The Bar War Continues Against Barb  Barb is Suing the  BBO [Board of Bar Overseers] in State and Federal Courts: Here is the State Complaint. Barb resents spending time on the battles because she could be helping people truly in need at this time. So Barb has taken the offensive.  She sued the BOARD OF BAR OVERSEERS and the OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL at the Mass. Supreme Judicial Court to test it.  As she expected, the SJC Judge Francis Xavier Spina dismissed the Complaint and the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction within a day. But she had her Complaint and Motion in U.S. District Court in Boston  literally a half-hour later. Here is the Complaint for State Court. The dismissal is a wonderful reason to be for the election of judges. COMING:  THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT FILED IN FEDERAL COURT. IT IS ALMOST THE SAME AS THE ONE FILED IN STATE COURT:  THE JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT DIFFERS AND   THERE ARE MANY COUNTS RAISING FEDERAL QUESTIONS. Go to Drano Series #108 to see the  Motion for Preliminary Injunction


 

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT                                                                                                     SINGLE-JUSTICE SESSION ----------------------------------------------------                                               CIVIL ACTION: _______________  Barbara C. Johnson, Esq.                                     Plaintiff  v.  Board of Bar Overseers of Massachusetts M. Ellen Carpenter, Esq., in her individual       and professional capacities, including her       capacity as Chair of the Board of Bar Overseers of Massachusetts Herbert P. Phillips, Esq., in his individual       and professional capacities, Office of Bar Counsel Daniel Crane, Esq., in his individual       and professional capacities, Commonwealth of Massachusetts                                     Defendants  ---------------------------------------------------- VERIFIED COMPLAINT (Plaintiff incorporates by reference the attached exhibits with the same force and effect as if herein set forth) INTRODUCTION This case arises out of a Petition of Discipline by Bar Counsel Daniel Crane ["Crane"] against Plaintiff, Barbara C. Johnson, Esq. ["Johnson"]. Johnson asserts that she as both a citizen and an attorney is entitled to the full sweep of due process and equal protection of all the laws. Johnson has brought actions for (1) a declaratory judgment (G.L. c 231A) that a bar disciplinary proceeding is a quasicriminal proceeding and that whether or not the proceeding is quasicriminal, respondents are entitled to a jury trial, (2) a declaratory judgment that the Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers are unconstitutional both facially and as applied for civil or quasicriminal proceedings, (3) a declaratory judgment that lawyers are entitled to the full sweep of due process and equal protection of all the laws, (4) declaratory judgment that §§ 9(1), 9(2), and 9(3) of Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01 are unconstitutional both facially and as applied (there is no scenario in which either the Board Rules or SJC Rule 4:01 §§9(1), 9(2), and 9(3) can be applied constitutionally), (5) declaratory judgment that §10 of SJC Rule 4:01 is unconstitutional both facially and as applied, and (6) declaratory judgment that Rule 1.5 of the Mass. Rules of Professional Conduct is unconstitutional on the grounds that it is too vague and too broad. JURISDICTION 1. The Supreme Judicial Court ["SJC"] has exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction over attorneys admitted to practice in this Commonwealth. S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 1, as amended. PARTIES 2. Your Plaintiff, Barbara C. Johnson ["Johnson"], who resides at 6 Appletree Lane, Andover, Essex County, MA 01810-4102, is (1) an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, (2) an attorney admitted to practice in the United States District Court at Boston and the First Circuit Court of Appeals, (3) an Internet publisher located at falseallegations.com, and (4) the Respondent in actions entered in Board of Bar Overseers as Nos. C2-01-0091, C2-01-0090, C2-00-0078, C2-98-0580. 3. Defendant Board of Bar Overseers of Massachusetts ["BBO"], located at 75 Federal Street, Boston, MA 02110, was established in 1974 by the Massachusetts SJC to ensure that the Canons of Ethics and Disciplinary Rules Regulating the Practice of Law are observed. It allegedly investigates and prosecutes complaints against lawyers, and administers and recommends to the SJC appropriate disciplinary action.  4. Defendant M. Ellen Carpenter ["Carpenter" or "Chair"], who is a resident of Massachusetts, has been, at all times relevant to this Complaint, (1) an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, (2) a partner of the lawfirm Roach & Carpenter, (3) chair person of the BBO, (4) a person who improperly conducted the affairs of the Commonwealth, and (5) accountable to Johnson and the people of the Commonwealth.\FN1 /   FN1 Com. v. Ellis, 429 Mass. 362, 371 (1999): "Article 5 [in Part the First, the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts], . . . provides that officers [including judges] of government `are at all times accountable to [the people].'"  5. Defendant Herbert P. Phillips ["Phillips"], who resides at 2 Skipper Way, Gloucester, Essex County, MA 01930, has been, at all times relevant to this Complaint has been (1) an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, (2) a partner of the lawfirm Phillips Gerstein Holber & Channen, (3) Special Hearing Office at the BBO, (4) a person who improperly conducted the affairs of the Commonwealth, and (5) accountable to Johnson and the people of the Commonwealth. 6. Defendant Office of Bar Counsel ["OBC"], located at 75 Federal Street, Boston, MA 02110I, is the prosecutorial arm of the BBO and is also funded by annual registration fees. . It allegedly investigates and prosecutes complaints against lawyers. 7. Defendant Daniel Crane ["Bar Counsel"], who is a resident of Massachusetts, has been, at all times relevant to this Complaint, (1) an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, (2) Bar Counsel, (3) a person who improperly conducted the affairs of the Commonwealth, and (4) accountable to Johnson and the people of the Commonwealth. 8. Defendant Commonwealth of Massachusetts [Commonwealth"] is a body politic that is formed by a voluntary association of individuals, and "is a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each Citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain Laws for the Common good" [Preamble. Massachusetts Constitution] and as an association, according to M.G.L. c. 4 §7, is a person for all purposes under all laws. FACTS NOTE All but three of the exhibits bear their "Docket Sheet Paper Number" and are in the addendum in chronological order. 9. The BBO assembles from time to time a quasijudicial court.  10. The BBO’s General Counsel, who at all times relevant to this Complaint has been Michael Fredrickson, reports to "the Board." 11. The 12 members of the BBO are appointed by the SJC. 12. Chair Carpenter is a friend and former colleague and partner of SJC Justice Martha B. Sosman.\FN2/ FN2 The Executive Director of the State Ethics Commission is Christine Roach, past and present partner of the Roach & Carpenter lawfirm with BBO Chair Carpenter and also a former colleague and partner of SJC Justice Sosman. The commission governs the conduct of public employees and elected officials and is, ironically, responsible for enforcing and administering the conflict of interest and financial disclosure laws, which apply to those employees and officials. 13. Bar Counsel Crane of the OBC reports to the SJC. 14. On 24 January 2003, Bar Counsel filed a Petition for Discipline\FN3/ against Johnson [Exhibit A, Docket Sheet]. FN3 The Petition for Discipline had three counts: one count for each of three separate and distinct matters. For convenience, the first was the Linnehan matter, the second was the Sano matter, and the third was the Coughlin matter. 15. The author of the petition was Assistant Bar Counsel Susan Strauss-Weisberg. 16. According to General Counsel Fredrickson, the requisite approval of the petition before it was filed in the BBO was given by BBO member Attorney Elizabeth M. Mulvey,\FN4/who became the Reviewing Board Member.   FN4 Initially General Counsel Michael Fredrickson told Johnson that it was he who had "approved" the petition, but in October 2003, he told Johnson that it was Mulvey who approved the petition and that she was now recused from the case. Someone made the decision to follow Section 3.54 of the Board Rules . 17. The Complainant of Count I\FN5/ was the child's mother, who ran for public office and on election day, both blamed her loss on Johnson's website and filed the complaint at the Bar.   FN5 Count I of the petition swirls around Linnehan’s custody and paternity case about which Johnson filed a Complaint in federal court. In the Linnehan Complaint, Johnson chastised a judge for depriving the father of his parental rights for over a decade without due process and equal protection. After filing the Complaint in federal court, Johnson published it on her website at falseallegations.com/bbo-drano90-answer-count-one-linnehan.doc. In Count II,\FN6/ Bar Counsel averred (a) that Johnson commingled funds by depositing Sanos’ money into her personal rather than into her IOLTA account. [Pet. ¶ 71], (b) that "the fees charged and collected by [Johnson] in the [Sano] matter were clearly excessive" [Pet. ¶ 82], and (c).that Johnson published confidential material re the Sanos without their consent. [Pet ¶ 91].\FN7/   FN6 Count II is concerned with a "consultation" matter. Johnson never made an appearance in court for any of the Sanos. The background: Four indictments had issued charging Deb Sano’s husband with sexual crimes and assault of the couple’s youngest and mentally challenged daughter. At the age of 15 months, the daughter suffered a stroke. At the time of the indictments, the daughter was around 28 years old chronologically but only around 1½ years old mentally. The daughter had been in the custody of the Department of Mental Retardation for around eight years. The parents had been restrained from seeing the daughter. The entire Sano family was pleased with Johnson’s services and sent emails to Johnson relaying their gratitude [Figures 1, 2, and 3 below]. And Complainant Deb Sano gave her consent to publication of the family story on Johnson’s website [Figure 3]. Whether Deb Sano’s consent was implicit or explicit is a fact for a jury to decide. Johnson received approximately $10,700, but realizing that the family faced considerable legal expense to defend against the criminal charges and to prosecute civil cases, Johnson deeply discounted her fees and in December 1999, returned approximately $3200 to Deb Sano. Deb Sano then complained to Johnson that she wanted to pay Johnson for only one hour and 36 minutes of time and to have Johnson return more money [Figure 4]. Johnson suggested to Deb Sano that the fee dispute be arbitrated. Instead of responding to Johnson’s offer to participate in arbitration, Deb Sano complained four months later – around April 2000 -- to the Bar. FN7 After Weisberg let Johnson know that charges would be brought, Johnson placed her bill to the Sanos and her responses to Weisberg on her website, at falseallegations.com/bbo-drano90-answer-count-two-sano.doc, so that the public could decide for themselves whether Johnson’s fees were excessive. More offensive is that the BBO puts up on its Internet that disciplinary proceedings are pending and then alleges that Johnson violated Bar rules when defending herself against false accusations. 18. Johnson averred (a) that she had already earned the money by the time she deposited it into her personal account [Am.Ans. ¶ 71], (b) that her fees were not excessive [Am.Ans. ¶ 82], and (c) that Johnson had the consent given by Deb Sano to publish the story on her website and published only those parts relevant to the dispute initiated by Sano [see Figure 1 following para 74 below, excerpt from an email dated 12 December 1999 at 19:03]. 19. In both Counts I and II of his petition,, Crane averred that Johnson published confidential material on her website and thereby harmed people.\FN8/ FN8 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. (Conn.) 479, 487 (1965), quoting Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (freedom of speech and of the press, protected by First Amendment, are fundamental personal rights and liberties protected by due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by States). Snyder v. Com. of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (same). 20. In Count III,\FN9/ Crane alleged that Johnson was jailed to force payment of funds allegedly ordered on 3 March 1995 to be paid. Pet. ¶ 124. FN9 Count III arose out of a whistleblower, wrongful termination case. During its prosecution in March 1995, eight years ago, Johnson was found in contempt of a non-existent order. Am.Ans. ¶ 108, 111, et al. After the labyrinthine proceedings of a Rube Goldberg remand case -- up and down the ladder of the courts several times -- the finding of contempt against Johnson was not vacated. On 17 December 1998, Johnson was ordered to jail because she said No to Judge Paul McGill, who had found her in contempt. She remained jailed for 24 hours. The Complainant of Count III in the petition was Judge McGill. 21.  Not only was Crane’s allegation untrue [Am.Ans. ¶ 124], but he knew it was untrue: his own exhibit to the petition proves otherwise. 22. Crane wants to put in his case for Count I through documents including, but not limited to, (a) the written complaint of the mother, Robyn, and Attorney Deborah Wolf and (b) letters from Assistant Bar Counsel to Johnson. 23.  Crane wants to put in his case for Count II through documents including, but not limited to, (a) the written complaint of the wife, Deb Sano and (b) letters from Assistant Bar Counsel to Johnson. 24.  Crane wants to put in his case for Count III through documents including, but not limited to, (a) the judicial memoranda, decisions, and orders from the labyrinthine proceedings for his case-in-chief\FN10/ and (b) letters from Assistant Bar Counsel to Johnson. FN10 Assistant Bar Counsel Susan Strauss-Weisberg ["Weisberg"] wrote Johnson saying that she might not call any witnesses for the Bar Counsel’s case-in-chief [Exh. B]. 25.  In Count I, Crane (a) has not identified with any particularity the offending language or the people allegedly actionably harmed and (b) has no intention of calling the mother-candidate, Robyn Gerry-Sylvia, or Linnehan son, Brenden, now in his majority – despite the fact that they are named in the OBC’s proposed list of witnesses. 26. In Count I, Crane also intentionally misrepresented that Johnson put onto her website documents Johnson had not put on her website. 27.  In Count II, Crane failed to identify (a) how much of the amount Johnson charged the Sanos is excessive and (b) the task(s) for which they allege Johnson overcharged the Sanos. 28.  In Count II, Crane also intentionally failed to acknowledge in the Petition for Discipline any of the facts or documents whatsoever in mitigation, although the OBC’s agents had copies of (a) each and every email sent from all the Sanos to Johnson and each and every email John sent to the Sanos and three of their married daughters and sons-in-law, including (b) the email in which Deb Sano had given her consent to publication of the family’s story on Johnson’s website [Pet. ¶91] and (c) the detailed, itemized accounting Johnson provided the Sanos. 29.  In Count III, Crane intentionally failed to acknowledge in the Petition for Discipline any of the facts or documents whatsoever in mitigation, although the OBC’s agents had scoured and copied each and every document in each and every file of or arising out of the Coughlin matter (including that involving Mark C. O’Connor and Johnson) in Concord District Court, Middlesex Superior Court, the Appeals Court, and the SJC. 30.  To force the disclosure of the facts raised in ¶¶ 26 and 28 above and other necessary facts, Johnson filed two motions for more definite statements, Weisberg opposed one of them; and SHO Phillips denied both of them [Papers 48 (8/26), 69 (9/9/03)); the opposition in Paper 62 (9/9/03); the denials in Papers 79 (9/16/03)]. 31.  Without witnesses, no cross-examination by Johnson will be possible, for Johnson cannot cross-examine a piece of paper. 32.  Johnson moved for authorization to take depositions and was denied [Paper 18 (06/24/03)]. 33.  The Board Rules also do not allow discovery, e.g., interrogatories or depositions, by a Respondent [Exh C]. 34.  The BBO, through an Assistant General Counsel, Carol Wagner, at the first prehearing conference, informed Johnson that the M.G.L. c. 30A, the Administrative Procedure Act, applies to BBO proceedings. 35.   On 4 November 2003, Johnson filed a motion, pursuant to Board Rule 4.5(a), requesting the issuance of subpoenas [Paper 90 (11/04/03)], but by 13 November 2003, Johnson had not yet received a decision from the BBO. 36.  Board Rule 4.5, Hearing for Subpoenas, provides that a respondent "may" request the assigned fact-finder or the entire Board to issue subpoenas but does not make it mandatory that a respondent request those entities to issue subpoenas, leaving it open to the respondent to choose whether to ask one of the named entities to issue subpoenas or to issue the subpoenas as a litigant does in a court with a judge who has been sworn in under oath to perform his or judicial duties. 37.  Massachusetts G.L. c. 30A, §12(3) gives any party to the adjudicatory hearing the right to issue subpoenas in the name of the agency conducting the proceeding. The party may have such subpoenas issued by a notary public or justice of the peace, or he may make written application to the agency, which shall forthwith issue the subpoenas requested. 38.  But BBO General Counsel, Michael Fredrickson, on Monday, 10 November 2003, informed Johnson that the Board Rules 4.5 and 4.6 overrule M.G.L. c. 30A, so that the State Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to BBO proceedings. 39.  Fredrickson intimated, in that November 12th conversation, in words for all intents and purposes, Do not bother to serve subpoenas because the special hearing officer will not allow your witnesses to testify if the BBO does not want to hear from them. 40.  While a sitting justice may, indeed, allow or disallow proposed witnesses to testify, Johnson was left with the impression -- because he inferred wrongly that c. 30A and Board Rules 4.5 and 4.6 were in conflict ---- that Johnson should expect that most of the witnesses she wants to subpoena will not be allowed to testify.\FN11/ FN11 Johnson has the right to summons and call witness under G.L. c. 233, §§ 1-6. Com. v. Graves, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 76, 84 ( 1993). Ulterior Motive of Bad-Faith Prosecution and Selective Enforcement 41,  The OBC selectively prosecutes attorneys about fees and fee disputes [Exh.D, a letter from Asst. Bar Counsel Arcos to a member of the complaining public]. 42.  The OBC chose Johnson for "selective prosecution, even though the fee dispute was de minimus. 43.  On 7 November 2003, Bar Counsel pregnantly denied the selective prosecution of Johnson and forewent proceedings against other attorneys for similar or related misconduct. [Paper xx, Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses (11/07/03)]. 44.  Assistant Bar Counsel Christa Arcos, an agent for the OBC, wrote to a member of the public, fee disputes are not generally within the jurisdiction of this office"[Exh.D]. 45.   Recently, on 27 October 2003, approximately 10 months after the petition for discipline was served, Bar Counsel identified to Johnson the webpages of which he complains: namely, Drano ##5, 9,12, 14, 15, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 31, 32, 37, 39, 42, 43, 44, 65, 66, 69, 70, 72, 73, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84a [Paper xx, (October 27, 2003, Bar Counsel’s Preliminary Disclosures, filed 11/12/03)]. 46.  The ulterior motive of the Bar Counsel is to censor Johnson’s website, and arises from Johnson’s exercise of her First Amendment right to political speech and free expression, as well as her right and obligation to see that justice is done, by publishing on her website information related to the unscrupulous acts of the now-retired Judge Ronald D. Harper and other court-appointed persons. 47.  Well aware of their untempered, extraordinary powers, the BBO and the OBC concluded that it is easier to cenSURe Johnson than to cenSOR the website. Motion for Trial by Jury 48.  Through her counsel, Johnson moved for a jury trial, and it was denied by Special Hearing Officer ["SHO"] Herbert P. Phillips [Papers 20 (6/24/03) and 28 (7/03/03)]. 49.  Upon deciding to represent herself, Johnson filed a motion to reconsider her motion for a jury [Paper 35 (7/22/03)]. 50.  Argument was heard at a pretrial conference on 22 July 2003. SHO Phillips graciously agreed to reconsider the motion, gave Assistant Bar Counsel Weisberg time to oppose, promised to make a decision within a week or 10 days after receipt of the opposition, and provided the parties with copies of the pretrial agreement and a schedule of due dates within a day or two of the hearing [¶3 of Paper 40 (7/23/03)]. 51.  Within a day, however, of the pretrial conference, Johnson received a copy of the first-page of her motion with the endorsement "Denied" on it. It had been decided by the Chair Carpenter [Papers 43, ¶3 of document entitled "Order" (7/25/03)]. 52.  Other than the power to scold, fine, or imprison jurors, who do not exist in the world of the BBO, Carpenter appears to have most of the powers that the Star Chamber did have: e.g., the power to dictate which witnesses may be subpoenaed by a respondent to trial. 53.  Upon the unexpected receipt of Carpenter’s ruling on the motion for a jury trial, Johnson immediately phoned Fredrickson both to inform him of the discrepancy and to query him as to how and why it occurred. 54.  Much to Fredrickson’s credit, within a day, Carpenter wrote Johnson saying that she "acted precipitously" [Paper 46 (7/29/03)]. 55.  Carpenter not only had "acted precipitously" but also had usurped the power of the SHO and had violated Board Rule 3.18(a). 56.  Rule 3.18(a) required the motion to be "submitted to a member of the Board for determination." Fredrickson had not designated a Board member to receive Johnson’s motions. It appeared that he designated himself or his administrative assistant. 57.  Rule 3.18(a) required the designated Board member to refer Johnson’s motion for determination to the chair of the assigned hearing committee, but there was no committee; or to the hearing panel, but there was none; or to the special hearing officer, but it was not referred to Phillips. Instead, Carpenter decided the motion. 58.  On the same day – 29 July 2003 -- that Carpenter wrote the "acted precipitously" letter, Bar Counsel decided to put into the record some opposition to Johnson’s motion to reconsider the denial of trial by jury, but Bar Counsel and Weisberg did that not by a formal pleading, but by a letter [Paper 45 (7/29/03)]. 59.  Subsequently, Johnson supplemented her brief in reply to Bar Counsel’s opposition to her motion for a jury trial [Paper 53 (8/26/03)]. 60.  Waiting for a determination from SHO Phillips on the jury-trial motion, Johnson phoned Fredrickson again. "That’s not going anywhere," he said. "I’d be astonished if it did. . . . No way in hell you’ll get a jury trial." 61.  Fredrickson was correct. Within a day or two after Johnson’s call to Fredrickson, SHO Phillips denied Johnson’s Motion to Reconsider Motion for Trial by Jury [Paper 78 (9/16/03)]. 62.  Such a response raised the question, then, Who was doing the decision-making? Who is at someone’s beck and call? Who is the someone? 63.  The secret, harsh, and arbitrary process resembles that of the Star Chamber.\FN12/ FN12 There is even some comic relief provided by the Board Rules. In accordance with Board Rule 3.5(b), Johnson bound each of her pleadings with staples or in a three-ring binder when the ¾-inch staples were inadequate. But she since has been informed by Fredrickson’s "Legal Administrative Assistant" June D. Risk not to bind them [Exh. C (8./25/03)]. 64.  Pursuant to Rule 1.2, someone – ostensibly "the Board" -- appointed Special Hearing Officer Phillips to hear charges of misconduct because "in view of the anticipated length of the hearing or for other reasons. 65.  The pretext for appointing a Special Hearing Officer was "that a speedy and just disposition would be better accomplished by such appointment than by referring the matter to a hearing committee or panel of the Board." See Board Rule 1.2. 66.  The real reason for appointing only one person rather than a panel appears to be that it is easier for Carpenter and Fredrickson to control the course of events, for example, the decisions on motions.\FN13/ FN13 Justice Black wrote, in words for all intents and purposes, the goal of a tyrannical government is to deprive its citizens of independence. In that way, they become "nothing more than parrots of the views of whatever group wields governmental power at the moment." Cohen, at 138. 67.  Johnson has no knowledge as to who actually did appoint Phillips – whether it was the Board or Chair Carpenter or Fredrickson or some as-yet-unidentified personage. 68.  Johnson does not know in advance who is going to decide the motions she submits. Another Violation of Rule 3.18(a) by the Chair Deciding Nondispositive Motions 69.  Johnson filed (1) a Motion for Order that Board Rule 3.18(a) Is to Be Followed, so as to Preclude Chair from Deciding Ostensibly Nondispositive Motion [Paper 49 (8/26/03)] and (2) a Motion to Preclude Chair from Sitting on any Committee or Deciding any Motion in These Actions [Paper 50 (8/26/03)]. 70.  Bar Counsel opposed the two motions named in ¶69 immediately above [Papers 63 and 64 (both 9/09/03)]. 71.  Chair Carpenter decided both motions to preclude described in ¶69 [Papers 74 and 75 (both 9/10/03)]. Another Rule 3.18(a) Motion, Finally Decided by SHO Phillips 72.  One of Johnson’s motions was to declare Count II on the grounds that the consent by the Sanos, or Parkers (Bar-supplied pseudonym), to publication of their story on Johnson’s website constituted a waiver of confidentiality [Paper 51 (8/26/03)]. 73.  Bar Counsel opposed the motion for a declaration of waiver of confidentiality [Paper 65 (9/09/03)]. 74.  The alleged implicit or explicit permission or consent had been given Johnson in am email on 12 December 1999 from the wife [Figure 1].   Subject: RE: Accounting finished Date: Sun, 12 Dec 1999 19:03:58 –0500 From: "dsano" dsano@bcn.net To: "Barbara C. Johnson" barbaracjohnson@worldnet.att.net Dear Barbara, Thanks. Know that your are not on our payroll anymore but would love to be able to keep you posted. Who knows we may someday be a story on your wonderful educational web site. <Numerous paragraphs redacted> We will be forever grateful for your help and concern. You have given us great hope and re-instilled out courage to fight. <Redaction> D&H Figure 1 75.  At the time, Johnson had not published the Sano story on her website. 76.  Johnson published her bill to the Sanos and some of the information for her defense only after the wife complained to the Bar that she wanted more money back than Johnson had returned. 77.  The Bar then declared the publication to be an unwarranted publication. 78.  Johnson disagreed that publication of the bill and some of the surrounding facts were unwarranted. She had a constitutional right to defend herself, and where the BBO made the disciplinary proceeding public on their Internet website, Johnson had and still has the right to defend her reputation publicly. 79.  SHO Phillips denied Johnson’s motion to declare Deb Sano’s consent to publication constituted a waiver of confidentiality [Paper 80 (9/16/03)]. Motions to Dismiss: Under Board Rule 3.18(b) 80.  Under Board Rule 3.18(b), all motions to dismiss the petition for discipline or any charges contained therein are to be determined by the Chair of the Board or the Chair’s designee. (a) Motion to Dismiss Count II: Privilege Does Not Apply in Attorney-Client Disputes 81.  Another of Johnson’s motions to dismiss Count II was on the grounds that privilege did not apply to disputes between a client and an attorney and that Johnson had a right to defend herself [Paper 59 (9/05/03)]. 82.  Despite Bar Counsel not opposing Johnson’s motion re the privilege in an attorney-client dispute, Chair Carpenter issued a summary denial of Johnson’s motion to dismiss Count II [Paper 60 (9/08/03)].\FN14/ FN14 The reasonable conclusion is that Carpenter upholds privilege in the face of a fee dispute. 83.  Subsequently Johnson filed a motion to reconsider the motion to dismiss on grounds that privilege did not apply to disputes between attorney and client [Paper 70 (9/10/03)]. 84.  The Chair then allowed the motion to reconsider but issued another naked denial of Johnson’s second motion to dismiss Count II on the no-privilege grounds [Paper 82 (9/30/03)]. Motion to Dismiss Count III: Prejudicial Delay 85.  The other motion was to dismiss Count III on the grounds that during the 5-8 year delay in bringing a disciplinary action, the tape of a necessary hearing was overwritten by the Commonwealth and an eyewitness passed away [Paper 52 (8/26/03)].\FN15/ FN15 Johnson’s contention was that although confidences must not be disclosed if they are not relevant to the defense, they may be disclosed if they are relevant to the defense of the charge. See Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1125, 95 S.Ct. 811 (1975). In such circumstances, "the attorney-client privilege may be treated as waived at least in part." Id. at 336. The motion to dismiss also included State legal citations, including Com. v. Brito, 390 Mass. 112 (1983), Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 (1991), Com. v. Woodberry, 26 Mass.App.Ct. 636 (1988), and Darius v. City of Boston, 433 Mass. 274 (2001). 86.  Bar Counsel’s opposition did not address the issue of the prejudice resulting from the loss or destruction of the tape of a critical proceeding five years ago\FN16/ or the death of a critical eyewitness within the intervening five years [Paper 67 (9/9/03)]. FN16 The critical proceeding occurred on 17 December 1998. 87.  Chair Carpenter denied the motion to dismiss Count III and then added that the SHO Phillips will have to determine whether there was prejudicial delay [Paper 71 (9/10/03)]. 88.  Johnson did plead laches as an affirmative defense. 89.  Other grounds for dismissal of Count III were based on an ex parte communication having occurred between the judge and opposing counsel [Pet. ¶122]and a material document having been physically altered by what appears to be a combined effort by the local district court motion judge and the former opposing counsel [See Figures 7(a-e)]. 90.  The issue of the ex parte communication was not addressed by the Chair, Carpenter, or SHO Phillips. Motion for Protection Order: Which Applies: Rule 3.18(a) or 3.22(c)? 91.  In Bar Counsel’s motion, Weisberg did not distinguish between a protection order and an order of impoundment as to Counts I and II [Paper 13 (5/29/03)]. 92.  Bar Counsel’s motion, written by Weisberg, was not only a motion for a "protective order" but also a motion for impoundment a motion to censor Johnson’s website a motion to enjoin Johnson’s political and free speech and a motion for secret hearings 93.  Weisberg and Bar Counsel failed to do the following: failed to acknowledge and identify the standards to be followed when determining such potpourri motions as Bar Counsel’s, failed to show good cause, failed to follow the procedures for impoundment, failed to state the authority giving the Bar the right to censor Johnson’s website and stifle her political speech and free expression, failed to state the scope of the website censorship sought, failed to state how the censorship was to be implemented, failed to state the authority giving the Bar permission to override Johnson’s First Amendment rights, failed to identify those documents which Bar Counsel wants to prevent disclosure and those which he wants to impound, and failed to provide copies to Johnson of those documents which Bar Counsel wants to prevent disclosure and those which he wants to impound. . 94.  Johnson opposed Bar Counsel’s potpourri motion on Counts I and II [Paper 55 (8/27/03)]. 95.  Johnson also moved to strike the motion for a protective order [Paper 54 (8/26/03)] not only because of its inherent flaws but also because the common law supported Johnson’s contentions regarding impoundment, §13 of c. 209C, First Amendment, and censorship. 96.  Bar Counsel did oppose Johnson’s motion to strike the protective order [Paper 66 (9/9/03)]. 97.  Despite all the flaws in Bar Counsel’s motion for a protective order , Chair Carpenter allowed Bar Counsel and Weisberg’s motion for a so-called protective order [Paper 73 (9/10/03)] and denied Johnson’s motion to strike [Paper 72 (9/10/03)]. 98.  But according to Rule 3.18(a), nondispositive motions are to be determined by the hearing panel or hearing officer, not by the Chair. 99.  In response to Johnson’s inquiry about the noncompliance with Rule 3.18(a), Fredrickson pointed to Rule 3.22(c). 100.  But Rule 3.22(c), as well as 3.22(b)(2), presumes that "the Board" issues a protective order. 101.  And Rule 3.22(b)(3) presumes the SJC issues the protective order. 102.  We’ve done it that way ever since I’ve been here," Fredrickson replied, in words for all intents and purposes.\FN17/ FN17 To a similar excuse in Cohen, Justice Black wrote: . . . This argument -- that constitutional rights are to be determined by long-standing practices rather than the words of the Constitution -- is not, as the majority points out, a new one. It lay at the basis of two of this Court's more renowned decisions -- Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 [1857], and Plessy v. Ferguson, <>163 U.S. 537 [1896]. But cf.Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 [1954]. The notion that a violation of the plain language of the Constitution can gain legal stature by long-continued practice is not one I can subscribe to. A majority group, as de Tocqueville observed, too often "claims the right not only of making the laws, but of breaking the laws it has made." De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 1, at 261 Cohen, at 142 n.23 (dissenting). 103.  Johnson reminded Fredrickson that none of the subsections of Rule 3.22 gives Ellen Carpenter the authority as Chair to rule on a motion for a protective order. 104.  Fredrickson’s explanation was that the Chair can appoint herself to act for the Board. 105.  Johnson told him, in words for all intents and purposes having the meaning, "But the rules make a distinction between ‘the Chair’ and ‘the Board,’ and she’s not acknowledging that. Every word has meaning." 106.  Johnson "asked Fredrickson, "How long have you been there?" 107.  Fredrickson replied, "Since 1989." 108.  Johnson commented to him, "Well, you’ve been doing it wrong that long." 109.  If Rule 3.22(c) is as Carpenter and Fredrickson are interpreting it, Rule 3.22(c) is in conflict with Rules 3.18(a) and 3.18(b). 110.  If Rule 3.22(c) is interpreted literally in accordance with the words used and the definitions given in Rule 1.2, then the 12 Board members, people appointed from time to time by the SJC, must determine the motion. 111.  Johnson had seven days within which to appeal Carpenter’s decision. But it would have been futile: Johnson’s views on the need for judicial accountability and the need for court reform are well-known to the courts, the BBO and OBC are the SJC’s offspring, Carpenter’s colleague and former partner is sitting on the SJC bench that appointed her to the Board, and Johnson had recently brought a few cases to the SJC, but the SJC made what Johnson perceived to be unconscionable decisions on those few cases.\FN18/ .    FN18 For details of author’s recent SJC cases, see falseallegations.com/drano88-abend-rule-27-letter-to-appeals-court.htm In Abend v. Myerson et al, the jury awarded approximately $250,000, but despite the trial judge having dismissed the counterclaim, he allowed the subtraction of a sum requested in the counterclaim. In effect, that ruling allowed "Gimbels" to lessen its debt to Abend by a sum "Macy’s" had given her. To top it off, SJC Justice Roderick L. Ireland unjustifiably, if not viciously, awarded the multimillion dollar defendant estate attorneys’ fees for a Rule 27.1 appeal. Johnson believes the award was to smite Johnson’s crusade to abolish judicial immunity. Abend is little, old, still hard-working lady over 70 years old whom the decedent did not pay for her extraordinary services she rendered to him for the last five years of his life, when he was failing from ill health (cancer, diabetes, etc.). He also did not pay into social security. Shame on the courts. falseallegations.com/drano87-gordon-rule-27-letter-to-appeals-court.htm In Cholfin v. Gordon, Gordon represented that he was Cholfin’s lawyer and put an attorney’s lien on her case, but he was not her lawyer. When Gordon moved to compel her phone number, Judge James McHugh wrote in his decision that Gordon should look it up in the phone book. And although Judge McHugh also declared the case ready for trial, Judge Wendi Gershengorn curiously. if not suspiciously (her husband is a well-known doctor), gave Gordon the summary judgment sought by his malpractice-insurance lawyers. Gershengorn found Cholfin’s case to be frivolous. Cholfin appealed but got no relief. Proposition: Let any lawyer put a lien on any stranger’s case. The higher courts do not mind the serious transgression of either the defendant lawyer or the rascally judge. falseallegations.com/drano94-restraining-order-in-another-state.htm The court refused to stop a trial of for a non-existent crime and wrote, in effect, let the man appeal after conviction. (This occurs when a DA misuses a previously uninterpreted and badly-written statute to hold onto a nonmeritorious case and then the SJC refuses to interpret it BEFORE trial.) Fortunately, a second district court judge chastised the ADA and dismissed the case after the 211:3 did not work. Fortunately, a jury acquitted another of Johnson’s clients – Meuse -- in minutes after a 5-day trial because of a similar circumstance . . . where the Court refused to interpret the statute and stop the unlawful prosecution. The Courts and the DAs have no right to complain of a cut budget. They waste the money that could be put to better use. They, like the Katzenjammer Kids, brought it upon themselves., and likely shall continue to do so until the legislature is better-informed in the practice of law and there is serious court reform. Motion to Preclude 112.  Bar Counsel also brought a motion to preclude Johnson from contesting the allegations of Count III of Petition for Discipline [Paper 12 (5/22/03)]. 113.  Johnson opposed Bar Counsel’s motion for preclusion [Paper 57 (8/29/03)] and Bar Counsel replied [Paper 68 (9/09/03)]. 114.  Chair Carpenter allowed Bar Counsel’s motion for issue preclusion of allegations of Count III [Paper 76 (9/10/03)] and then corrected her order [Paper 77 (9/11/03)]. 115.  In allowing the motion to preclude, Carpenter usurped the power of Special Hearing Officer Phillips, as identified in Rule 3.18(a). 116.  The motive of Carpenter and likely persons unidentified was to preclude Johnson from showing that the lower-court orders were not only "bad," they were based on fabricated facts and findings and on, literally, a materially altered document [see Figures 2(a-e)]. Figure 2(a): Note the words "filed open court  3-03-95" at the top of the paper. Note the two date-stamps, particularly the topmost one.  Are the numerals 22 or 03??? \FN19/ FN19 AFTER Johnson argued on March 22d that no such order  issued on March 3d and AFTER a diligent clerk had typed the March 22 endorsement into the docket sheet, McGill had to have changed the little rubber wheel on his date-stamp and added the top endorsement. If the lower endorsement had not already been on the page, he would not have had to squinch up his signature to avoid overwriting the words "After further." If the upper endorsement had been on the page on March 3d, it would have appeared in the March 7th Disposition Notice.  It was not included in that notice. If the upper endorsement had been on the page on March 3d, it would have appeared in the docket sheet entries for March 3d.  It is NOT in the docket sheet entries for March 3d. If the upper endorsement had been on the page on March 22d, it would have appeared in the docket sheet entries for March 22d.  It is NOT in the docket sheet entries for March 22d.   In fact, it appears nowhere in the docket sheets. If the notations "62.6" and "92-7907" were on the page on March 3d, they would have been there on March 22d, but they are not. Bar Counsel should have reported McGill to the Commission on Judicial Conduct.  Next look at another version of the endorsement on Motion 157 in Exhibit 2(b).  It was altered by opposing counsel, Mark O'Connor.   Compare the scanned in images of the fabricated document with the original endorsed page.  Criminal charges should be brought against O’Connor.     Excerpt from Figure 2(b).  Newly fabricated endorsement. Note the  missing bottom loop of the "g" in "hearing"  and the tail of the "M" in "McGill" still  between the typed words "counsel" and "or."    Excerpt from Figure 2(c). Enlargement of endorsement. The tail of the "M" between "counsel" and "or" is more visible as well the other residual marks – left over from the days of "White-out." Excerpt from Figure 2(d). Compare the date stamp with that in Figure 2(e) Excerpt from Figure 2(e) 117.  The Board Rules are written in contemplation that a respondent to a petition for discipline will have facts in mitigation. 118.  Rule 3.15(f) requires that mitigation be pled. Rule 3.15(f) is the equivalent, one presumes, of an affirmative defense, which means that it must be pled or it is forfeited. And Johnson pled mitigation.\FN20/ FN20 "There is something specially repugnant to justice in using rules of practice in such a manner as to debar a prisoner from defending himself, especially when the professed object of the rules so used is to provide for his defense." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 822-823 (1975), quoting 1 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, 341-342 (1883). 119.  When Johnson phoned Fredrickson and asked when to expect the rulings on a pile of her own motions, he said, "They just went out. You’ll have them by tomorrow." 120.  Johnson question him, "Denied, are they?" 121.  Fredrickson responded, "You didn’t expect anything else, did you?" 122.  "I guess not. . . . As I’ve been saying, Due process went out the window a while ago. You really are running a Star Chamber there." 123.  "It’s due," Fredrickson said, in a voice dripping with condemnation. "It’s due."\FN21/ FN21 The majority is holding . . . that lawyers are not entitled to the full sweep of due process protections because they had no such protections against judges or their fellow lawyers in England. But I see no reason why this generation of Americans should be deprived of a part of its Bill of Rights on the basis of medieval English practices that our Forefathers left England, fought a revolution and wrote a Constitution to get rid of. Cohen, at 142 (Justice Black, with whom Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas concurred, dissenting). Fearing that the majority opinion in Cohen implied that "a lawyer is not to have the protection of the First Amendment with regard to his private beliefs and associations whenever his exercise of those freedoms might interfere with his duty to ‘co-operate’ with a judge’" [id. at 145], they concurred. It seems to me that the majority takes a fundamentally unsound position when it endorses a practice based upon the artificial notion that rights and privileges can be stripped from a man in his capacity as a lawyer without affecting the rights and privileges of that man as a man. Id. at 145 (dissent). COUNT 1: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (that Bar disciplinary proceeding is a quasicriminal proceeding and  that whether or not the proceeding is quasicriminal,  respondents are entitled to a jury trial) 124.  Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 123 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth. 125.  There are two actual controversies: (1) whether a Bar disciplinary proceeding is a quasicriminal proceeding and (2) whether attorney respondents, including Johnson, are entitled to a jury trial, regardless of whether the proceeding is quasicriminal or civil. 126.  By denying Johnson the right to trial by jury, she is being deprived of her rights under article XV of the Mass. Declaration of Rights. 127.  The United States Supreme Court declared disbarment proceedings to be of a "quasi-criminal nature." In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. (Ohio) 544, 551 (1968); Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.(N.J.) 423, 438 (1982) (Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment). 128.   The quasicriminal nature of the proceedings triggers article XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, allowing Johnson to present all proofs favorable to her, to meet witnesses against her face to face, to be fully heard in her defense, and not to be deprived of her property but by the judgment of her peers, which means a jury trial. 129.  In contrast, the Massachusetts SJC and Fredrickson, the bulwark of the BBO privy council, deem disciplinary proceedings to be civil in nature and refuse to accept the United States Supreme Court’s decisions on the issue as the last word. 130.  Notwithstanding the controversy over whether bar disciplinary proceedings are civil, criminal, or quasicriminal in nature, so long as they are on the common-law side of the court, attorneys are entitled to a jury trial in a prosecution brought by the Bar Counsel.\FN22/ FN22 The difference between the natures has other implications, too. The significance of the civil-criminal dichotomy is that a criminal defendant has a right not to testify, and cannot suffer an adverse ruling from not testifying. In a civil case, if the defendant does not respond, there is an adverse inference drawn, and if he were to answer, it would be against his or her interest. Brown v. U.S., 356 U.S. (Mich.) 148, 158-159 (1958); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. (Cal.) 308, 318-319 (1976). This part of stare decisis, the Bar finds worthy of accepting. Those decisions which the Bar finds adverse to its humungous power, the Bar ignores.   In the instant case, Johnson has been forthright and wants to testify, but the difference might be significant to other lawyers confronting the Board. 131.  Historically, in Massachusetts, attorney-discipline cases have been identified as being on the common-law side of the court, making a jury trial legally possible. Boston Bar Ass'n v. Greenhood, 168 Mass. 169, 183 (1897).\FN23/ FN23 In In re Mayberry, 295 Mass. 155, 166, 168 (1936), however, the Court found that the respondent was not prejudiced by the findings of a single justice rather than by jurors because the ". . . jurors [were] of low grade in respect to intelligence and character." In re Sleeper, 251 Mass. 6, 12 (1925). 132.  Article XV of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights is another source of Respondent Johnson’s right to a jury trial.\FN24/ FN24 Article XV. In all controversies concerning property, and in all suits between two or more persons, except in cases in which it has heretofore been otherways used and practiced, the parties have a right to a trial by jury; and this method of procedure shall be held sacred, unless, in causes arising on the high seas, and such as relate to mariners' wages, the legislature shall hereafter find it necessary to alter it Article XV of the Declaration of Rights, Part the First, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 133.  Even "[a]ctions for declaratory judgment can . . . be heard by a jury if there are triable issues of fact and the judge determines that a jury traditionally would have determined those issues." New Bedford Housing Authority v. Olan, 50 Mass.App.Ct. 188, 197 (2000). The significance of the New Bedford decision was that even equitable claims could be given to a jury. 134.  And after New Bedford, the Court in Rosati v. Boston Pipe Covering, Inc., 434 Mass. 349, 350 (2001) further echoed the reasoning in that decision. 135.  If this controversy is not resolved, and the Massachusetts judicial branch has shown that it is not willing to resolve it, there will be further litigation.\FN25/ FN25 The Massachusetts judicial branch has failed to resolve this conflict, which has inevitably led to this litigation, and has neither provided a remedy, as guaranteed by Article XI of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, nor been accountable, as guaranteed by Article V of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, for the unlawful acts of the judiciary. In so doing, the Massachusetts judicial branch has violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. COUNT 2: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (facial and as-applied challenges to constitutionality of Board of Bar Overseers Rules) 136.  Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 135 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth. 137.  The Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers were promulgated pursuant to Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, Section 5(3)(i). 138.  There are actual controversies, including but not limited to, the following: whether the secrecy of the initial so-called investigation is unconstitutional. See Board Rules 4.4 and 4.7, whether giving the Board the right to subpoena whomever they want but denying the identifiable class of practicing lawyers the right to subpoena whomever they want is discriminatory and thus unconstitutional both on the face of the rules as well as how they are applied, \FN26/ FN26 Johnson understands well that there are circumstances when a witness is not allowed, but in the circumstances of the BBO actions, the exclusion for unidentified reasons is violative of her rights to due process and equal protection. whether the denial of Johnson’s right to rely on the Rules of Civil Procedure, such as those for discovery, is unconstitutional, whether the absence of a provision allowing discovery, such as the right to serve Interrogatories on the opposing party, the right to serve Requests for Production of Documents, the right to conduct depositions – such absence being more akin to those of Criminal Procedure, coupled with the BBO’s assertion that the proceedings are civil in nature and not quasicriminal in nature, makes the Board Rules unconstitutional on their face and/or as applied,\FN27/   FN27 The word "respondent" is a euphemism. The property rights of respondents are at risk. whether the denial of Johnson’s Motion for a More Definite Statement is unconstitutional.   139.   If these controversies are not resolved, and the Massachusetts judicial branch has shown that it is not willing to resolve it, there will be further litigation.\FN28/   FN28 The Massachusetts judicial branch has failed to resolve this conflict, which has inevitably led to this litigation, and has neither provided a remedy, as guaranteed by Article XI of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, nor been accountable, as guaranteed by Article V of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, for the unlawful acts of the judiciary. In so doing, the Massachusetts judicial branch has violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 140.  Johnson contends that the Board Rules are unconstitutional. 141.  Johnson and others are further hampered by there being no predictable rules of evidence, there being no available records as to the admissibility of documents in past cases, a unique interpretation of the scope of confidentiality and entitlement at the Bar, not being able to take a deposition unless the witness is not subject to service of subpoena or unable to attend hearing because of age, illness, or other infirmity, and prior approval of the Board or the hearing panel or officer being required before the deposition may be taken, privacy of the accused attorney not being considered by the rules. See Rule 4.7(a), Bar Counsel being allowed to take a deposition by "investigatory subpoena," while the respondent, or accused attorney, is not entitled either to know or to be present at a deposition taken prior to the petition for discipline issuing, but is entitled to be present after the petition issues [Rule 4.4(c)]. 142.  The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has failed to correct the Board Rules. 143.  The legislature has failed to write a statute that prevents and protects against injury to the lawyers who are subject to victimization by the Board Rules. 144.  The Board Rules have no safeguards and no due-process provisions. 145.  Bestowed with extraordinary powers and themselves unregulated, the BBO and the OBC use arbitrary procedures and violate their own Board Rules. 146.  The judicial branch, on behalf of the Commonwealth, has violated Article V of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights\FN29/ by bestowing quasijudicial immunity, pursuant to §9(3) of Massachusetts SJC Rule 4:01, on "[t]he Board, members of the Board and its staff, members of hearing committees, special hearing officers, and the bar counsel and members of his or her staff." FN29 Art. V of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights reads: "All power residing originally in the people, and being derived from them, the magistrates and officers of government, visited with authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are their substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them." 147.  Historically, Article V of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights abrogated the common law rule of sovereign immunity, which had theretofore immunized public entities from suit in tort claims arising from both the intentional and the negligent acts or omissions of public employees. 148.  The lack of accountability, afforded by the bestowal of immunity from liability is violative of Article V of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 149.  The Board Rules fail to ensure that lawyers have or will have an opportunity to exercise their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws. 150.  The Board Rules provide no safeguards as to the competency and honesty of the Board, its members, its staff, the hearing committees, any special hearing officer. 151.  The Board Rules provide no standards by which the Board, its members, its staff, the hearing committees, and any special hearing officer are to work. 152.  The Board Rules provide no standard of review to be used to determine that competency or honesty prevails in the process. 153.  The Board Rules provide no requirement of an evidentiary hearing at which the parties can rebut any materials adverse to a party. 154.  If this controversy is not resolved, there will be further litigation.\FN30/ FN30 The Massachusetts judicial branch has failed to resolve this conflict, which has inevitably led to this litigation, and has neither provided a remedy, as guaranteed by Article XI of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, nor been accountable, as guaranteed by Article V of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, for the unlawful acts of the judiciary. In so doing, the Massachusetts judicial branch has violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.   COUNT 3: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT ATTORNEYS ARE ENTITLED TO THE FULL SWEEP OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES, AND IMMUNITIES, DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION 155.  Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 154 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth. 156.  There are actual controversies, including, but not limited to, whether Johnson, as a lawyer, has a right to the full sweep of rights, privileges, immunities, due process and equal protection , including the First Amendment rights to political speech and free expression., and the right to defend herself against adversaries. 157.  At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff has had a right under the due process and equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions not to be deprived by the government of her constitutionally protected interest in her license to practice law, her to exercise her right to political speech and free expression. U.S.C. Const.Amend. 1, 14; M.G.L. Const. Pt. 1, Art. 10.\FN31/ FN31 Attorneys must be able to avail themselves of "the general rules which govern society." Cohen v Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 136 (1961) (Mr. Justice Black, with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas concur, dissenting). [Cohen, a 5-to-4 decision, was overruled in Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 (U.S.N.Y. 1967).] In Cohen, some 40 years ago, Messrs. Justice Black, Chief Justice Warren, and Justice Douglas eloquently warned that the important role that lawyers are to play in society makes it all the more imperative that they not be discriminated against and not be deprived of "the basic freedoms that are designed to protect the individual against the tyrannical exertion of governmental power." Cohen, at 138. Singling out "groups for special treatment with regard to certain constitutional privileges" is "clearly unconstitutional." Id., at 137 n. 13, citing Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 456-467 (1954).   When the Founders of this Nation drew up our Constitution, they were uneasily aware of this English practice, both as it had prevailed in that country and as it had been experienced in the colonies prior to the Revolution. Particularly fresh in their minds was the treatment that had been accorded the lawyers who had sought to defend John Peter Zenger against a charge of seditious libel before a royal court in New York in 1735. These two lawyers had been summarily disbarred by the judges presiding at that trial for [filing Exceptions after being warned not to do so]. It is to the lasting credit and renown of the colonial bar that Andrew Hamilton, a lawyer of Philadelphia, defied the hostility of the judges, defended and brought about the acquittal of Zenger. Cohen, at 140-141. Such language throughout the dissents to the later-overruled majority report in Cohen makes this author confident that were these high justices here today, it is likely they would write, "In Medieval England, the BBO/OBC would have become as justly vilified as the Star Chamber."   158.  The BBO and the Bar Counsel disagree with Johnson that she has a right under the due process and equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions not to be deprived by the government of her constitutionally protected interest in her license to practice law. 159.  The BBO and the Bar Counsel disagree with Johnson that she has a right under the First Amendment to political speech. 160.  The BBO and the Bar Counsel disagree with Johnson that she has a right under the First Amendment to free expression. 161.  The BBO and the Bar Counsel disagree with Johnson that she has a right to defend herself against adversaries. 162.  The BBO and the Bar Counsel disagree with Johnson that she has a right to pierce immunities not made into law by our legislatures. 163.  The BBO and the Bar Counsel disagree with Johnson that article V of the Mass. Declaration of rights make all magistrates and officers of all three branches of government accountable to all the people, including Johnson, at all times. 164.  The BBO and the Bar Counsel contend that Johnson has no rights to due process and equal protection of the laws except those of which they approve. 165.  As a result, acting under the color of law, Defendants worked a denial of Johnson's rights, privileges or immunities secured by the United States Constitution or by Federal law\FN32/ and guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. FN32 Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1061 (1st Cir. 1997); McNamara v. Honeyman, 406 Mass. 43, 52 (1989). 166.  Defendants unlawfully and knowingly also breached the Board Rules 1.2, 3.15(f), 3.18(a), 3.18(b), 3.22(b)(2), 3.22(b)(3), 3.22(c), which unlawful acts were expressly committed in the absence of jurisdiction,\FN33/ to wit, Chair Carpenter did not have the power and/or authority or the discretion to usurp the powers of other persons as named in the Board Rules, Chair Carpenter and SHO Phillips ignored the common law, Chair Carpenter and SHO Phillips and the BBO knowingly impeded and hindered the due course of justice, with the intent to deny Johnson due process and the equal protection of the laws, which unlawful acts were expressly committed in the absence of jurisdiction. FN33 Rankin v. Howard. 633 F.2d 844 (1980), cert. denied sub nom., Zeller v. Rankin, 451 U.S. 939 (1980). 167.  As a result of Defendants' concerted unlawful and malicious conduct, Johnson is at jeopardy of being irreparably harmed not only from being deprived of her right to remain free from having to answer and stand trial for baseless charges but also from the obloquy of the community,. 168.  Without due process of law, and deprived of her rights to due process and the equal protection of the laws, the due course of justice has been and shall be impeded, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States. 169.  Johnson was harmed and has been suffering from worry about the stress, humiliation, anxiety, loss of trust, loss of confidence in and feelings of betrayal by the justice system, shock, and emotional scarring, all compensable as emotional distress, and other damages.\FN34/ FN34 The rule is well settled, however, that if the natural consequence of the wrongful act, done willfully or with gross negligence, is mental suffering to the plaintiff, then that element may be considered in assessing damages. Stiles, 233 Mass. at 185, cites omitted. "Good faith and absence of malice in the perpetration of such a palpable wrong to the plaintiff constitute no defense to the defendants against the almost inevitable effect of their acts." Id. 170.  Carpenter did not have the power and/or authority or the discretion (a) under Board Rule 3.18(a) to decide Bar Counsel’s motion for a protective order and motion to preclude Johnson’s defenses. 171.  Carpenter intentionally interfered with Johnson's exercise and enjoyment of her clear and established rights secured by the state and federal constitutions or laws of the United States and/or the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and thereby deprived her of those rights and caused her injuries. 172.  As a result of the concerted unlawful and malicious action of Carpenter, Johnson was deprived of her rights to both due process and the equal protection of the laws, and the due course of justice was impeded, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States. 173.  If the above-identified controversies are not resolved, there will be further litigation. COUNT 4: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (that §§ 9(1), 9(2), and 9(3), the immunity provisions, of Massachusetts SJC Rule 4:01 are unconstitutional) 174.  Johnson repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 173 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth. 175:  There are actual controversies over whether.SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 9(1), 9(2), and 9(3) are unconstitutional both facially and as applied, whether §§ 9(1), 9(2), and 9(3) can supercede article V of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, whether.the SJC violated the separation of powers provisions in our State constitution.when it approved the promulgation of SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 9(1), 9(2), and 9(3). 176.  By the immunity granted in § 9(1), 9(2), and 9(3), Plaintiff and others similarly situated are deprived of their rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions by the government of her constitutionally protected interest in seeking a remedy for wrongs done them. U.S.C. Const.Amend. 14; M.G.L. Const. Pt. 1, Art. 10.\FN35/   FN35 Attorneys must be able to avail themselves of "the general rules which govern society." Cohen v Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 136 (1961) (Mr. Justice Black, with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas concur, dissenting). [Cohen, a 5-to-4 decision, was overruled in Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 (U.S.N.Y. 1967).]\/ In Cohen, some 40 years ago, Messrs. Justice Black, Chief Justice Warren, and Justice Douglas eloquently warned that the important role that lawyers are to play in society makes it all the more imperative that they not be discriminated against and not be deprived of "the basic freedoms that are designed to protect the individual against the tyrannical exertion of governmental power." Cohen, at 138. Singling out "groups for special treatment with regard to certain constitutional privileges" is "clearly unconstitutional." Id., at 137 n. 13, citing Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 456-467 (1954).   When the Founders of this Nation drew up our Constitution, they were uneasily aware of this English practice, both as it had prevailed in that country and as it had been experienced in the colonies prior to the Revolution. Particularly fresh in their minds was the treatment that had been accorded the lawyers who had sought to defend John Peter Zenger against a charge of seditious libel before a royal court in New York in 1735. These two lawyers had been summarily disbarred by the judges presiding at that trial for [filing Exceptions after being warned not to do so]. It is to the lasting credit and renown of the colonial bar that Andrew Hamilton, a lawyer of Philadelphia, defied the hostility of the judges, defended and brought about the acquittal of Zenger. Cohen, at 140-141. Such language throughout the dissents to the later-overruled majority report in Cohen makes this author confident that were these high justices here today, it is likely they would write, "In Medieval England, the BBO/OBC would have become as justly vilified as the Star Chamber." 177.  Section 9(1) of Massachusetts SJC Rule 4:01 provides immunity to Complainants to the Board. By so doing, (a) Johnson and others similarly situated have been put at risk by Court permission of becoming victims of false reporting and (b) the Court has not only intentionally aided and abetted but intentionally encouraged false reporting by Complainants: in the instant case by Robyn Gerry-Sylvia, Deborah Wolf, Deborah Sano, and Judge Paul McGill. 178.  While there is a constitutional right to petition, Complainants in courts of general or limited jurisdiction are not immune from counterclaims of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, frivolous pleading, and the like. Where the BBO is, like police departments, in the business of enforcement, the Complainants to the BBO should be no less responsible for false reporting to the BBO than the general public is for reporting falsely to the police. See criminal statute M.G.L. c. 269 §13A, false reporting to the police. 179.  Section 9(2) of Massachusetts SJC Rule 4:01 provides immunity to the Complainant and to each witness giving sworn testimony. By so doing, (a) Johnson and others similarly situated have been put at risk by Court permission of becoming victims of false swearing and false testimony and (b) the Court not only intentionally aids and abets but intentionally encourages false swearing and false testimony by Complainants and witnesses. 180.  Other complainants and witnesses in courts of general or limited jurisdiction are not immune from perjury charges – albeit they are rarely brought. To offer witness immunity without safeguards encourages perjury and false swearing. 181.  Section 9(3) of Massachusetts SJC Rule 4:01 provides immunity from liability to "[t]he Board, members of the Board and its staff, members of hearing committees, special hearing officers, and the bar counsel and members of his or her staff." By so doing, (a) Johnson and others similarly situated have been put at risk by Court permission of becoming victims of false charges and abuse of process and (b) the Court not only intentionally aids and abets but intentionally encourages those immunized to act as a cabal with ulterior motives such as in the instant case, where both censorship of Johnson’s website and retaliation against her for criticizing the courts are the primary reasons false charges have been levied, prosecuted, and adjudicated by those immunized by § 9(3). 182.  The offer of immunity in § 9(3) violates article V of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and is thus unlawful.\FN36/\FN37/ \FN38/ FN36 Article V reads: "All power residing originally in the people, and being derived from them, the magistrates and officers of government, visited with authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are their substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them." FN37 The doctrine of judicial immunity was born in England in 1607 from the womb of a devil court, the reviled Star Chamber, and in the United States around 200 years later from the rib of the Star Chamber case when the Supreme Court usurped a legislative function in violation of the separation of powers and by judicial fiat, brought judicial immunity to our shores. Given those conditions of birth, the doctrine of judicial immunity and its derivatives – quasijudicial immunity and even immunity by a court rule as in SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 9(1), 9(2), and 9(3) -- is unconstitutional and may not be applied to this case or to any other. With such repugnant roots, the doctrine may not override the duly ratified and never amended article V of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which guarantees accountability of all the magistrates and officers of the three branches of government to the people at all times. The doctrine must not be countenanced by this Court, for judicial immunity inappropriately and unconstitutionally does not allow scrutiny of the courts. It fosters secrecy, sloth, and unscrupulousness. FN38 Curiously, at least two Courts -- Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), and Stump v Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) – have concluded that ". . . we held that this doctrine of judicial immunity was applicable in suits under §1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983, for the legislative record gave no indication that Congress intended to abolish this long-established principle." Stump, 435 U.S. at 356, citing Pierson. That was a full untruth. See Mr. Justice Douglas’s dissent in Pierson. There he cites the Congressional Record, showing that Congress fully intended that judges would not be immune when they deprive people of their civil rights. The rationale of the Court was specious on other grounds, too. For instance, a first-year law student is taught that he cannot sue for breach of duty if there is no duty; he cannot sue for breach of contract if there is no contract. It was, therefore, self-serving and in bad faith for the Pierson and Stump Courts to call attention to the lack of a record that Congress intended to abolish judicial immunity, because the court in Pierson knew or should have known that Congress did not state that it "intended to abolish judicial immunity" because it had never established judicial immunity. It was men in black robes who brought judicial immunity to our shores in the 19th century. Congress was not at their party! Congress had already had its party and had decided judges would not be immune to prosecution under §1983: i.e., the section was "on the books fully eight months prior to the decision in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871). Skullduggery might have been afoot. Certainly it had to be an affront to Congress when the Court decided to follow the English courts rather than its own United States Congress! And when approving §9 of SJC Rule 4:01 in Massachusetts, the SJC erred in basing its law on fallacious, erroneous law that was an affront to article V of our Declaration of Rights. Granted, the action in Bradley was not brought under any of the Civil Rights Acts" [Pierson, at 549 n. 3 (dissent)], but the debate in Congress regarding judicial immunity was expansive. With the passing of the Act that same year, the Court had to know the majority in Congress was for accountability to stem the tide of personal interests and corruption. So that statement by the Court in Pierson and acknowledged by the Court in Stump is valueless, hollow. It is a statement made only by a result-oriented court, not an intellectually courageous, principled court. It should hold no weight with this Court, which prides itself on thorough and principled opinions. This Court should bravely herald that there is no history of a sound rationale in support of judicial immunity. And the Court in Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S.(Va.) 522, 540 (1984), cited the dissenting opinion in Pierson, at 558-564 for the proposition that "every Member of Congress who spoke to the issue assumed that judges would be liable under §1983." And in Pierson itself, Mr. Justice Douglas wrote in his dissent:   The statute [42 U.S.C. §1983], which came on the books as §1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13, provides that "every person" who under color of state law or custom "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." To most, "every person" would mean every person, not every person except judges. Pierson, at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting).   The argument that the actions of public officials must not be subjected to judicial scrutiny because to do so would have an inhibiting effect on their work, is but a more sophisticated manner of saying " The King can do no wrong." [5] Chief Justice Cockburn long ago disposed of the argument that liability would deter judges:   "I cannot believe that judges . . . would fail to discharge their duty faithfully and fearlessly according to their oaths and consciences . . . from any fear of exposing themselves to actions at law. I am persuaded that the number of such actions would be infinitely small and would be easily disposed of. While, on the other hand, I can easily conceive cases in which judicial opportunity might be so perverted and abused for the purpose of injustice as that, unsound principles, the authors of such wrong ought to be responsible to the parties wronged." Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, L.R. 5 Q. B. 94, 110 (C. J. Cockburn, dissenting). Pierson, at 564-566 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied). He then went on about not subjecting to immunity those judges who are dispensing justice. No one, including Johnson, quarrels with that proposition.  But that is far different from saying that a judge shall be immune from the consequences of any of his judicial actions, and that he shall not be liable for the knowing and intentional deprivation of a person's civil rights. What about the judge who conspires with local law enforcement officers to "railroad" a dissenter? What about the judge who knowingly turns a trial into a "kangaroo" court? Or one who intentionally flouts the Constitution in order to obtain a conviction? Congress, I think, concluded that the evils of allowing intentional, knowing deprivations of civil rights to go unredressed far outweighed the speculative inhibiting effects which might attend an inquiry into a judicial deprivation of civil rights. [6] The plight of the oppressed is indeed serious. . . . Pierson, at 563-567 (Douglas, J., dissenting).   COUNT 5: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (that § 10, the settlement provision, of Massachusetts SJC Rule 4:01 is unconstitutional) 183.  Johnson repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 182 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth. 184.  There is an actual controversy over whether §10 impedes settlement between a complainant and a respondent in a disciplinary proceeding by impairing the respondent’s right to contract. 185.  When two parties settle a matter, the parties enter into a contract. Each must perform their side of the bargain. It would stand to reason, common sense, common logic, that whether one is compromising, or making restitution (if appropriate), or settling, the termination of the disciplinary proceeding is the goal of both parties. If one party still wants a disciplinary proceeding to continue, there is nothing to compromise or settle. 186.  Section 10 interferes with the parties’ constitutional rights to resolve their dispute in a manner acceptable to both entities. 187.  In interfering with or impairing the right to contract, which existed long before 1974, when the BBO and OBC came into existence, §10 is an unlawful attempt to override Johnson’s diverse constitutional rights, e.g., under article I of our Mass. Declaration of Rights; the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and clause 1 of section 10 of article 1 of the U.S. Constitution. COUNT 6: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (that Rule 1.5 of the Mass. Rules of Professional Conduct is unconstitutional) 188.  Johnson repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 187 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth. 189.  There are three actual controversies: whether Johnson can be charged with violating M.R.Prof.C. 1.5, given that Bar Counsel Crane has not identified how much of the amount Johnson charged the Sanos he believes is excessive whether Johnson can be charged with violating M.R.Prof.C. 1.5, given that Bar Counsel Crane has not identified the task(s) for which Bar Counsel alleges Johnson overcharged the Sanos whether the fees charged by Johnson were excessive, where Bar Counsel averred that "the fees charged and collected by [Johnson] in the [Sano] matter were clearly excessive" [Pet. ¶ 82] and Johnson denied that her fees were excessive. Am.Ans. ¶ 82. 190.  Where Rule 1.5 does not require the OBC and/or Bar Counsel either to identify how much of the amount Johnson charged the Sanos they believe is excessive or to identify the task(s) for which they allege Johnson overcharged the Sanos, the Rule’s vagueness or broadness deprives Johnson and others similarly situated of the full panoply of rights under articles VIII, XI, and XII of the Mass. Declaration of Rights. 191.  The vagueness or broadness allows the OBC and Bar Counsel to abuse the process. 192.  For instance, the vagueness or broadness allows the OBC and Bar Counsel to prosecute selectively some attorneys and not others, for instance, about fees and fee disputes.\FN39/ FN39 Weisberg addresses the selective prosecution in a very recent motion to strike Johnson’s affirmative defenses, the last document in the appendix. 193.  For example, in a letter from Asst. Bar Counsel Christa Arcos to a member of the complaining public, Arcos, an agent for the OBC, wrote "fee disputes are not generally within the jurisdiction of this office"[Exh.D], in which case the OBC has selectively prosecuting Johnson in Count II over a de minimus fee dispute. 194.  After Weisberg let Johnson know that charges would be brought, Johnson placed her bill to the Sanos and her responses to Weisberg on her website, so that the public could decide for themselves whether Johnson’s fees were excessive. 195.  Johnson’s bill to the Sanos is not privileged and even is the bill is assumed arguendo to be privileged, under Montgomery v. Pickering, 116 Mass. 227, 231 (1874), the privilege is waived only as to the subject matter of the Sanos’ testimony, and under Woburn v. Henshaw, 101 Mass. 193, 200 (1869), the Sanos are liable to full cross-examination. Neitlich v. Peterson, 15 Mass.App.Ct. 622, 626-627 (1983). 196.  The harm and damage Johnson has suffered continues after selective prosecution:  On the BBO and OBC Internet website, the BBO put up notice that disciplinary proceedings are pending. That is unconstitutional. Johnson has not been adjudged blameworthy or guilty of anything. She is innocent of all accusations until found otherwise after a fair trial. 197.  It is also unconstitutional for the BBO and OBC to allege that Johnson violated Bar rules when defending herself against false accusations. 198.  The broadness and vagueness of Rule 1.5 and the rules in general to cause this deprivation of Johnson’s constitutional rights. 199.  If this controversy is not resolved, there will be further litigation. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Johnson prays that this Honorable court find: 1.  that a Bar disciplinary proceeding is a quasicriminal proceeding, 2.  that whether or not the disciplinary proceeding is quasicriminal, Johnson – and other lawyers similarly situated -- confronted by the BBO is entitled to a trial by jury, 3.  that the Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers are unconstitutional, 4.  that Plaintiff is entitled to the full sweep of due process rights as well as to her rights under the First Amendment, 5.  that §§ 9(1), 9(2), and 9(3), the immunity provisions, of Massachusetts SJC Rule 4:01 are unconstitutional, 6.  that the settlement provision of § 10 of Massachusetts SJC Rule 4:01 is unconstitutional, 7.  that Rule 1.5 of the M.R.Prof.C. is unconstitutional, 8.  that Johnson seeks additional equitable relief from the BBO, the OBC, and the Commonwealth, such as severe sanctions against Chair Carpenter and SHO Phillips for their incompetence, lawlessness, and deliberate indifference to the clearly established and secured constitutional rights of Johnson, and if within the power of this court, instructions to the SJC to replace Carpenter with someone else forthwith as Chair of the BBO, and 9.  that the BBO is hereby restrained from prosecuting their actions against Plaintiff until further order of this Court.                                                                 PLAINTIFF BARBARA C. JOHNSON, Pro se 14 November 2003                                      _____________________________                                                                 Barbara C. Johnson, Esq.                                                                 6 Appletree Lane                                                                 Andover, MA 01810-4102                                                                 978-474-0833 PLAINTIFF'S VERIFICATION The undersigned, being duly sworn, deposes and says that I am the Plaintiff herein, and have read the foregoing pleading filed on my behalf, and the facts stated therein are true. __ November 2003                                      _____________________________                                                                  Barbara C. Johnson, Esq.   Subscribed and sworn to before me, this ___th day of November 2003.                                                                 ______________________________                                                                 Notary Public BE SURE TO SEE THE FEDERAL AND STATE  MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND BE SURE TO SEE THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT FILED IN FEDERAL COMPLAINTS TWO DAYS LATER.  iT IS ALMOST THE SAME AS THIS ONE EXCEPT FOR THE JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND FOR THE COUNTS RAISING FEDERAL QUESTIONS. In other words, it is longer!!