depriving Mother Johnson of her constitutional rights, including but not limited to her rights to due process and equal protection, and usurping the powers of the jury.

141. Acting under the color of state law, Defendants worked a denial of Johnson's rights, privileges or immunities secured by the United States Constitution or by Federal law and guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, to wit, 

(a) the defendants have unlawfully and knowingly impeded and hindered, and are continuing to impede and hinder, the due course of justice, with the intent to deny Johnson—and others similarly situated—due process and the equal protection of the laws, which unlawful acts were expressly committed in the absence of jurisdiction:

(b) the defendants have knowingly impeded and hindered, and are continuing to impede and hinder, the due course of justice by denying Johnson a trial by jury.

143. Johnson is being harmed and caused to suffer from worry about the stress, humiliation, anxiety, loss of trust, loss of confidence in and feelings of betrayal by the justice system, shock, and emotional scarring, all compensable as emotional distress, and other damages.\ / 

144. Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 143 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth.

145. The conspiratorial purpose was political retaliation. 

146. The first indication of invidious discrimination and retaliation for political ideas opposite those of the judiciary occurred on 27 June 2007 in footnote 2 of Judge Billings’ memorandum in which he wrote “The plaintiff, a recently disbarred attorney, is representing herself.  The defendants are represented by counsel.” 

147. The scheme of the conspiracy was (1) to declare that Mother had no evidence, (2) to preclude Mother from discovery, and (3) to call explicit attention to Mother’s disbarment, (4) to persuade all judges who might be on the case to retaliate against Mother, (5) to deny Mother a trial on her claims. 

148. The motives of each named and unnamed co-conspirator were not only to ingrati-ate himself with his brethren and but also to feather their career nest, which would eventually benefit each of them financially and economically. 

149. Defendants breached their professional duties by continuing to conspire to com-mit fraud upon Mother.

150. Judge Cornetta accepted the assignment to the case and made it abundantly clear on 12 August 2011 that he had joined the conspiracy by allowing the misconduct of Rossetti.

151. If Cornetta did not know the law upon which he based his order, he was either incompetent or intentionally acting outside of the scope of his judicial responsibilities. 

152. The misrepresentations were deliberate and were designed to produce a judgment that was favorable to the defendants in the underlying action.

153. The defendants intentionally interfered with Mother's exercise and enjoyment of her clear and established rights secured by the state and federal constitutions or laws of the United States and/or the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and thereby deprived her of those rights and caused her injuries. 

154. As a result of the concerted unlawful and malicious conspiracy of the named and unnamed co-conspirators, Mother was deprived of her rights to both due process and the equal protection of the laws, the due course of justice being impeded, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C. secs. 1983 and 1985. 

INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATORY ANIMUS: THE DISPARATE IMPACT\ /

155. In denying Mother her rights to discovery but allowing Marc and Yvonne their rights to discovery, according to a facially neutral scheme, the violation discriminated—by its disparate impact—against Mother because of both her age and her politics, and she was thereby deprived, indirectly or directly, of the equal protection of the laws, injured in her person and property and deprived of having and exercising rights and privileges of a citizen of the United States and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 

156. Another example of the invidiously discriminatory animus was the cessation of discovery by both Judge Billings and Judge Cornetta.

157. As a result of their concerted unlawful and malicious conspiracy of the defendants, Johnson was deprived of both her liberty without due process of law and her right to equal protection of the laws, and the due course of justice was impeded, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C. §§  1983 and 1985. 

158. Mother Johnson has been harmed and has been suffering from worry about her welfare were she to be deprived of her home, caused to incur considerable loss, and suffer from stress, feelings of hopelessness, humiliation, anxiety, fear for her safety and well-being, loss of trust, loss of confidence in and feelings of betrayal by the justice system, shock, and emotional scarring, all compensable as emotional distress, and other damages. 

159. Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 158 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth.

160. Defendants (a) had an object to be accomplished; (b) had an agreement on the object or course of action, to wit, to deprive Mother of her right to the equal protection of the laws, specifically, the right to conduct discovery and to be allowed her claims to a jury; (c) performed one or more unlawful overt acts; and (d) caused Mother damages that were a direct result of those acts. 

161. In furtherance of their object, Defendants did two or more overt acts against the plaintiffs. Those unlawful overt acts include, but are not limited to, the facts outlined in Count 10, supra, conspiracy under section 1985(3). 

162. All defendants are liable for their acts. 

163. Mother Johnson suffered harm and damages as a direct result of those acts. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Barbara Johnson prays that this Honorable court find:

1. that, under 231A, a judge acting outside or in excess of the scope of his jurisdiction is not protected by the umbrella of immunity, and may be liable for money damages,

2. that Massachusetts Superior Court Rules 9A, et seq., is constitutional and requires judges as well as parties to comply with them,

3. that all parties to a lawsuit are entitled to the full sweep of due process and equal protection of all the laws, including those under the First Amendment,

4. that Canon 2 (A,B) of the Code of Judicial Conduct is constitutional both facially and as applied and requires all judges to comply with Canon 2 as if it were common law, if not statutory in nature,

5. that Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is constitutional both facially and as applied, and requires all judges to comply with Canon 3 as if it were common law, if not statutory in nature,

6. that the defendants have violated § 1983 by depriving Johnson of due process and equal protection and of her right to her property,

7. that the defendants have violated § 1985(3) by conspiring to violate Johnson’s constitutional civil rights, 

8. that Johnson shall be awarded additional equitable relief from Judge Cornetta and the Commonwealth, for their incompetence, lawlessness, and deliberate indifference to the clearly established and secured constitutional rights of Mother, and if within the power of this court, instructions to the SJC to replace Cornetta with a competent and intelligent judge who is cognizant with the law, i.e., constitution, statutes, rules, and regulations, 

9. that the defendants have violated § 1983 by preventing or aiding in preventing the violation of Johnson’s constitutional civil rights, and by knowingly, recklessly, or with gross negligence failing or refusing to do so, 

10. that the plaintiff be awarded judgment against all the defendants, jointly and sev-erally, for actual, general, special, compensatory damages and further demands judgment against all defendants, jointly and severally, for exemplary or punitive damages\ / in an amount to be determined by the jury, plus the costs of this action, including attorney's fees, 

11. that the plaintiff be granted such other relief deemed to be just and fair and in any other way in which the Court deems appropriate. 
 

Barbara C. Johnson
/s/ barbjohnson74@gmail.com
14 September 2011  Barbara C. Johnson, Pro Se
Apdo #404-4013
Alajuela, Atenas, Atenas
20501-Costa Rica
barbjohnson74@gmail.com
SKYPE ID: barbjohnson74
SKYPEIN: 978-961-0079 (Newburyport, MA)
Costa Rican Landline: 506-2446-6724

The undersigned, being duly sworn, deposes and says that I am the Plaintiff herein, and have read the foregoing pleading filed on my behalf, and the facts stated therein are true.
 

14 September 2011                                 /s/barbjohnson74@gmail.com
 

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this ___ day of  September 2011.