The Bar War Continues Against Barb  Barb Sued the  BBO [Board of Bar Overseers] in Massachusetts' Supreme Judicial Court. The Complaint was dismissed within a day or two, sua sponte. One half-hour later, she sued in U.S. District Court in Boston. Here is the Federal Complaint, the original amended by adding claims for money damages. Barb resents spending time on the battling with the BBO, because she could be helping people truly in need at this time. So Barb has taken the offensive.  CENSORSHIP  came as the BBO's Christmas present this year.  The sender was Chair of the Board M. Ellen Carpenter, friend and former partner of Mass. SJC Justice Martha Sosman, and current partner of Christine Roach of the State Ethics Commission (Laughable, isn't it, folks?) And on New Year's Eve came the news that former Vice Chair of the BBO and now Appeals Court Judge Cynthia Cohen has joined the fray. Barb speculates that Cohen learned about this complaint against the Board of Bar and her friends Ellen (the Chair) and Danny (the Bar Counsel) for $15million. To retaliate against me, Cynthia Cohen* (with Judge Mel Greenberg  but not Judge Kass**) sanctioned a little old lady client*** of mine $29,000.  The jury verdict was in her favor, but the courts have whittled it away. ___________________________________________ *  I had already embarrassed her former firm in two courts. ** Interesting.  Judge Kass, who had been on the original appellate panel backed off the negative Rule 27 decision.  Cohen should have recused herself. See the Rule 27 letter to Justices Cohen Greenberg, and Kass at Drano Series #88: drano88-abend-rule-27-letter-to-appeals-court.htm *** Where Did Justice Go? (Case #2, An Estate Owed Elderly Caregiver Payment for Services ) The decision in this old case is so badly reasoned that  I cannot help think it is a great example of how far the court will go to retaliate because I'm fighting JUDICIAL IMMUNITY.


 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS ------------------------------------------------------------                     CIVIL ACTION: 03-CV-12314-WGY Barbara C. Johnson, Esq.                                                   Plaintiff  v.  Board of Bar Overseers of Massachusetts M. Ellen Carpenter, Esq., in her individual        and professional capacities, including her       capacity as Chair of the Board of Bar  Overseers of Massachusetts Herbert P. Phillips, Esq., in his individual        and professional capacities, Office of Bar Counsel Daniel Crane, Esq., in his individual        and professional capacities, Commonwealth of Massachusetts,                                                    Defendants  --------------------------------------------------------- AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND ON ALL COUNTS (Plaintiff incorporates by reference the attached exhibits with the same force and effect as if herein set forth) INTRODUCTION This case arises out of a Petition of Discipline by Bar Counsel Daniel Crane ["Crane"] against Plaintiff, Barbara C. Johnson, Esq. ["Johnson"]. Johnson asserts that she as both a citizen and an attorney is entitled to the full sweep of due process and equal protection of all the laws.  Johnson has brought two causes of action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, one under 42 U.S.C. §1985(3), and six for declaratory judgments. They are (1) a declaratory judgment (G.L. c 231A) that a bar disciplinary proceeding is a quasicriminal proceeding and that whether or not the proceeding is quasicriminal, respondents are entitled to a jury trial, (2) a declaratory judgment that the Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers are unconstitutional both facially and as applied for civil or quasicriminal proceedings, (3) a declaratory judgment that lawyers are entitled to the full sweep of due process and equal protection of all the laws, (4) declaratory judgment that §§ 9(1), 9(2), and 9(3) of Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01 are unconstitutional both facially and as applied (there is no scenario in which either the Board Rules or SJC Rule 4:01 §§9(1), 9(2), and 9(3) can be applied constitutionally), (5) declaratory judgment that §10 of SJC Rule 4:01 is unconstitutional both facially and as applied, (6) declaratory judgment that Rule 1.5 of the Mass. Rules of Professional Conduct is unconstitutional on the grounds that it is too vague and too broad, (7) violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 (due process and equal protection clauses), and (8) violation of 42 U.S.C. §1985(3) (conspiracy), and (9) violations of 42 U.S.C.§1983 (refusing or neglecting to prevent). and (10) defamation by Daniel Crane and  the BBO. JURISDICTION 1.  Jurisdiction of this court arises under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question), 1337 amount in controversy), 1343(a) (deprivation of civil rights and privileges, furtherance of conspiracy, equitable relief), and 1367(a) (supplemental jurisdiction); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 (civil action for deprivation of rights) and 1988 (proceedings in vindication of civil rights); and 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (scheme or artifice to defraud). 2.  Jurisdiction of this court for the pendent claims is authorized by F.R.Civ.P. 18(a), and arises under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction as set forth in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). PARTIES 1. Your Plaintiff, Barbara C. Johnson ["Johnson"], who resides at 6 Appletree Lane, Andover, Essex County, MA 01810-4102, is (1) an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, (2) an attorney admitted to practice in the United States District Court at Boston and the First Circuit Court of Appeals, (3) an Internet publisher located at falseallegations.com, and (4) the Respondent in actions entered in Board of Bar Overseers as Nos. C2-01-0091, C2-01-0090, C2-00-0078, C2-98-0580. 2. Defendant Board of Bar Overseers of Massachusetts [“BBO”], located at 75 Federal Street, Boston, MA 02110, was established in 1974 by the Massachusetts SJC as an independent administrative body to ensure that the Canons of Ethics and Disciplinary Rules Regulating the Practice of Law are observed.  It allegedly investigates and prosecutes complaints against lawyers, and administers and recommends to the SJC appropriate disciplinary action.  3. Defendant M. Ellen Carpenter  ["Carpenter" or “Chair”], who is a resident of Massachusetts, has been, at all times relevant to this Complaint, (1) an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, (2) a partner of the lawfirm Roach & Carpenter, (3) chair person of the BBO, (4) a person who improperly conducted the affairs of the Commonwealth, and (5) accountable to Johnson and the people of the Commonwealth.\1/ FN1 Com. v. Ellis, 429 Mass. 362, 371 (1999): "Article 5 [in Part the First, the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts], . . . provides that officers [including judges] of government `are at all times accountable to [the people].'"  4. Defendant Herbert P. Phillips  ["Phillips"], who resides at 2 Skipper Way, Gloucester, Essex County, MA 01930, has been, at all times relevant to this Complaint has been (1) an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, (2) a partner of the lawfirm Phillips Gerstein Holber & Channen, (3) Special Hearing Office at the BBO, (4) a person who improperly conducted the affairs of the Commonwealth, and (5) accountable to Johnson and the people of the Commonwealth. 5. Defendant Office of Bar Counsel [“OBC”], located at 75 Federal Street, Boston, MA 02110, is the prosecutorial arm of the BBO and is also funded by annual registration fees.  It was established by the Supreme Judicial Court in 1974 as an independent administrative body to investigate and evaluate complaints against lawyers.  The OBC allegedly investigates, evaluates, and prosecutes complaints against lawyers. 6. Defendant Daniel Crane  [“Bar Counsel”], who is a resident of Mas-sachusetts, has been, at all times relevant to this Complaint, (1) an attorney licensed to practice law in the Com-monwealth of Massachusetts, (2) Bar Counsel, (3) a person who improperly conducted the affairs of the Commonwealth, and (4) accountable to Johnson and the people of the Commonwealth. 7. Defendant Commonwealth of Massachusetts [Commonwealth”] is a body politic that is formed by a voluntary association of individuals, and "is a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each Citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain Laws for the Common good" [Preamble.  Massachusetts Constitution] and as an association, according to M.G.L. c. 4 §7, is a person for all purposes under all laws. FACTS  8. The BBO assembles from time to time a quasijudicial court.  9. The BBO’s General Counsel, who at all times relevant to this Complaint has been Michael Fredrickson, reports to “the Board.” 10. The 12 members of the BBO are appointed by the SJC. 11. Chair Carpenter is a friend and former colleague and partner of SJC Justice Martha B. Sosman.\2/ FN2      The Executive Director of the State Ethics Commission is Christine Roach, past and present partner of the Roach & Carpenter lawfirm with BBO Chair Carpenter and also a former colleague and partner of SJC Justice Sosman. The commission governs the conduct of public employees and elected officials and is, ironically, responsible for enforcing and administering the conflict of interest and financial disclosure laws, which apply to those employees and officials. 12. Bar Counsel Crane of the OBC reports to the SJC. 13. On 24 January 2003, Bar Counsel filed a Petition for Discipline\3/ against Johnson  [Exhibit A, Docket Sheet]. FN3      The Petition for Discipline had three counts: one count for each of three separate and distinct matters. For convenience, the first was the Linnehan matter, the second was the Sano matter, and the third was the Coughlin matter. 14. The author of the petition was Assistant Bar Counsel Susan Strauss-Weisberg. 15. According to General Counsel Fredrickson, the requisite approval of the petition before it was filed in the BBO was given by BBO member Attorney Elizabeth M. Mulvey,\4/ who became the Reviewing Board Member. 4      Initially General Counsel Michael Fredrickson told Johnson that it was he who had "approved" the petition, but in October 2003, he told Johnson that it was Mulvey who approved the petition and that she was now recused from the case. Someone made the decision to follow Section 3.54 of the Board Rules. 16. The Complainant of Count I\5/ was the child's mother, who ran for public office and on election day, both blamed her loss on Johnson's website and filed the complaint at the Bar.  In Count II,\6/ Bar Counsel averred (a) that Johnson commingled funds by depositing Sanos’ money into her personal rather than into her IOLTA account. [Pet.  ¶71], (b) that “the fees charged and collected by [Johnson] in the  [Sano] matter were clearly excessive” [Pet.  ¶82], and (c).that Johnson published confidential material re the Sanos without their consent. [Pet  ¶91].\7/ 5Count I of the petition swirls around Linnehan’s custody and paternity case about which Johnson filed a Complaint in federal court. In the Linnehan Complaint, Johnson chastised a judge for depriving the father of his parental rights for over a decade without due process and equal protection. Johnson published her answer to the BBO and OBC on her website at falseallegations.com/bbo-drano90-answer-count-one-linnehan.doc. 6Count IIis concerned with a "consultation" matter. Johnson never made an appearance in court for any of the Sanos. The background: Four indictments had issued charging Deb Sano’s husband with sexual crimes and assault of the couple’s youngest and mentally challenged daughter. At the age of 15 months, the daughter suffered a stroke. At the time of the indictments, the daughter was around 28 years old chronologically but only around 1½ years old mentally. The daughter had been in the custody of the Department of Mental Retardation for around eight years. The parents had been restrained from seeing the daughter. The entire Sano family was pleased with Johnson’s services and sent emails to Johnson relaying their gratitude [Figures 1, 2, and 3 below]. And Complainant Deb Sano gave her consent to publication of the family story on Johnson’s website [Figure 3]. Whether Deb Sano’s consent was implicit or explicit is a fact for a jury to decide. Johnson received approximately $10,700, but realizing that the family faced considerable legal expense to defend against the criminal charges and to prosecute civil cases, Johnson deeply discounted her fees and in December 1999, returned approximately $3200 to Deb Sano. Deb Sano then complained to Johnson that she wanted to pay Johnson for only one hour and 36 minutes of time and to have Johnson return more money [Figure 4]. Johnson suggested to Deb Sano that the fee dispute be arbitrated. Instead of responding to Johnson’s offer to participate in arbitration, Deb Sano complained four months later – around April 2000 -- to the Bar. 7After Weisberg let Johnson know that charges would be brought, Johnson placed her bill to the Sanos and her responses to Weisberg on her website, at falseallegations.com/bbo-drano90-answer-count-two-sano.doc, so that the public could decide for themselves whether Johnson’s fees were excessive. More offensive is that the BBO puts up on its Internet that disciplinary proceedings are pending and then alleges that Johnson violated Bar rules when defending herself against false accusations. 17. Johnson averred (a) that she had already earned the money by the time she deposited it into her personal account [Am.Ans. ¶ 71], (b) that her fees were not excessive [Am.Ans. ¶82], and (c) that Johnson had the consent given by Deb Sano to publish the story on her website and published only those parts relevant to the dispute initiated by Sano [see Figure 1 following para 74 below, excerpt from an email dated 12 December 1999 at 19:03]. 18. In both Counts I and II of his petition, Crane averred that Johnson published confidential material on her website and thereby harmed people.\8/  8Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. (Conn.) 479, 487 (1965), quoting Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (freedom of speech and of the press, protected by First Amendment, are fundamental personal rights and liberties protected by due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by States). Snyder v. Com. of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (same). 19. In Count III,\9/ Crane alleged that Johnson was jailed to force payment of funds allegedly ordered on 3 March 1995 to be paid.  Pet.  ¶124. 9Count III arose out of a whistleblower, wrongful termination case. During its prosecution in March 1995, eight years ago, Johnson was found in contempt of a non-existent order. Am.Ans. ¶ 108, 111, et al. After the labyrinthine proceedings of a Rube Goldberg remand case -- up and down the ladder of the courts several times -- the finding of contempt against Johnson was not vacated. On 17 December 1998, Johnson was ordered to jail because she said No to Judge Paul McGill, who had found her in contempt. She remained jailed for 24 hours. The Complainant of Count III in the petition was Judge McGill.       "The validity of the contempt order … depends on the correctness of the underlying discovery order." Greater Newburyport Clamshell Alliance v. Public Service Co., 838F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 01/29/1988), citing Hanley v. James McHugh Const. Co., 419 F.2d 955, 957 (7th Cir. 1969). 20. Not only was Crane’s allegation untrue [Am.Ans. ¶124], but he knew it was un-true: his own exhibit to the petition proves otherwise. 21. Crane wanted to put in his case for Count I through documents including, but not limited to, (a) the written complaint of the mother, Robyn, and Attorney Deborah Wolf and (b) letters from Assistant Bar Counsel to Johnson. 22. Crane wanted to put in his case for Count II through documents including, but not limited to, (a) the written complaint of the wife, Deb Sano and (b) letters from Assistant Bar Counsel to Johnson. 23. Crane wanted to put in his case for Count III through documents including, but not limited to, (a) the judicial memoranda, decisions, and orders from the labyrinthine proceedings for his case-in-chief\10/ and (b) letters from Assistant Bar Counsel to Johnson. 10 Assistant Bar Counsel Susan Strauss-Weisberg ["Weisberg"] wrote Johnson saying that she might not call any witnesses for the Bar Counsel’s case-in-chief [Exh. B]. 24. In Count I, Crane (a) did not identify with any particularity the offending language or the people allegedly actionably harmed and (b) had no intention of calling the mother-candidate, Robyn Gerry-Sylvia, or Linnehan son, Brenden, now in his majority – despite the fact that they were named in the OBC’s proposed list of witnesses. 25. In Count I, Crane also intentionally misrepresented that Johnson put onto her web-site documents Johnson had not put on her website. 26. In Count II, Crane failed to identify (a) how much of the amount Johnson charged the Sanos is excessive and (b) the task(s) for which they allege Johnson overcharged the Sanos. 27. In Count II, Crane also intentionally failed to acknowledge in the Petition for Discipline any of the facts or documents whatsoever in mitigation, although the OBC’s agents had copies of (a) each and every email sent from all the Sanos to Johnson and each and every email Johnson sent to the Sanos and three of their married daughters and sons-in-law, including (b) the email in which Deb Sano had given her consent to publication of the family’s story on Johnson’s website [Pet. ¶91] and (c) the detailed, itemized accounting Johnson provided the Sanos. 28. In Count III, Crane intentionally failed to acknowledge in the Petition for Discipline any of the facts or documents whatsoever in mitigation, although the OBC’s agents had scoured and copied each and every document in each and every file in or arising out of the Cough-lin matter (including that involving Mark C. O’Connor and Johnson) in Concord District Court, Middlesex Superior Court, the Appeals Court, and the SJC. 29. To force the disclosure of the facts raised in  ¶¶26 and 28 above and other necessary facts, Johnson filed motions for more definite statements, Weisberg opposed one of them; and SHO Phillips denied them [Papers 48 (8/26),  69 (9/9/03) xx (11/4/03); the opposition in Paper  62 (9/9/03); the denials in Papers 79 (9/16/03) and YY (11/18/03)] 30. Without witnesses, no cross-examination by Johnson was, will, or would be possible, for Johnson cannot cross-examine a piece of paper.  31. Johnson moved for authorization to take depositions and was denied [Paper 18 (06/24/03)].  32. The Board Rules also do not allow discovery, e.g., interrogatories or depositions, by a Respondent [Exh C].  33. At the first prehearing conference, the BBO, through Assistant General Counsel Carol Wagner, informed Johnson that M.G.L. c. 30A, the Administrative Procedure Act, applies to BBO proceedings. 37. On 4 November 2003, Johnson filed a motion, pursuant to Board Rule 4.5(a), requesting the issuance of subpoenas [Paper 90 (11/04/03)].  That motion was ultimately denied but for a few subpoenas, which were not produced until a few days before trial.  (See ¶142, infra).  34. Board Rule 4.5, Hearing for Subpoenas, provides that a respondent “may” request the assigned factfinder or the entire Board to issue subpoenas but it is not mandatory that a respondent request those entities to issue subpoenas, leaving it open to the respondent to choose whether to ask one of the named entities to issue subpoenas or to issue the subpoenas as a litigant does in a court with a judge who has been sworn in under oath to perform his or judicial duties. 38. Massachusetts G.L. c. 30A, §12(3) gives any party to the adjudicatory hearing  the right to issue subpoenas in the name of the agency conducting the proceeding. The party may have such subpoenas issued by a notary public . . . make written application to the agency, which shall forthwith issue the subpoenas requested. 39. But BBO General Counsel, Michael Fredrickson, on Monday, 10 November 2003, informed Johnson that the Board Rules 4.5 and 4.6 overrule M.G.L. c. 30A, so that the State Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to BBO proceedings. 40. Fredrickson intimated, in that November 12th conversation, in words for all intents and purposes, Do not bother to serve subpoenas because the special hearing officer will not allow your witnesses to testify if the BBO does not want to hear from them. 41. While a sitting justice may, indeed, allow or disallow proposed witnesses to testify, Johnson was left with the impression  -- because he inferred wrongly that c. 30A and Board Rules 4.5 and 4.6 were in conflict ---- that Johnson should expect that most of the witnesses she wanted to subpoena would not be allowed to testify.\11/  (See ¶142, infra). 11Johnson has the right to summons and call witness under G.L. c. 233, §§ 1-6. Com. v. Graves, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 76, 84 ( 1993). Ulterior Motive of Bad-Faith Prosecution and Selective Enforcement:  First Amendment Rights 41. The OBC selectively prosecutes attorneys about fees and fee disputes [Exh.D, a letter from Asst. Bar Counsel Arcos to a member of the complaining public]. 42. The OBC chose Johnson for “selective prosecution, even though the fee dispute was de minimus. 43. On 7 November 2003, Bar Counsel pregnantly denied the selective prosecution of Johnson and forewent proceedings against other attorneys for similar or related misconduct. [Paper 110, Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses (11/07/03)]. 44. Assistant Bar Counsel Christa Arcos, an agent for the OBC, wrote to a member of the public, fee disputes are not generally within the jurisdiction of this office”[Exh.D]. 45. On 27 October 2003, approximately 10 months after the petition for discipline was  served, Bar Counsel identified to Johnson the webpages of which he complains: namely, Drano ##5, 9,12, 14, 15, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 31, 32, 37, 39, 42, 43, 44, 65, 66, 69, 70, 72, 73, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84a  [Paper xx, (October 27, 2003, Bar Counsel’s Preliminary Disclosures]. 46. The ulterior motive of the Bar Counsel is to censor Johnson’s website, and arises from Johnson’s exercise of her First Amendment right to political speech and free expression, as well as her right and obligation to see that justice is done, by publishing on her website information related to the unscrupulous acts of the now-retired Judge Ronald D. Harper and other court-appointed persons. 47. Well aware of their untempered, extraordinary powers, the BBO and the OBC concluded that it is easier to cenSURe Johnson than to cenSOR the website.    Motion for Trial by Jury 48. Through her counsel, Johnson moved for a jury trial, and it was denied by Special Hearing Officer [“SHO”] Herbert P. Phillips [Papers 20 (6/24/03) and 28 (7/03/03)]. 49. Upon deciding to represent herself, Johnson filed a motion to reconsider her motion for a jury [Paper 35 (7/22/03)]. (This motion was uploaded to Johnson’s website.) 50. Argument was heard at a pretrial conference on 22 July 2003.  SHO Phillips graciously agreed to reconsider the motion, gave Assistant Bar Counsel Weisberg time to oppose, promised to make a decision within a week or 10 days after receipt of the opposition, and provided the parties with copies of the pretrial agreement and a schedule of due dates within a day or two of the hearing [¶3 of Paper 40 (7/23/03)]. 51. Within a day, however, of the pretrial conference, Johnson received a copy of the first-page of her motion with the endorsement “Denied” on it.  It had been decided by the Chair Carpenter [Papers 43, 3 of document entitled “Order” (7/25/03)]. 52. Other than the power to scold, fine, or imprison jurors, who do not exist in the  world of the BBO, Carpenter appears to have most of the powers that the Star Chamber did have: e.g., the power to dictate which witnesses may be subpoenaed by a respondent to trial.  53. Upon the unexpected receipt of Carpenter’s ruling on the motion for a jury trial, Johnson immediately phoned Fredrickson both to inform him of the discrepancy and to query him as to how and why it occurred.  54. Much to Fredrickson’s credit, within a day, Carpenter wrote Johnson saying that she “acted precipitously” [Paper 46 (7/29/03)].  55. Carpenter not only had “acted precipitously” but also had usurped the power of the SHO and had violated Board Rule 3.18(a). 56. Rule 3.18(a) required the motion to be “submitted to a member of the Board for determination.”  Fredrickson had not designated a Board member to receive Johnson’s motions.  It appeared that he designated himself or his administrative assistant.  57. Rule 3.18(a) required the designated Board member to refer Johnson’s motion for determination to the chair of the assigned hearing committee, but there was no committee; or to the hearing panel, but there was none; or to the special hearing officer, but it was not referred to Phillips.  Instead, Carpenter decided the motion. 58. On the same day – 29 July 2003 -- that Carpenter wrote the “acted precipitously” letter, Bar Counsel decided to put into the record some opposition to Johnson’s motion to reconsider the denial of trial by jury, but Bar Counsel and Weisberg did that not by a formal pleading, but by a letter [Paper 45 (7/29/03)]. 59. Subsequently, Johnson supplemented her brief in reply to Bar Counsel’s opposition to her motion for a jury trial [Paper 53 (8/26/03)].  (Johnson uploaded this supplemental brief to her website Drano Series.) 60. Waiting for a determination from SHO Phillips on the jury-trial motion, Johnson phoned Fredrickson again. “That’s not going anywhere,” he said.  “I’d be astonished if it did. . . . No way in hell you’ll get a jury trial.” 61. Fredrickson was correct.  Within a day or two after Johnson’s call to Fredrickson, SHO Phillips denied Johnson’s Motion to Reconsider Motion for Trial by Jury [Paper 78 (9/16/03)]. 62. Such a response raised the question, then, Who was doing the decision-making?  Who is at someone’s beck and call?  Who is the someone?  63. The secret, harsh, and arbitrary process resembles that of the Star Chamber.\12/ 12There is even some comic relief provided by the Board Rules. In accordance with Board Rule 3.5(b), Johnson bound each of her pleadings with staples or in a three-ring binder when the ¾-inch staples were inadequate. But she since has been informed by Fredrickson’s "Legal Administrative Assistant" June D. Risk not to bind them [Exh. C (8./25/03)]. 64. Pursuant to Rule 1.2, someone – ostensibly “the Board” -- appointed Special Hearing Officer Phillips to hear charges of misconduct because “in view of the anticipated length of the hearing or for other reasons. 65. The pretext for appointing a Special Hearing Officer was “that a speedy and just disposition would be better accomplished by such appointment than by referring the matter to a hearing committee or panel of the Board.”  See Board Rule 1.2. 66. The real reason for appointing only one person rather than a panel appears to be that it is easier for Carpenter and Fredrickson to control the course of events, for example, the decisions on motions.\13/  13 Justice Black wrote, in words for all intents and purposes, the goal of a tyrannical government is to deprive its citizens of independence. In that way, they become "nothing more than parrots of the views of whatever group wields governmental power at the moment." Cohen, at 138. 67. Johnson has no knowledge as to who actually did appoint Phillips – whether it was the Board or Chair Carpenter or Fredrickson or some as-yet-unidentified personage. 68. Johnson does not know in advance who is going to decide the motions she submits. Another Violation of Rule 3.18(a) by the Chair Deciding Nondispositive Motions 69. Johnson filed (1) a Motion for Order that Board Rule 3.18(a) Is to Be Followed, so  as to Preclude Chair from Deciding Ostensibly Nondispositive Motion [Paper 49 (8/26/03)] and (2) a Motion to Preclude Chair from Sitting on any Committee or Deciding any Motion in These Actions [Paper 50 (8/26/03)]. 70. Bar Counsel opposed the two motions named in 69 immediately above [Papers 63 and 64 (both 9/09/03)]. 71. Chair Carpenter decided both motions to preclude described in 69 [Papers 74 and 75 (both 9/10/03)]. Another Rule 3.18(a) Motion, Finally Decided by SHO Phillips  72. One of Johnson’s motions was to declare Count II on the grounds (a) that the consent by the Sanos, or Parkers (Bar-supplied pseudonym), to publication of their story on Johnson’s website constituted a waiver of confidentiality [Paper 51 (8/26/03)] and (b) that Johnson had a right to defend herself (more infra). 73. Bar Counsel opposed the motion for a declaration of waiver of confidentiality [Paper 65 (9/09/03)]. 74. The alleged implicit or explicit permission or consent had been given Johnson in an  email  on 12 December 1999 from the wife [Figure 1].     Subject: RE: Accounting finished Date: Sun, 12 Dec 1999 19:03:58 –0500 From: "dsano" dsano@bcn.net To: "Barbara C. Johnson" barbaracjohnson@worldnet.att.net Dear Barbara, Thanks. Know that your are not on our payroll anymore but would love to be able to keep you posted.  Who knows we may someday be a story on your wonderful educational web site. <Numerous paragraphs redacted> We will be forever grateful for your help and concern. You have given us great hope and re-instilled out courage to fight. <Redaction>  D&H Figure 1 75. At the time, Johnson had not published the Sano story on her website. 76. Johnson published her bill to the Sanos and some of the information for her defense only after the wife complained to the Bar that she wanted more money back than Johnson had returned.  77. The Bar then declared the publication to be an unwarranted publication. 78. Johnson disagreed that publication of the bill and some of the surrounding facts were unwarranted.  She had a constitutional right to defend herself, and where the BBO made the disciplinary proceeding public on their Internet website, Johnson had and still has the right to defend her reputation publicly. 79. SHO Phillips denied Johnson’s motion to declare Deb Sano’s consent to publication constituted a waiver of confidentiality [Paper 80 (9/16/03)]. Motions to Dismiss: Under Board Rule 3.18(b) 80. Under Board Rule 3.18(b), all motions to dismiss the petition for discipline or any charges contained therein are to be determined by the Chair of the Board or the Chair’s designee. (a) Motion to Dismiss Count II: Privilege Does Not Apply in Attorney-Client Disputes 81. Another of Johnson’s motions to dismiss Count II was on the grounds that privilege did not apply to disputes between a client and an attorney and that Johnson had a right to defend herself [Paper 59 (9/05/03)].  82. Despite Bar Counsel not opposing Johnson’s motion re the privilege in an attorney-client dispute, Chair Carpenter issued a summary denial of Johnson’s motion to dismiss Count II [Paper 60 (9/08/03)].\14/ 14The reasonable conclusion is that Carpenter upholds privilege in the face of a fee dispute. 83. Subsequently Johnson filed a motion to reconsider the motion to dismiss on grounds that privilege did not apply to disputes between attorney and client [Paper 70 (9/10/03)]. 84. The Chair then allowed the motion to reconsider but issued another naked denial of Johnson’s second motion to dismiss Count II on the no-privilege grounds [Paper 82 (9/30/03)]. Motion to Dismiss Count III: Prejudicial Delay 85. The other motion was to dismiss Count III on the grounds that during the 5-8 year delay in bringing a disciplinary action, the tape of a hearing  was overwritten by the Commonwealth and an eyewitness passed away [Paper 52 (8/26/03)].\15/  A tape of that hearing would have contained exculpatory evidence. 15 Johnson’s contention was that although confidences must not be disclosed if they are not relevant to the defense, they may be disclosed if they are relevant to the defense of the charge. See Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1125, 95 S.Ct. 811 (1975). In such circumstances, "the attorney-client privilege may be treated as waived at least in part." Id. at 336. The motion to dismiss also included State legal citations, including Com. v. Brito, 390 Mass. 112 (1983), Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 (1991), Com. v. Woodberry, 26 Mass.App.Ct. 636 (1988), and Darius v. City of Boston, 433 Mass. 274 (2001). 86. Bar Counsel’s opposition did not address the issue of the prejudice resulting from the loss or destruction of the tape of a critical proceeding five years ago\16/ or the death of a critical eyewitness within the intervening five years [Paper 67 (9/9/03)]. 16 The critical proceeding occurred on 17 December 1998. 87. Chair Carpenter denied the motion to dismiss Count III and then added that the determination as to whether there was prejudicial delay was one for SHO Phillips to make [Paper 71 (9/10/03)].  88. Johnson did plead laches as an affirmative defense. 89. Other grounds for dismissal of Count III were based on an ex parte communication having occurred between the judge and opposing counsel [Pet. ¶122]and a material document having been physically altered by what appears to be a combined effort by the local district court motion judge and the former opposing counsel  [See Figures 7(a-e)].  90. Carpenter and Phillips did not address the issue of the ex parte communication. Motion for Protection Order: Which Applies: Rule 3.18(a) or 3.22(c)? 91. In Bar Counsel’s motion, Weisberg did not distinguish between a protection order and an order of impoundment as to Counts I and II [Paper 13 (5/29/03)]. 92. Bar Counsel’s motion, written by Weisberg, was not only a motion for a “protec-tive order” but also  a motion for impoundment  a motion to censor Johnson’s website  a motion to enjoin Johnson’s political and free speech and  a motion for secret hearings  93. Weisberg and Bar Counsel failed to do the following: a. failed to acknowledge and identify the standards to be followed when determining such potpourri motions as Bar Counsel’s, b. failed to show good cause, failed to follow the procedures for impoundment, c. failed to state the authority giving the Bar the right to censor Johnson’s website and stifle her political speech and free expression,  d. failed to state the scope of the website censorship sought,  e. failed to state how the censorship was to be implemented,  f. failed to state the authority giving the Bar permission to override Johnson’s First Amendment rights,  g. failed to identify those documents which Bar Counsel wants to prevent disclosure and those which he wants to impound, and h. failed to provide copies to Johnson of those documents which Bar Counsel wants to prevent disclosure and those which he wants to impound.  .  94. Johnson opposed Bar Counsel’s potpourri motion on Counts I and II [Paper 55 (8/27/03)]. 95. Johnson also moved to strike the motion for a protective order [Paper 54 (8/26/03)] not only because of its inherent flaws but also because the common law supported Johnson’s contentions regarding impoundment, §13 of c. 209C, First Amendment, and censorship. 96. Bar Counsel did oppose Johnson’s motion to strike the protective order [Paper 66 (9/9/03)]. 97. Despite all the flaws in Bar Counsel’s motion for a protective order , Chair Carpenter allowed Bar Counsel and Weisberg’s motion for a so-called protective order [Paper 73 (9/10/03)] and denied Johnson’s motion to strike [Paper 72 (9/10/03)]. 98. But according to Rule 3.18(a), nondispositive motions are to be determined by the hearing panel or hearing officer, not by the Chair. 99. In response to Johnson’s inquiry about the noncompliance with Rule 3.18(a), Fredrickson pointed to Rule 3.22(c).  100. But Rule 3.22(c), as well as 3.22(b)(2), presumes that “the Board” issues a protective order.  101. And Rule 3.22(b)(3) presumes the SJC issues the protective order.  102. We’ve done it that way ever since I’ve been here,” Fredrickson replied, in words  for all intents and purposes.\17/    17 To a similar excuse in Cohen, Justice Black wrote: . . . This argument -- that constitutional rights are to be determined by long-standing practices rather than the words of the Constitution -- is not, as the majority points out, a new one. It lay at the basis of two of this Court's more renowned decisions -- Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 [1857], and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 [1896]. But cf.Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 [1954]. The notion that a violation of the plain language of the Constitution can gain legal stature by long-continued practice is not one I can subscribe to. A majority group, as de Tocqueville observed, too often "claims the right not only of making the laws, but of breaking the laws it has made." De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 1, at 261. Cohen, at 142 n.23 (dissenting). 103. Johnson reminded Fredrickson that none of the subsections of Rule 3.22 gives Ellen Carpenter the authority as Chair to rule on a motion for a protective order. 104. Fredrickson’s explanation was that the Chair can appoint herself to act for the Board. 105. Johnson told him, in words for all intents and purposes having the meaning, “But the rules make a distinction between ‘the Chair’ and ‘the Board,’ and she’s not acknowledging that.  Every word has meaning.” 106. Johnson “asked Fredrickson, “How long have you been there?” 107. Fredrickson replied, “Since 1989.” 108. Johnson commented to him, “Well, you’ve been doing it wrong that long.” 109. If Rule 3.22(c) is as Carpenter and Fredrickson are interpreting it, Rule 3.22(c) is in conflict with Rules 3.18(a) and 3.18(b).  110. If Rule 3.22(c) is interpreted literally in accordance with the words used and the definitions given in Rule 1.2, then the 12 Board members, people appointed from time to time by the SJC, must determine the motion.  111. Johnson had seven days within which to appeal Carpenter’s decision.  But it would have been futile: a. Johnson’s views on the need for judicial accountability and the need for court reform are well-known to the courts, b. the BBO and OBC are the SJC’s offspring, c. Carpenter’s colleague and former partner is sitting on the SJC bench that appointed her to the Board, and d. Johnson had recently brought a few cases to the SJC, but the SJC made what Johnson perceived to be unconscionable decisions on those few cases.\18/    . 18For details of author’s recent SJC cases, see falseallegations.com/drano88-abend-rule-27-letter-to-appeals-court.htm In Abend v. Myerson et al, the jury awarded approximately $250,000, but despite the trial judge having dismissed the counterclaim, he allowed the subtraction of a sum requested in the counterclaim. In effect, that ruling allowed "Gimbels" to lessen its debt to Abend by a sum "Macy’s" had given her. To top it off, SJC Justice Roderick L. Ireland unjustifiably, if not viciously, awarded the multimillion dollar defendant estate attorneys’ fees for a Rule 27.1 appeal. Johnson believes the award was to smite Johnson’s crusade to abolish judicial immunity. Abend is little, old, still hard-working lady over 70 years old whom the decedent did not pay for her extraordinary services she rendered to him for the last five years of his life, when he was failing from ill health (cancer, diabetes, etc.). He also did not pay into employer social security for her. Shame on the courts.     N0TE On 31 December 2003, about a week after this amended appeal was filed seeking $$$ millions from her old working buddies, , new Appeals Court Judge Cynthia Cohen, who had been VICE CHAIR OF THE BBO BEFORE HER RECENT APPOINTMENT TO THE APPEALS COURT  and Judge Mel Greenberg ORDERED ABEND to pay the insurance lawyers $29,000.  Mind you, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is Abend whom the jury believed. It is from a jury award of $250,000 that the judges -- in different ways -- began subtracting. The last two deductions have nothing to do with Abend  or ith justice.  They have everything to do with getting Johnson. falseallegations.com/drano87-gordon-rule-27-letter-to-appeals-court.htm In Cholfin v. Gordon, Gordon represented that he was Cholfin’s lawyer and put an attorney’s lien on her case, but he was not her lawyer. When Gordon moved to compel her phone number, Judge James McHugh wrote in his decision that Gordon should look it up in the phone book. And although Judge McHugh also declared the case ready for trial, Judge Wendi Gershengorn curiously. if not suspiciously (her husband is a well-known doctor), gave Gordon the summary judgment sought by his malpractice-insurance lawyers. Gershengorn found Cholfin’s case to be frivolous. Cholfin appealed but got no relief. Proposition: Let any lawyer put a lien on any stranger’s case. The higher courts do not mind the serious transgression of either the defendant lawyer or the rascally judge. falseallegations.com/drano94-restraining-order-in-another-state.htm The court refused to stop a trial of for a non-existent crime and wrote, in effect, let the man appeal after conviction. (This occurs when a DA misuses a previously uninterpreted and badly-written statute to hold onto a nonmeritorious case and then the SJC refuses to interpret it BEFORE trial.) Fortunately, a second district court judge chastised the ADA and dismissed the case after the 211:3 did not work. Fortunately, a jury acquitted another of Johnson’s clients – Meuse -- in minutes after a 5-day trial because of a similar circumstance . . . where the Court refused to interpret the statute and stop the unlawful prosecution. The Courts and the DAs have no right to complain of a cut budget. They waste the money that could be put to better use. They, like the Katzenjammer Kids, brought it upon themselves., and likely shall continue to do so until the legislature is better-informed in the practice of law and there is serious court reform. Motion to Preclude  112. Bar Counsel also brought a motion to preclude Johnson from contesting the allegations of Count III of Petition for Discipline [Paper 12 (5/22/03)]. 113. Johnson opposed Bar Counsel’s motion for preclusion [Paper 57 (8/29/03)] and Bar Counsel replied [Paper 68 (9/09/03)]. 114. Chair Carpenter allowed Bar Counsel’s motion for issue preclusion of allegations of  Count III [Paper 76 (9/10/03)] and then corrected her order [Paper 77 (9/11/03)]. 115. In allowing the motion to preclude, Carpenter usurped the power of Special Hearing Officer Phillips, as identified in Rule 3.18(a). 116. The motive of Carpenter and likely persons unidentified was to preclude Johnson from showing that the lower-court orders were not only “bad,” they were based on fabricated facts and findings and on, literally, a materially altered document [see Figures 2(a-e)].     Figure 2(a): Note the words "filed open court  3-03-95" at the top of the paper. Note the two date-stamps, particularly the topmost one.  Are the numerals 22 or 03??? \19/ 19 AFTER Johnson argued on March 22d that no such order  issued on March 3d and AFTER a diligent clerk had typed the March 22 endorsement into the docket sheet, McGill had to have changed the little rubber wheel on his date-stamp and added the top endorsement. If the lower endorsement had not already been on the page, he would not have had to squinch up his signature to avoid overwriting the words "After further." If the upper endorsement had been on the page on March 3d, it would have appeared in the March 7th Disposition Notice.  It was not included in that notice. If the upper endorsement had been on the page on March 3d, it would have appeared in the docket sheet entries for March 3d.  It is NOT in the docket sheet entries for March 3d. If the upper endorsement had been on the page on March 22d, it would have appeared in the docket sheet entries for March 22d.  It is NOT in the docket sheet entries for March 22d.   In fact, it appears nowhere in the docket sheets. If the notations "62.6" and "92-7907" were on the page on March 3d, they would have been there on March 22d, but they are not. Bar Counsel should have reported McGill to the Commission on Judicial Conduct.  Next look at another version of the endorsement on Motion 157 in Exhibit 2(b).  It was altered by opposing counsel, Mark O'Connor.   Compare the scanned in images of the fabricated document with the original endorsed page.  Criminal charges should be brought against O’Connor.   Excerpt from Figure 2(b).  Newly fabricated endorsement. Note the " missing bottom loop of the "g" in "hearing" l and the tail of the "M" in "McGill" still  between the typed words "counsel" and "or."          Excerpt from Figure 2(c). Enlargement of endorsement. The tail of the "M" between "counsel" and "or" is more visible as well the other residual marks – left over from the days of "White-out." Excerpt from Figure 2(d).  Compare the date stamp with that in Figure 2(e)  Excerpt from Figure 2(e) 117. The Board Rules are written in contemplation that a respondent to a petition for dis-cipline will have facts in mitigation.  118. Rule 3.15(f) requires that mitigation be pled.  Rule 3.15(f) is the equivalent, one presumes, of an affirmative defense, which means that it must be pled or it is forfeited.  And John-son pled mitigation.\20/ 20"There is something specially repugnant to justice in using rules of practice in such a manner as to debar a prisoner from defending himself, especially when the professed object of the rules so used is to provide for his defense." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 822-823 (1975), quoting 1 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, 341-342 (1883). 119. When Johnson phoned Fredrickson and asked when to expect the rulings on a pile of her own motions, he said, “They just went out.  You’ll have them by tomorrow.” 120. Johnson question him, “Denied, are they?” 121. Fredrickson responded, “You didn’t expect anything else, did you?” 122. “I guess not. . . .  As I’ve been saying, Due process went out the window a while ago.  You really are running a Star Chamber there.” 123. “It’s due,” Fredrickson said, in a voice dripping with condemnation.  “It’s due.”\21/ 21 The majority is holding . . . that lawyers are not entitled to the full sweep of due process protections because they had no such protections against judges or their fellow lawyers in England. But I see no reason why this generation of Americans should be deprived of a part of its Bill of Rights on the basis of medieval English practices that our Forefathers left England, fought a revolution and wrote a Constitution to get rid of. Cohen, at 142 (Justice Black, with whom Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas concurred, dissenting). Fearing that the majority opinion in Cohen implied that "a lawyer is not to have the protection of the First Amendment with regard to his private beliefs and associations whenever his exercise of those freedoms might interfere with his duty to ‘co-operate’ with a judge’" [id. at 145], they concurred.   It seems to me that the majority takes a fundamentally unsound position when it endorses a practice based upon the artificial notion that rights and privileges can be stripped from a man in his capacity as a lawyer without affecting the rights and privileges of that man as a man. Id. at 145 (dissent). The Trial Closes In Substantive Issues 124. Five weeks prior to the scheduled trial, Crane through Assistant Bar Counsel Weisberg informed Johnson in words for all intents and purposes that he wanted to censor 32 of her Drano Series website files [see §45, supra] and that he would likely call no witnesses to trial. 125. Two weeks prior to trial, on 18 November 2003, the BBO withheld and/or denied exculpatory evidence from Johnson, specifically,  a. the BBO denied Johnson’s motion for copies of tape of any proceedings in which respondent participated, specifically of the hearing of 17 December 1998, and of which Crane was in possession.[Paper 98 (11/4/03); DENIED 11/18/03] b. the BBO denied Johnson’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Admission of Any Appeals Court or Supreme Judicial Court Decisions Denied [Paper 96 (11/4/03)] c. the BBO withheld from Johnson the original of the alleged order of 3 March 1995, of which Judge Paul McGill found Johnson in contempt i. the BBO withheld it by denying Johnson’s motion to compel the production of it from OBC.  Johnson wanted the alleged order as it allegedly actually appeared on 3 March 1995 and not on 22 March 1995  [Paper  93 (11/6/03); DENIED 11/18/03]. ii. The noncompliance with that phantom order formed the basis of Bar Counsel’s allegation that Johnson violated some Rule of Professional Conduct. Johnson’s Attempt to Narrow the Issues 126. Throughout the month of November 2003, Johnson filed many motions with the goal to narrow the issues for trial, given that (a) the BBO had denied her motions for more definite statements, (b) it was not substantially clear with what Johnson was being charged, (c) Bar Counsel Crane’s petition arose from three entirely unrelated matters – different people, different eras, different underlying matters: a custody and paternity action ongoing from 1988 into 2002 (seven successive counsel) a fee dispute from 1999 a whistleblower case from 1994-1998 127. Bar Counsel and the BBO refused to inform Johnson with sufficient particularity of that which she was being charged. 128. Because the charges were insufficiently particular, or vague, Johnson listed as potential trial witnesses all those people named in the 32 website files identified by Bar Counsel in his list of 100-plus trial exhibits plus those she would need for her defense and impeachment purposes. 129. SHO Herbert Phillips ordered Johnson to provide witness summaries of each of the witnesses named by Johnson in her list of proposed trial witnesses.  130. Given that the order came so close to trial, the order was burdensome and harassing to Johnson. 131. SHO Herbert Phillips did not order Crane to provide summaries of each of his proposed trial exhibits.  132. Given that Crane was using the documents in lieu of witnesses, the documents were in fact the OBC and Bar Counsel’s de facto witnesses. 133. Johnson filed a Motion for Bar Counsel to Write Paragraph Summaries of the Purpose of Introducing Each of 101 Documents [Paper 97 (11/7/03)].  Johnson’s purpose in filing the motion was to be able to learn the reason Crane was offering each of his 101 documents.  134. At a prehearing conference on 17 November 2003, Phillips told the stenographer repeatedly that the proceeding was “off the record” when Johnson spoke. 135. Without explanation, on 18 November 2003, Phillips denied Johnson’s motion for paragraph summaries of Crane’s documents ,and thus did not order Crane to write paragraph summaries of his documents, which were quasi-witnesses.  136. In ordering Johnson to write witness summaries and not ordering Crane to write document or quasiwitness summaries, Phillips treated the Bar Counsel and Johnson in a disparate manner. 137. The motions Johnson filed in order to narrow the issues for trial were: Motion in Limine to Preclude Use of Chalk at Trial [Paper 112; DENIED without prejudice 11/18/03].   Motion in Limine to Preclude Drano Series and All Other Documents Related to Count One If Bar Counsel Is Not Going to Call, or Issue the Subpoenas Requested by Respondent for, Robyn Gerry-Sylvia, Brenden Linnehan A/K/A Brenden Sylvia, Deborah Wolf, Bruce Lider , Judge Ronald Harper, Christopher Salt, Sandra Fyfe, Eileen Kern, John "Jack" McCarthy, Eli Newberger, Joseph Fitzgerald and Judge Mark Lawton As Witnesses in the Case Denied [Paper 100 (11/5/03); DENIED by Phillips on 11/18/03]. Motion in Limine to Preclude Any and All Drano Series and All Other Documents Related to Count Two If Bar Counsel Is Not Going to Call, Issue the Subpoenas Requested by Respondent for Deborah Sano, Harry Sano, their Four Daughters and the Three Sons-In-Law, Richard Simons, William Simons, or to Issue the Subpoenas Requested by Respondent for the Persons Identified on Her Proposed List of Witnesses As Witnesses 37 Through 49 [Paper 101 (11/5/03); DENIED by Phillips on 11/18/03]. Motion in Limine to Preclude Drano Series and All Other Documents Related to Count Three If Bar Counsel Is Not Going to Call, or Issue the Subpoenas Requested by Respondent for Mark C. O’Connor, Paul McGill and Witnesses on Respondent’s Witness List Number 50-51, 54-66, 69-88 [Paper 102 (11/5/03); DENIED by Phillips on 11/18/03].   Motion to Dismiss Count I on the Grounds That Without Witnesses, Bar Counsel Cannot Make Out Prima Facie Case for Count I  [Filed 11/7/03); docketed 11/10/03; DENIED 12/1/03 by M. Ellen Carpenter, signed by June Risk on her behalf]   Motion to Dismiss Count II on the Grounds That the Fee Dispute Involves A Fee That Is Not Clearly Excessive and It Outside the Jurisdiction of the Board of Bar Overseers  [Filed 11/7/03); docketed 11/10/03; DENIED by M. Ellen Carpenter, signed by June Risk on her behalf on 12/1/03].   Motion to Dismiss All Allegations of Violating Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct Denied  [Paper filed 11/28/03; docketed 12/1/03, DENIED by M. Ellen Carpenter, signed by June Risk on her behalf on 12/1/03]   Motion to Dismiss Count I on the Grounds That  Without an Adjudication by an Article III Court, There Can Be No Ethical Violation of Professional Ethics [Paper filed 11/28/03; docketed 12/1/03; DENIED by M. Ellen Carpenter, signed by June Risk on her behalf on 12/1/03 ] 138. On or around 20 November 2003, Johnson filed “Respondent’s Summaries of Testimony of Expected Witnesses Ordered over Respondent’s Objections” and argued that until she knew the purpose of Crane’s 100-plus exhibits, she could only give general summaries. 139. On 20 November 2003, Johnson filed a “Motion to Vacate Order to Write Paragraph Summaries for Each of Respondent’s Proposed Witnesses Where Bar Counsel Has Not Been Ordered to Write Paragraph Summaries of the Purpose of Introducing Each of 101 Documents [Paper 113].   Phillips denied Johnson’s motion on 24 November 2003. 140. On 24 November 2003, Phillips ordered Johnson again to supply witness summaries.  141. On or around 24 November 2003, Johnson filed a Motion to Amend November 24th Order Regarding Summaries of Testimony of Proposed Witnesses.  That motion was denied by Phillips. 142. On or around 29 and 30 November 2003, Johnson filed the following eight motions to dismiss  the charges of alleged violations of diverse Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct.   Each motion was summarily denied by M. Ellen Carpenter.  All were docketed and endorsed “DENIED” on 12/1/03  by June Risk, legal administrative assistant, on Carpenter’s behalf: Mass. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a) Mass. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(a) Mass. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.9(a), (B1), (B2), (C1), and (C2)  Mass. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.15(a), (b), and (c) Mass. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16(D)  Mass. Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(c) Mass. Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4  Mass. Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(c), (D), and (H)  Procedural Issues: BBO Deprived Johnson of Her Right to Call Witnesses 143. Relying on Board Rule 4.5 not precluding Johnson, the Respondent, from causing service of her own subpoenas and not conflicting with M.G.L. c. 30A, Johnson filed on 4 and 5 November 2003 three motions regarding the subpoenas: one discussed in 37, supra; the second a Motion for Approval of Use of Uninterested Party for Service of Subpoenas As of November 24th, Still Not Acted Upon.  [Paper 91 (11/4/03); DENIED by Phillips on 11/18/03]; and the third, entitled, “Rule 4.5(a) Request for Full Board (Not the Chair Alone) to Issue Subpoenas Requiring Attendance and Testimony At Trial” [Paper 90; DENIED  by Phillips on 11/18/03]. 144. Whereas other motions had been decided on the same day or a day after they were filed, Johnson’s subpoena-related motions were not acted upon.  So, on 9 November 2003, Johnson wrote the BBO Registration Department and sought the home addresses of 37 lawyers and judges to be used to effect service.  The letter, too, was ignored.  After several phonecalls pursuing a response, Johnson learned the letter with the embedded list had been given to the “head” of the department: “Laurie.” 145. On 24 November, 2003, Johnson filed Motion to Compel "Laurie" of the Registration Department to Furnish the Addresses of Either the Residence or the Last office Address Furnished in the Last Registration of Each of the Lawyers Identified as Respondent’s Potential Witnesses.  The motion was ignored by the BBO and by Phillips. Miscellaneous Issues 146. During the next month, Johnson filed several motions, the purpose of which is self-explanatory and which fall into a miscellany category:    Motion for Referral by Bar to District Attorney for Criminal Prosecution of Mark C. O’Connor  [Paper 99 filed on 11/5/03; DENIED by Phillips on 11/18/03], Motion to Remove Susan Strauss-Weisberg As Prosecutor in This Case [Paper 95 filed on11/5/03; DENIED by Phillips on 11/18/03], Letter to Weisberg Sent Under Caption [Paper filed on 11/6/03] Motion for BBO to Pay for Cost of Copying Documents [Paper 94 (11/6/03); DENIED by Phillips on 11/18/03], Motion to Recuse Special Hearing officer Herbert P. Phillips [DENIED by Phillips 12/1/03]. The Trial Was Upon Us 147. A week before trial, on Monday, 24 November 2003, Johnson received notice that the Bar Counsel was denied for the first time two motions: Bar Counsel’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Contesting Authenticity  [DENIED by Phillips on 11/24/03] and Bar Counsel’s Motion for Videographed and Audiographed Proceedings [DENIED by Phillips on 11/24/03]. 148. For the BBO, Phillips denied Bar Counsel’s Motion for Videographed and Audiographed Proceedings because Johnson had only “conditionally opposed” it: “Johnson does not oppose videotaping and audiotaping of the proceedings. Johnson does object, however, to the reasons averred by Susan Strauss Weisberg [“Weisberg”] and Bar Counsel as a basis for their request”  (See exhibits in addendum.). 149.   Phillips denied it because he understood Johnson wanted the proceedings to be videographed and audiographed.  150. Also on 24 November 2003, Johnson received an order stating, “The merits of the underlying cases in Counts One and Two are irrelevant to this proceeding and testimony on these issues is excluded.”  (See Figure 3.) Figure 3. Paragraph 4 of Order of 24 November 2003 by Phillips 151. The merits of the underlying case of Count I constituted Johnson’s defense that public scrutiny is necessary to guard against unscrupulous judicial proceedings and that it was because of unscrupulous judicial proceedings (a) that James Linnehan had not seen his son in 12-15 years (depending on when counted from), (b) that he had never been given an opportunity to examine those adverse to him and the child, (c) that he had never been given an opportunity to take the stand, (d) that there never had been evidentiary hearing for any purpose during those years, (e) that he had seven lawyers, consecutively, trying to reunite father and child, and none was able to overcome the unscrupulousness of the courts. 152. The merits of the underlying matter of Count II – a fee dispute for consulting --  constituted Johnson’s defense that the fee was reasonable, that it was not excessive, that she had the written consent of the people to publish their story on her website (although Johnson did not publish anything until AFTER Crane through Weisberg informed Johnson the OBC was going forward with a petition). 153. That same order of 24 November 2003, included another order regarding retroactivity.  ”  (See Figure 4.) Figure 4. Paragraph 5 of Order of 24 November 2003 by Phillips 154. On or around 6 March 2003, Johnson filed, pursuant to M.G.L. c. 211 §3, a Com-plaint in the Nature of a Petition for a Writ Of Certiorari and to Invoke the General Superintendence of the Court on the issue of retroactivity of M.G.L. c. 209C §13 in the underlying case of Count I of the Petition for Discipline.  155. Crane had intervened in that case, the Linnehan case, and sought records he stated were confidential under M.G.L. c. 209C §13 prior to and after its amendment becoming effective on 31 March 1998. 156. Johnson did not represent Linnehan in 1998. 157. Johnson made an appearance in that case when she wrote a Complaint for Modification and then an Amended Complaint for Modification during the Spring of 2000. 158. In the Amended Complaint for Modification, Johnson used pre-1998 information because the standard so requires, the standard being the necessity to show how the circumstances out of which the original order arose substantially changed, making a new order appropriate. 159. Ultimately, Johnson posted the Amended Complaint for Modification on her website, falseallegations.com. 160. It is the posting of the Amended Complaint for Modification on her website of which Bar Counsel has complained, contending that the material within the presumptively public record is confidential and privileged.   Johnson contends otherwise. 161. In the BBO case, Johnson moved for the BBO to report the issue to the Supreme Judicial Court. 162. As grounds, Johnson contended that the BBO was without jurisdiction and/or authority to decide the issue of law, to wit, whether the amendment had retroactive or prospective effect..  Johnson contended that it looked backward and forward.  Bar Counsel disagreed. 163. Because Bar Counsel contends that c. 209C §13 looks only forward, he brought the charges against Johnson for uploading allegedly presumptively impounded materials to her website.  (See at 12/8/03 in the addendum, Johnson’s Motion for BBO to Report Issue of Whether M.G.L. 209C, §13, As Amended, Effective March 31, 1998, Has Retroactive or Prospective Effect.)  164. Phillips’ same order of 24 November 2003, included another order regarding harm.   (See Figure 5.) Figure 5. Paragraph 6 of Order of 24 November 2003 by Phillips 165. To put in evidence of mental or emotional harm, Bar Counsel had the burden or was obliged to put on the human being who allegedly suffered the mental or emotional harm, but wanted to put that evidence in through his prosecutor’s letter to Johnson. 166. And on 24 November 2003, Johnson received an order allowing Bar Counsel to prove authenticity by affidavit (See Figure 6), by which they would be allowed to overcome Johnson’s objection on the grounds that Weisberg would become a fact witness for Counts I and II and that Johnson needed a human to cross-examine. Figure 6. A Second Order of 24 November 2003 by Phillips 167. There was at least one known materially altered document in the underlying case that was the subject of Count III. 168. Bar Counsel Crane through Weisberg averred that certain documents had been up-loaded to Johnson’s website that had never been uploaded to her website. 169. Bar Counsel Crane through Weisberg averred that certain documents were privileged and confidential but were not. 170.  Bar Counsel Crane through Weisberg averred that certain documents were filed in Juvenile Court but were not. 171. Authenticity was an issue for the trial. 172. There were considerable number of falsities – not typographical errors or inadver-tent slip-ups – in the Petition for Discipline regarding the documents Bar Counsel was going to offer at trial. 173. Johnson was entitled to examine the authors of the documents before the documents were accepted as evidence. On or around 28 November 2003, Johnson filed a Notice to Board of Bar Overseers and the Special Hearing Officer Herbert P. Phillips which reads as in Figure 7:     Now comes Respondent Barbara C. Johnson [“Johnson”] to give notice that the order received at 11:30 this morning of Friday, 28 November 2003 is unconstitutional in that it dares outrageously to deny Johnson the ability to defend herself against the bogus charges by Bar Counsel. It is one thing for the BBO via the Special Hearing Officer Herbert Phillips [“SHO”] to say Johnson cannot put testimony on at trial, but another to say that the BBO and/or the SHO may control who Johnson can call as a witness.  SHO’s several orders, particularly the one dated November 26th and received this morning, November 28th, are proof of the continuing malicious conduct of the BBO and Phillips to violate Johnson’s rights of due process.   Johnson may call any witness she wants by subpoena.   The BBO and/or the SHO may NOT dictate whom Johnson has the right to call as a witness.  G.L. c. 233 §1, which reads: Chapter 233: Section 1 Issuance of summonses for witnesses Section 1.  A clerk of a court of record, a notary public or a justice of the peace may issue summonses for witnesses in all cases pending before courts, magistrates, auditors, referees, arbitrators or other persons authorized to examine witnesses, and at all hearings upon applications for complaints wherein a person may be charged with the commission of a crime; but a notary public or a justice of the peace shall not issue sum-monses for witnesses in criminal cases except upon request of the attorney general, district attorney or other person who acts in  the case in behalf of the commonwealth or of the defendant.  If the summons is issued at the request of the defendant that fact shall be stated therein. The summons shall be in the form heretofore adopted and commonly used, but may be altered from time to time like other writs. The statutory language is unambiguous and means that SHO Phillips cannot prevent Johnson from subpoenaing or calling witnesses.  Johnson has the power to subpoena witnesses under G.L. c. 233, §8.  Foster from Gloucester, Inc. v. City Council of Gloucester, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 284, 292 (1980), citing Bloom v. City of Worcester,  363 Mass 136, 162-163 (1973).  Pursuant to G.L.c. 233, ss. 4-6, a person who fails, without sufficient excuse, to appear as a witness after being "duly summonsed" remains subject to the following: liability "to the aggrieved party in tort for all damages caused by such failure" to appear; punishment by fine for contempt of court;  and the issuance of a warrant to bring him before the court to "answer for the contempt and also to testify in the case in which he was summonsed." See, as to discretionary nature of an order to appear,  Bloom v. City of Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 161 (1973). St. Leger v. Agency Rent A Car, Inc., 1993 WL 346464 *3 n. 3, 1993 Mass.App.Div. 170, n. 3 (1993).   See also Trial Handbook, Swartz, §11.1. See other cases under the statute. Figure 7. Notice to Board of Bar Overseers and the Special Hearing Officer Herbert P. Phillips  174. At 11:30 on the morning of Friday, 28 November 2003, Johnson received seven subpoenas issued by Board of Bar Member Attorney Janet Kenton-Walker.  Johnson was not being allowed to subpoena documents along with the persons to the hearing. 175. On 2 December 2003, Herbert Phillips served in hand on Johnson his order quashing all subpoenas not issued by the Board.  .  (See Figure 8.) Figure 8. An Order of 2 December  2003, by Phillips 176. Trial had been scheduled for December 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, and 11, 2003. 177. The proceeding began on 2 December 2003. 178. On 2 December 2003, Assistant Bar Counsel Weisberg gave her Opening Statement. 179. On 2 December 2003, two of Johnson’s witnesses appeared and Phillips asked whether they were here because of Johnson’s subpoenas, and when they said, Yes, Phillips excused them and told them the subpoenas were invalid and they could leave. 180. On 2 December 2003, Johnson began her Opening Statement. 181. In the middle of Johnson’s Opening Statement, Weisberg objected when Johnson mentioned the names of the complainants and anticipated witnesses.  182. Weisberg claimed there had been a protective order on 10 September 2003 that precluded Johnson from mentioning their names. 183. Johnson knew of no such order regarding mentioning the names orally, but attempted to identify the persons without using their real names, by substituting the words “man,” “woman,” “male,” “female,” etc.  184. A few times, she slipped by saying the first name of a complainant, viz., Robyn. 185. Phillips was then prodded literally and physically and encouraged and advised by Assistant General Counsel Carol Wagner, who had admitted at the prehearing conference on 17 November 2003 that she was his counsel, to order the small audience composed of members of the public out of the courtroom. 186. Phillips then ordered the public audience from the hearing room on the first day of the scheduled trial. 187. A member of the public immediately stood to express his outrage,\22/ Phillips refused to rescind his order to the public to leave, Johnson asked him to reconsider, Phillips refused (saying her paralegal could stay), Johnson told Phillips she did not trust him and the she feared staying without witnesses (discounting her “paralegal,” for he was vulnerable to the BBO later saying that he was not a “long-arm” witness), and then Johnson walked out with the last of the public to leave.  22 See entry for 12/5/03. That person wrote an unsolicited letter; it is attached to Johnson’s Motion to Dismiss All Counts on Grounds of BBO Violating Board Rule 3.22(B) and Constitutional Rights to a Public Hearing. 188. Johnson was entitled to a hearing open to the public. 189. Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss All Counts on Grounds of BBO Violating Board Rule 3.22(b) and Constitutional Rights to A Public Hearing.  It was denied on 8 December 2003 [filed 12/5/03; denied 12/8/03, signed “per Board Chair” by Michael Fredrickson]. 190. On 8 December 2003, Johnson filed a Motion for BBO to Report Issue of Whether M.G.L. 209c, §13, As Amended, Effective March 31, 1998, Has Retroactive or Prospective Effect. 191. The motion cited in ¶190 was denied by the Chair M. Ellen Carpenter because there were names in it. 192. Chair M. Ellen Carpenter again usurped power that was not hers: she did not have the authority under the Board’s own rules to decide the motion cited in ¶190. 193.  On 9 December 2003, Johnson filed a Petition for Board Rule 3.59 Rehearing or Alternatively, Motion to Vacate Unlawful BBO Rulings Made During the Unlawful Proceeding on 2 December 2003.  The Petition was denied on 12 December 2003 by Phillips. 194. On 9 December 2003, Johnson also filed a Motion for Conference with the Twelve (12) Members of the Board of Bar 2003 [Denied on 12/12/03 by Phillips]. 195. On 12 December 2003, Johnson filed a Motion to Reconsider Respondent's Petition for Board Rule 3.59 Rehearing or Alternatively, Motion to Vacate Unlawful BBO Rulings Made During the Unlawful Proceeding on 2 December 2003 [docketed 12/15/03; reconsideration allowed, but decision to deny motion for new hearing or vacate rulings, denied 12/15/03, signed “per Herbert Phillips” by Michael Fredrickson]. COUNT 1: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (that Bar disciplinary proceeding is a quasicriminal proceeding and that whether or not the proceeding is quasicriminal, respondents are entitled to a jury trial) 196. Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 195 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth.  197. There are two actual controversies: (1) whether a Bar disciplinary proceeding is a quasicriminal proceeding and (2) whether attorney respondents, including Johnson, are entitled to a jury trial, regardless of whether the proceeding is quasicriminal or civil. 198. By denying Johnson the right to trial by jury, she has been deprived of her rights under article XV of the Mass. Declaration of Rights. 199. The United States Supreme Court declared disbarment proceedings to be of a “quasi-criminal nature.” In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. (Ohio) 544, 551 (1968); Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.(N.J.) 423,  438 (1982) (Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment).  200. The quasicriminal nature of the proceedings triggers article XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, allowing Johnson to present all proofs favorable to her, to meet witnesses against her face to face, to be fully heard in her defense, and not to be deprived of her property but by the judgment of her peers, which means a jury trial. 201. In contrast, the Massachusetts SJC and Fredrickson, the bulwark of the BBO privy council, deem disciplinary proceedings to be civil in nature and refuse to accept the United States Supreme Court’s decisions on the issue as the last word. 202. Notwithstanding the controversy over whether bar disciplinary proceedings are civil, criminal, or quasicriminal in nature, so long as they are on the common-law side of the court, attorneys are entitled to a jury trial in a prosecution brought by the Bar Counsel.\23/ 23 The difference between the natures has other implications, too. The significance of the civil-criminal dichotomy is that a criminal defendant has a right not to testify, and cannot suffer an adverse ruling from not testifying. In a civil case, if the defendant does not respond, there is an adverse inference drawn, and if he were to answer, it would be against his or her interest. Brown v. U.S., 356 U.S. (Mich.) 148, 158-159 (1958); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. (Cal.) 308, 318-319 (1976). This part of stare decisis, the Bar finds worthy of accepting. Those decisions which the Bar finds adverse to its humungous power, the Bar ignores. In the instant case, Johnson has been forthright and wants to testify, but the difference might be significant to other lawyers confronting the Board. 203. Historically, in Massachusetts, attorney-discipline cases have been identified as being on the common-law side of the court, making a jury trial legally possible.  Boston Bar Ass'n v. Greenhood, 168 Mass. 169, 183 (1897).\24/ 24 In In re Mayberry, 295 Mass. 155, 166, 168 (1936), however, the Court found that the respondent was not prejudiced by the findings of a single justice rather than by jurors because the ". . . jurors [were] of low grade in respect to intelligence and character." In re Sleeper, 251 Mass. 6, 12 (1925). 204. Article XV of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights is another source of Respondent Johnson’s right to a jury trial.\25/ 25 Article XV. In all controversies concerning property, and in all suits between two or more persons, except in cases in which it has heretofore been otherways used and practiced, the parties have a right to a trial by jury; and this method of procedure shall be held sacred, unless, in causes arising on the high seas, and such as relate to mariners' wages, the legislature shall hereafter find it necessary to alter it Article XV of the Declaration of Rights, Part the First, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 205.  Even “[a]ctions for declaratory judgment can . . . be heard by a jury if there are triable issues of fact and the judge determines that a jury traditionally would have determined those issues.”  New Bedford Housing Authority v. Olan, 50 Mass.App.Ct. 188, 197 (2000).  The significance of the New Bedford decision was that even equitable claims could be given to a jury.  206. And after New Bedford, the Court in Rosati v. Boston Pipe Covering, Inc., 434 Mass. 349, 350 (2001) further echoed the reasoning in that decision. 207. If this controversy is not resolved, and the Massachusetts judicial branch has shown that it is not willing to resolve it, there will be further litigation.\26/ 26The Massachusetts judicial branch has failed to resolve this conflict, which has inevitably led to this litigation, and has neither provided a remedy, as guaranteed by Article XI of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, nor been accountable, as guaranteed by Article V of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, for the unlawful acts of the judiciary. In so doing, the Massachusetts judicial branch has violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. COUNT 2: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (facial and as-applied challenges to constitutionality  of Board of Bar Overseers Rules) 208. Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 207 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth. 209. The Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers were promulgated pursuant to Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, Section 5(3)(i). 210. There are actual controversies, including but not limited to, the following:  (a) whether the secrecy of the initial so-called investigation is unconstitutional.  See Board Rules 4.4 and 4.7, (b) whether giving the Board the right to subpoena whomever they want but denying the identifiable class of practicing lawyers the right to subpoena whomever they want is discriminatory and thus unconstitutional both on the face of the rules as well as how they are applied, \27/ 27Johnson understands well that there are circumstances when a witness is not allowed, but in the circumstances of the BBO actions, the exclusion for unidentified reasons is violative of her rights to due process and equal protection. (c) whether the denial of Johnson’s right to rely on the Rules of Civil Procedure, such as those for discovery, is unconstitutional, (d) whether the absence of a provision allowing discovery, such as  the right to serve Interrogatories on the opposing party, the right to serve Requests for Production of Documents,  the right to conduct depositions – such absence being more akin to those of Criminal Procedure, coupled with the BBO’s assertion that the proceedings are civil in nature and not quasicriminal in nature, makes the Board Rules unconstitutional on their face and/or as applied,\28/  28The word "respondent" is a euphemism. The property rights of respondents are at risk. (e) whether the denial of Johnson’s Motion for a More Definite Statement is unconstitutional.. 211. If these controversies are not resolved, and the Massachusetts judicial branch has shown that it is not willing to resolve it, there will be further litigation.\29/ 29The Massachusetts judicial branch has failed to resolve this conflict, which has inevitably led to this litigation, and has neither provided a remedy, as guaranteed by Article XI of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, nor been accountable, as guaranteed by Article V of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, for the unlawful acts of the judiciary. In so doing, the Massachusetts judicial branch has violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 212. Johnson contends that the Board Rules are unconstitutional.  213. Johnson and others are further hampered by  (a) there being no predictable rules of evidence,  (b) there being no available records as to the admissibility of documents in past cases,  (c) a unique interpretation of the scope of confidentiality and entitlement at the Bar,  (d) not being able to take a deposition unless the witness is not subject to service of subpoena or unable to attend hearing because of age, illness, or other infirmity, and (e) prior approval of the Board or the hearing panel or officer being required before the deposition may be taken, (f) privacy of the accused attorney not being considered by the rules.  See Rule 4.7(a), (g) Bar Counsel being allowed to take a deposition by “investigatory subpoena,” while the respondent, or accused attorney, is not entitled either to know or to be present at a deposition taken prior to the petition for discipline issuing, but is entitled to be present after the petition issues [Rule 4.4(c)], (h) there being no safeguards for respondents from abuse by the Board and its Chair or General Counsel.  214. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has failed to correct the Board Rules. 215. The legislature has failed to write a statute that prevents and protects against injury to the lawyers who are subject to victimization by the Board Rules. 216. The Board Rules have no safeguards and no due-process provisions. 217. Bestowed with extraordinary powers and themselves unregulated, the BBO and the OBC use arbitrary procedures and violate their own Board Rules. 218. The judicial branch, on behalf of the Commonwealth, has violated Article V of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights\30/ by bestowing quasijudicial immunity, pursuant to §9(3) of Massachusetts SJC Rule 4:01, on “[t]he Board, members of the Board and its staff, members of hearing committees, special hearing officers, and the bar counsel and members of his or her staff.”  30Art. V of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights reads: "All power residing originally in the people, and being derived from them, the magistrates and officers of government, visited with authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are their substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them." 219. Historically, Article V of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights abrogated the common law rule of sovereign immunity, which had theretofore immunized public entities from suit in tort claims arising from both the intentional and the negligent acts or omissions of public employees. 220. The lack of accountability, afforded by the bestowal of immunity from liability is violative of Article V of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  221. The Board Rules fail to ensure that lawyers have or will have an opportunity to ex-ercise their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws. 222. The Board Rules provide no safeguards as to the competency and honesty of the Board, its members, its staff, the hearing committees, any special hearing officer. 223. The Board Rules provide no standards by which the Board, its members, its staff, the hearing committees, and any special hearing officer are to work. 224. The Board Rules provide no standard of review to be used to determine that competency or honesty prevails in the process. 225. The Board Rules provide no requirement of an evidentiary hearing at which the parties can rebut any materials adverse to a party.  226. If this controversy is not resolved, there will be further litigation.\31/ 31The Massachusetts judicial branch has failed to resolve this conflict, which has inevitably led to this litigation, and has neither provided a remedy, as guaranteed by Article XI of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, nor been accountable, as guaranteed by Article V of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, for the unlawful acts of the judiciary. In so doing, the Massachusetts judicial branch has violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. COUNT 3: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT ATTORNEYS ARE ENTITLED TO  THE FULL SWEEP OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES, AND IMMUNITIES,  DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION  227. Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 226 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth. 228. There are actual controversies, including, but not limited to, whether Johnson, as a lawyer, has a right to the full sweep of rights, privileges, immunities, due process and equal protection , including the First Amendment rights to political speech and free expression., and the right to defend herself against adversaries. 229. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff has had a right under the due process and equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions not to be deprived by the government of her constitutionally protected interest in her license to practice law, her to exercise her right to political speech and free expression.  U.S.C. Const.Amend. 1, 14; M.G.L. Const. Pt. 1, Art. 10.\32/ 32 Attorneys must be able to avail themselves of "the general rules which govern society." Cohen v Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 136 (1961) (Mr. Justice Black, with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas concur, dissenting). [Cohen, a 5-to-4 decision, was overruled in Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 (U.S.N.Y. 1967).] In Cohen, some 40 years ago, Messrs. Justice Black, Chief Justice Warren, and Justice Douglas eloquently warned that the important role that lawyers are to play in society makes it all the more imperative that they not be discriminated against and not be deprived of "the basic freedoms that are designed to protect the individual against the tyrannical exertion of governmental power." Cohen, at 138. Singling out "groups for special treatment with regard to certain constitutional privileges" is "clearly unconstitutional." Id., at 137 n. 13, citing Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 456-467 (1954). When the Founders of this Nation drew up our Constitution, they were uneasily aware of this English practice, both as it had prevailed in that country and as it had been experienced in the colonies prior to the Revolution. Particularly fresh in their minds was the treatment that had been accorded the lawyers who had sought to defend John Peter Zenger against a charge of seditious libel before a royal court in New York in 1735. These two lawyers had been summarily disbarred by the judges presiding at that trial for [filing Exceptions after being warned not to do so]. It is to the lasting credit and renown of the colonial bar that Andrew Hamilton, a lawyer of Philadelphia, defied the hostility of the judges, defended and brought about the acquittal of Zenger. Cohen, at 140-141. Such language throughout the dissents to the later-overruled majority report in Cohen makes this author confident that were these high justices here today, it is likely they would write, "In Medieval England, the BBO/OBC would have become as justly vilified as the Star Chamber."   230. The BBO and the Bar Counsel disagree with Johnson that she has a right under the due process and equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions not to be deprived by the government of her constitutionally protected interest in her license to practice law. 231. The BBO and the Bar Counsel disagree with Johnson that she has a right under the First Amendment to political speech. 232. The BBO and the Bar Counsel disagree with Johnson that she has a right under the First Amendment to free expression. 233. The BBO and the Bar Counsel disagree with Johnson that she has a right to defend herself against adversaries. 234. The BBO and the Bar Counsel disagree with Johnson that she has a right to pierce immunities not made into law by our legislatures. 235. The BBO and the Bar Counsel disagree with Johnson that article V of the Mass. Declaration of rights make all magistrates and officers of all three branches of government ac-countable to all the people, including Johnson, at all times. 236. The BBO and the Bar Counsel contend that Johnson has no rights to due process and equal protection of the laws except those of which they approve. 237. As a result, acting under the color of law, Defendants worked a denial of Johnson's rights, privileges or immunities secured by the United States Constitution or by Federal law\33/ and guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 33Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1061 (1st Cir. 1997); McNamara v. Honeyman, 406 Mass. 43, 52 (1989). 238. Defendants unlawfully and knowingly also breached the Board Rules 1.2, 3.15(f), 3.18(a), 3.18(b), 3.22(b)(2), 3.22(b)(3), 3.22(c), which unlawful acts were expressly committed in the absence of jurisdiction,\34/ to wit,  34 Rankin v. Howard. 633 F.2d 844 (1980), cert. denied sub nom., Zeller v. Rankin, 451 U.S. 939 (1980). Chair Carpenter did not have the power and/or authority or the discretion to usurp the powers of other persons as named in the Board Rules, Chair Carpenter and SHO Phillips ignored the common law,  Chair Carpenter and SHO Phillips and the BBO knowingly impeded and hindered the due course of justice, with the intent to deny Johnson due process and the equal protection of the laws, which unlawful acts were expressly committed in the absence of jurisdiction, SHO Phillips, aided and abetted by Assistant General Counsel Carol Wagner, knowingly deprived Johnson due process and the equal protection of the laws when Phillips ordered the public out of the room in which the trial against Respondent was taking place.  Johnson was entitled to have a public trial, and the public had the right to participate in that trial, SHO Phillips knowingly deprived Johnson due process and the equal protection of the laws when he ruled Johnson’s duly served trial-witness subpoenas invalid, SHO Phillips knowingly deprived Johnson due process and the equal protection of the laws when he ruled that the merits of the underlying cases were irrelevant when, in fact, they contained Johnson’s defenses. 239. As a result of Defendants' concerted unlawful and malicious conduct, Johnson is at jeopardy of being irreparably harmed not only from being deprived of her right to remain free from having to answer and stand trial for baseless charges but also from the obloquy of the community. 240. Without due process of law, and deprived of her rights to due process and the equal protection of the laws, the due course of justice has been and shall be impeded, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Four-teenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States.  241. Johnson was harmed and has been suffering from worry about the stress, humiliation, anxiety, loss of trust, loss of confidence in and feelings of betrayal by the jus-tice system, shock, and emotional scarring, all compensable as emotional distress, and other damages.  242. Carpenter did not have the power and/or authority or the discretion (a) under Board Rule 3.18(a) to decide Bar Counsel’s motion for a protective order and motion to preclude Johnson’s defenses.  Carpenter intentionally interfered with Johnson's exercise and enjoyment of her clear and established rights secured by the state and federal constitutions or laws of the United States and/or the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and thereby deprived her of those rights and caused her injuries.  243. As a result of the concerted unlawful and malicious action of Carpenter, Johnson was deprived of her rights to both due process and the equal protection of the laws, and the due course of justice was impeded, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States. 244. If the above-identified controversies are not resolved, there will be further litigation. COUNT 4: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (that §§ 9(1), 9(2), and 9(3), the immunity provisions, of Massachusetts SJC Rule 4:01 are unconstitutional) 245. Johnson repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 244 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth. 246. There are actual controversies over whether.SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 9(1), 9(2), and 9(3) are unconstitutional both facially and as applied, whether §§ 9(1), 9(2), and 9(3) can supercede article V of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, whether.the SJC violated the separation of powers provisions in our State constitution.when it approved the promulgation of SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 9(1), 9(2), and 9(3). 247. By the immunity granted in § 9(1), 9(2), and 9(3), Plaintiff and others similarly situated are deprived of their rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions by the government of her constitutionally protected interest in seeking a remedy for wrongs done them.  U.S.C. Const.Amend. 14; M.G.L. Const. Pt. 1, Art. 10.  248. Section 9(1) of Massachusetts SJC Rule 4:01 provides immunity to Complainants to the Board.  By so doing, (a) Johnson and others similarly situated have been put at risk by Court permission of becoming victims of false reporting and (b) the Court has not only intentionally aided and abetted but intentionally encouraged false reporting by Complainants: in the instant case by Robyn Gerry-Sylvia, Deborah Wolf, Deborah Sano, and Judge Paul McGill. 249. While there is a constitutional right to petition, Complainants in courts of general or limited jurisdiction are not immune from counterclaims of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, frivolous pleading, and the like.  Where the BBO is, like police departments, in the business of enforcement, the Complainants to the BBO should be no less responsible for false reporting to the BBO than the general public is for reporting falsely to the police.  See criminal statute M.G.L. c. 269 §13A, false reporting to the police. 250. Section 9(2) of Massachusetts SJC Rule 4:01 provides immunity to the Complainant and to each witness giving sworn testimony.  By so doing, (a) Johnson and others similarly situated have been put at risk by Court permission of becoming victims of false swearing and false testimony and (b) the Court not only intentionally aids and abets but intentionally encourages false swearing and false testimony by Complainants and witnesses. 251. Other complainants and witnesses in courts of general or limited jurisdiction are not immune from perjury charges – albeit they are rarely brought.  To offer witness immunity without safeguards encourages perjury and false swearing. 252. Section 9(3) of Massachusetts SJC Rule 4:01 provides immunity from liability to “[t]he Board, members of the Board and its staff, members of hearing committees, special hearing officers, and the bar counsel and members of his or her staff.”  By so doing, (a) Johnson and others similarly situated have been put at risk by Court permission of becoming victims of false charges and abuse of process and (b) the Court not only intentionally aids and abets but intentionally encourages those immunized to act as a cabal with ulterior motives such as in the instant case, where both censorship of Johnson’s website and retaliation against her for criticizing the courts are the primary reasons false charges have been levied, prosecuted, and adjudicated by those immunized by § 9(3). 253. The offer of immunity in § 9(3) violates article V of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and is thus unlawful.\35/ \36/ \37/   35Article V reads: "All power residing originally in the people, and being derived from them, the magistrates and officers of government, visited with authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are their substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them." 36The doctrine of judicial immunity was born in England in 1607 from the womb of a devil court, the reviled Star Chamber, and in the United States around 200 years later from the rib of the Star Chamber case when the Supreme Court usurped a legislative function in violation of the separation of powers and by judicial fiat, brought judicial immunity to our shores. Given those conditions of birth, the doctrine of judicial immunity and its derivatives – quasijudicial immunity and even immunity by a court rule as in SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 9(1), 9(2), and 9(3) -- is unconstitutional and may not be applied to this case or to any other. With such repugnant roots, the doctrine may not override the duly ratified and never amended article V of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which guarantees accountability of all the magistrates and officers of the three branches of government to the people at all times. The doctrine must not be countenanced by this Court, for judicial immunity inappropriately and unconstitutionally does not allow scrutiny of the courts. It fosters secrecy, sloth, and unscrupulousness. 37Curiously, at least two Courts -- Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), and Stump v Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) – have concluded that ". . . we held that this doctrine of judicial immunity was applicable in suits under §1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983, for the legislative record gave no indication that Congress intended to abolish this long-established principle." Stump, 435 U.S. at 356, citing Pierson. That was a full untruth. See Mr. Justice Douglas’s dissent in Pierson. There he cites the Congressional Record, showing that Congress fully intended that judges would not be immune when they deprive people of their civil rights. The rationale of the Court was specious on other grounds, too. For instance, a first-year law student is taught that he cannot sue for breach of duty if there is no duty; he cannot sue for breach of contract if there is no contract. It was, therefore, self-serving and in bad faith for the Pierson and Stump Courts to call attention to the lack of a record that Congress intended to abolish judicial immunity, because the court in Pierson knew or should have known that Congress did not state that it "intended to abolish judicial immunity" because it had never established judicial immunity. It was men in black robes who brought judicial immunity to our shores in the 19th century. Congress was not at their party! Congress had already had its party and had decided judges would not be immune to prosecution under §1983: i.e., the section was "on the books fully eight months prior to the decision in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871). Skullduggery might have been afoot. Certainly it had to be an affront to Congress when the Court decided to follow the English courts rather than its own United States Congress! And when approving §9 of SJC Rule 4:01 in Massachusetts, the SJC erred in basing its law on fallacious, erroneous law that was an affront to article V of our Declaration of Rights. Granted, the action in Bradley was not brought under any of the Civil Rights Acts" [Pierson, at 549 n. 3 (dissent)], but the debate in Congress regarding judicial immunity was expansive. With the passing of the Act that same year, the Court had to know the majority in Congress was for accountability to stem the tide of personal interests and corruption. So that statement by the Court in Pierson and acknowledged by the Court in Stump is valueless, hollow. It is a statement made only by a result-oriented court, not an intellectually courageous, principled court. It should hold no weight with this Court, which prides itself on thorough and principled opinions. This Court should bravely herald that there is no history of a sound rationale in support of judicial immunity. And the Court in Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S.(Va.) 522, 540 (1984), cited the dissenting opinion in Pierson, at 558-564 for the proposition that "every Member of Congress who spoke to the issue assumed that judges would be liable under §1983." And in Pierson itself, Mr. Justice Douglas wrote in his dissent: The statute [42 U.S.C. §1983], which came on the books as §1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13, provides that "every person" who under color of state law or custom "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." To most, "every person" would mean every person, not every person except judges. Pierson, at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The argument that the actions of public officials must not be subjected to judicial scrutiny because to do so would have an inhibiting effect on their work, is but a more sophisticated manner of saying " The King can do no wrong." [5] Chief Justice Cockburn long ago disposed of the argument that liability would deter judges: "I cannot believe that judges . . . would fail to discharge their duty faithfully and fearlessly according to their oaths and consciences . . . from any fear of exposing themselves to actions at law. I am persuaded that the number of such actions would be infinitely small and would be easily disposed of. While, on the other hand, I can easily conceive cases in which judicial opportunity might be so perverted and abused for the purpose of injustice as that, unsound principles, the authors of such wrong ought to be responsible to the parties wronged." Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, L.R. 5 Q. B. 94, 110 (C. J. Cockburn, dissenting). Pierson, at 564-566 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied). He then went on about not subjecting to immunity those judges who are dispensing justice. No one, including Johnson, quarrels with that proposition. But that is far different from saying that a judge shall be immune from the consequences of any of his judicial actions, and that he shall not be liable for the knowing and intentional deprivation of a person's civil rights. What about the judge who conspires with local law enforcement officers to "railroad" a dissenter? What about the judge who knowingly turns a trial into a "kangaroo" court? Or one who intentionally flouts the Constitution in order to obtain a conviction? Congress, I think, concluded that the evils of allowing intentional, knowing deprivations of civil rights to go unredressed far outweighed the speculative inhibiting effects which might attend an inquiry into a judicial deprivation of civil rights. [6] The plight of the oppressed is indeed serious. . . . Pierson, at 563-567 (Douglas, J., dissenting). COUNT 5: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (that § 10, the settlement provision, of Massachusetts SJC Rule 4:01 is unconstitutional) 254. Johnson repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 253 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth. 255. There is an actual controversy over whether §10 impedes settlement between a complainant and a respondent in a disciplinary proceeding by impairing the respondent’s right to contract. 256. When two parties settle a matter, the parties enter into a contract.  Each must perform their side of the bargain.  It would stand to reason, common sense, common logic, that whether one is compromising, or making restitution (if appropriate), or settling, the termination of the disciplinary proceeding is the goal of both parties.  If one party still wants a disciplinary proceeding to continue, there is nothing to compromise or settle. 257. Section 10 interferes with the parties’ constitutional rights to resolve their dispute in a manner acceptable to both entities.  258. In interfering with or impairing the right to contract, which existed long before 1974, when the BBO and OBC came into existence, §10 is an unlawful attempt to override Johnson’s diverse constitutional rights, e.g., under article I of our Mass. Declaration of Rights; the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and clause 1 of section 10 of article 1 of the U.S. Constitution. COUNT 6: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (that Rule 1.5 of the Mass. Rules of Professional Conduct is unconstitutional) 259. Johnson repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 258 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth. 260. There are three actual controversies:  whether Johnson can be charged with violating M.R.Prof.C. 1.5, given that Bar Counsel Crane has not identified how much of the amount Johnson charged the Sanos he believes is excessive whether Johnson can be charged with violating M.R.Prof.C. 1.5, given that Bar Counsel Crane has not identified the task(s) for which Bar Counsel alleges Johnson overcharged the Sanos whether Johnson’s fees were excessive, where Bar Counsel averred that “the fees charged and collected by [Johnson] in the  [Sano] matter were clearly excessive” [Pet.¶ 82] and Johnson denied that her fees were excessive.  Am.Ans.¶82. 261. Where Rule 1.5 does not require the OBC and/or Bar Counsel either to identify how much of the amount Johnson charged the Sanos they believe is excessive or to identify the task(s) for which they allege Johnson overcharged the Sanos, the Rule’s vagueness or broadness deprives Johnson and others similarly situated of the full panoply of rights under articles VIII, XI, and XII of the Mass. Declaration of Rights. 262. The vagueness or broadness allows the OBC and Bar Counsel to abuse the process. 263. For instance, the vagueness or broadness allows the OBC and Bar Counsel to prosecute selectively some attorneys and not others, for instance, about fees and fee disputes.\38/ 38Weisberg addresses the selective prosecution in her motion to strike Johnson’s affirmative defenses {Paper 110]. 264. For example, in a letter from Asst. Bar Counsel Christa Arcos to a member of the complaining public, Arcos, an agent for the OBC, wrote “fee disputes are not generally within the jurisdiction of this office”[Exh.D], in which case the OBC has selectively prosecuting Johnson in Count II over a de minimus fee dispute.  The complained-of attorney whom the OBC chose NOT to prosecute is a member of the Massachusetts Judicial Nominating Committee.  Not having seen the pleadings and other documents in the case, Johnson takes no position on the complaint, but the letter from Arcos clearly shows no investigation whatsoever was performed by the OBC. 265. Bar Counsel also selectively excludes from prosecution attorneys whom they might need to prosecute other attorneys they have previously selected for prosecution.  For example, see Exh.E, a complaint against Attorney Deborah Wolf by the pained parents of a sightless daughter, for whom Attorney Deborah Wolf was appointed counsel.   Deborah Wolf, one of the complainants against Johnson in Count One, is needed to testify against Johnson if her written complaint is deemed sufficient by SHO Phillips.  Six months later, the OBC has not responded to the Danns. 266. After Weisberg let Johnson know that charges would be brought, Johnson placed her bill to the Sanos and her responses to Weisberg on her website, so that the public could decide for themselves whether Johnson’s fees were excessive. 267. Johnson’s bill to the Sanos is not privileged and even is the bill is assumed arguendo to be privileged, under Montgomery v. Pickering, 116 Mass. 227, 231 (1874), the privilege is waived only as to the subject matter of the Sanos’ testimony, and under Woburn v. Henshaw, 101 Mass. 193, 200 (1869), the Sanos are liable to full cross-examination.  Neitlich v. Peterson, 15 Mass.App.Ct. 622, 626-627 (1983). 268. The harm and damage Johnson has suffered continues after selective prosecution:  269. On the BBO and OBC Internet website, the BBO put up notice that disciplinary proceedings are pending.  That is unconstitutional.  Johnson has not been adjudged blameworthy or guilty of anything.  She is innocent of all accusations until found otherwise after a fair trial.  270. It is also unconstitutional for the BBO and OBC to allege that Johnson violated Bar rules when defending herself against false accusations. 271. The broadness and vagueness of Rule 1.5 and the rules in general to cause this deprivation of Johnson’s constitutional rights. 272. If this controversy is not resolved, there will be further litigation. COUNT 7: VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983  (DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES)  273. Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 272 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth. 274. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff had a right under the due process and equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions not to be deprived by the government of her constitutionally protected interest in her property, to wit her license to practice law.  U.S.C. Const.Amend. 14; M.G.L. Const. Pt. 1, Art. 10.  275. At all times relevant herein, the conduct of all defendants were subject to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988.\39/  39 The congressional purpose seems to me to be clear. A condition of lawlessness existed in certain of the States, under which people were being denied their civil rights. Congress intended to provide a remedy for the wrongs being perpetrated. And its members were not unaware that certain members of the judiciary were implicated in the state of affairs which the statute was intended to rectify. It was often noted that "[i]mmunity is given to crime, and the records of the public tribunals are searched in vain for any evidence of effective redress." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 374. . . . "[T]he courts are in many instances under the control of those who are wholly inimical to the impartial administration of law and equity." Id., at 394. . . . The members . . . were apprehensive that there had been a complete breakdown in the administration of justice in certain States and that laws nondiscriminatory on their face were being applied in a discriminatory manner, that the newly won civil rights of the Negro were being ignored, and that the Constitution was being defied. It was against this background that the section was passed, and it is against this background that it should be interpreted. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 559-560 (1967). 276. Acting under the color of law, Defendants worked a denial of Johnson's rights, privileges or immunities secured by the United States Constitution or by Federal law and guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, to wit,  (A) the defendants have acted and are continuing to act unlawfully and knowingly in the absence of jurisdiction. (B) the defendants have unlawfully and knowingly impeded and hindered, and are continuing to impede and hinder, the due course of justice, with the intent to deny Johnson -- and others similarly situated -- due process and the equal protection of the laws, which unlawful acts were expressly committed in the absence of jurisdiction: i. Defendants BBO and OBC, acting in a nonadministrative fashion, suspended SJC Rule 4:01 and usurped a legislative function\40/ in violation of the constitutionally guaranteed separation of powers, and thereby violated Arts. XX and XXX of the Mass. Declaration of Rights: 40 Where a judge usurps the authority of the legislature, and for the exercise of such authority, no excuse is permissible. Allard v. Estes, 292 Mass. 187, 196 (1935). (a) the BBO and OBC decided to assume jurisdiction over a First Amendment matter: Johnson’s website, falseallegations.com (b) without an adjudication by a constitutionally approved court, as to whether Johnson’s website contained speech violative of the First Amendment, Defendant Crane assigned Assistant Bar Counsel Susan Strauss Weisberg to perform an investigation and evaluation of Johnson’s website, (c) on behalf of Defendant Crane, Assistant Bar Counsel Susan Strauss Weisberg drafted a Petition for Discipline charging Johnson with violating ethical rules by uploading certain files – primarily pleadings filed in the U.S. District Court in Boston, Massachusetts, and the Probate & Family Court of Bristol County, Massachusetts – to her website, (d) after obtaining BBO approval, given by a Board member, OBC and/or Crane and/or Weisberg caused to be served on Johnson a Petition for Discipline, (e) on 27 October 2003, Johnson received a list of the allegedly offensive website URLs: there were 32 of them; ii. the natural Defendants Carpenter and Crane in their official capacities committed and are continuing to commit the BBO to unlawful acts, by denying Johnson the rights guaranteed her in the First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, iii. the natural Defendants Carpenter and Crane in both their professional and individual capacities, the BBO, and the OBC have had, and continue to have, no lawful excuse to indulge in quasijudicial legislation, instituted by judicial fiat, (C) the defendants have knowingly impeded and hindered, and are continuing to impede and hinder, the due course of justice, by threatening Johnson with not being able to put witnesses on in her defense if she does not reveal her defense strategy by writing paragraphs summarizing the anticipated testimony of her witnesses BUT NOT requiring the Bar Counsel to reveal his strategy by writing paragraphs summarizing the more-than-100 documents Bar Counsel wants admitted into evidence in lieu of testimony by living witnesses (D) the defendants have knowingly impeded and hindered, and are continuing to impede and hinder, the due course of justice by denying Johnson the right to depose witnesses prior to trial but reserving that right to themselves, (E) the defendants have knowingly impeded and hindered, and are continuing to impede and hinder, the due course of justice by seeking to take after hearing Johnson’s property, to wit, her license to practice law, while making no provision to allow Johnson to seek to take their property, to wit, money damages for the injury and harm they have caused and are causing Johnson, (F) the defendants have knowingly impeded and hindered, and are continuing to impede and hinder, the due course of justice by withholding exculpatory evidence, namely, a material court order that was physically altered by opposing counsel, (G) the defendants have knowingly impeded and hindered, and are continuing to impede and hinder, the due course of justice by denying Johnson a trial by jury. 277. As a result of Defendants' concerted unlawful and malicious conduct, Johnson was both deprived, without due process of law, of her right to her property, and deprived of her right to equal protection of the laws, and the due course of justice was impeded, in violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983.  278.  Johnson was harmed and has been suffering from worry about her livelihood, stress, humiliation, anxiety, loss of trust, loss of confidence in and feelings of betrayal by the justice system, shock, and emotional scarring, all compensable as emotional distress, and other damages.\41/  41 The rule is well settled, however, that if the natural consequence of the wrongful act, done willfully or with gross negligence, is mental suffering to the plaintiff, then that element may be considered in assessing damages. Stiles, 233 Mass. at 185, cites omitted. "Good faith and absence of malice in the perpetration of such a palpable wrong to the plaintiff constitute no defense to the defendants against the almost inevitable effect of their acts." Id. COUNT 8: VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)  (CONSPIRACY)  279. Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 278 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth. 280. As a result of their concerted unlawful and malicious conspiracy of the defendants, Johnson was deprived of both her liberty without due process of law and her right to equal protection of the laws, and the due course of justice was impeded, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C. §§  1983 and 1985.  281. Johnson has been harmed and has been suffering from worry about her welfare were she to be deprived of her license, stress, humiliation, anxiety, fear for her safety and well-being, loss of trust, loss of confidence in and feelings of betrayal by the justice system, shock, and emotional scarring, all compensable as emotional distress, and other damages.  COUNT 9: VIOLATIONS OF 42 U.S.C. 1983: REFUSING OR NEGLECTING TO PREVENT 282. Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 281 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth. 283. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant Phillips as special hearing officer was acting under the direction and control of Defendant BBO. 284. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant Chair Carpenter was acting under the direction and control of the 12-person Board of Bar Overseers. 285. On Monday morning, 17 November 2003, at a hearing transcribed by a certified reporter (Ruth Hulke), BBO Assistant General Counsel Carol Wagner [“Wagner”] informed both Johnson -- when Johnson inquired about the continuous whispering by Wagner into Phillips’ ear -- and the public audience at the hearing that she, Wagner, was present at the pretrial hearing as SHO Phillip’s counsel. 286. SHO Phillips has been a member of the Bar for 46 years (since 1957). 287. Given Phillips’ considerable experience as a hearing officer of disciplinary proceedings, it is a fact for a jury to determine (a) whether Wagner was trying to prevent Phillips from making injudicious and  extrajudicial decisions or (b) whether she was trying to prevent Phillips from making judicial-like decisions or (c) whether she was pulling his puppet strings. 288. Acting under color of law and pursuant to official policy or custom, the BBO knowingly, recklessly, or with gross negligence failed to instruct, supervise, control, and discipline on a continuing basis Defendants Carpenter and Phillips in their duties to refrain from: (a) unlawfully and maliciously harassing a citizen, Johnson, who was acting in accordance with her constitutional and statutory rights, privileges, and immunities,  (b) unlawfully and maliciously prosecuting a citizen, Johnson, who was acting in accordance with her constitutional and statutory rights, privileges, and immunities, (c) conspiring to violate the rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed to Plaintiff by the Constitution and laws of the United States and the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; and (d) otherwise depriving Plaintiff of his constitutional and statutory rights, privileges, and immunities. 289. Defendant BBO and Chair Carpenter had knowledge or, had they diligently exercised that duties to instruct, supervise, control, and discipline on a continuing basis, should have had knowledge that the wrongs conspired to be done, as heretofore alleged, were about to be committed.  Defendants BBO and Chair Carpenter had power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of said wrongs, could have done so by reasonable diligence, and knowingly, recklessly, or with gross negligence failed or refused to do so. 290. Defendants BBO and Chair Carpenter directly or indirectly, under color of law, approved or ratified the unlawful, deliberate, malicious, reckless, and wanton conduct of Defendant Phillips heretofore described. 291. As a direct and proximate cause of the negligent and intentional acts of Defendants BBO and Chair Carpenter as set forth above, Johnson suffered psychic and emotional injury, loss of income, and severe mental anguish in connection with the deprivation of her constitutional and statutory rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and protected by 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. COUNT 10:   DEFAMATION BY DANIEL CRANE AND THE BBO 292. Johnson repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the  allegations in paragraphs 1 through 291 above with the same force and effect  as if herein set forth.  293. On Thursday, 18 December 2003, Defendant Daniel Crane told Reporter Shawn Regan one or more oral false statements that were intended to impeach Plaintiff Johnson’s honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation.  294. The defamatory statements were, including, but not limited to, the following:  (a) that the disciplinary hearing stems from complaints from two of Johnson’s former clients and contempt of court order from a judge, (b) that  Johnson published confidential information about the ex-wife of a client, (c) that Johnson mentioned and/or repeatedly mentioned the names of children whose identities were protected. 295. The statements or information given to Regan by Crane was published on 19 December 2003 both in the Eagle-Tribune, located at North Andover, Massachusetts, newspaper and online at http://www.eagletribune.com/news/stories/20031219/FP_004.htm.  296. On or around 24 January 2003, Defendant Board of Bar Overseers published on its website at http://db.state.ma.us/obcbbo/bboreg/lookup.asp below plaintiff’s name and address the words “1.    1/24/03 XXX: Disciplinary Proceedings Pending”  297. The notification to the public that disciplinary proceedings were pending without more were words intended to impeach Plaintiff Johnson’s honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation.   298. Johnson has been harmed and damaged by Crane’s and the BBO’s publications.  WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Johnson prays that this Honorable court find: 1. that a Bar disciplinary proceeding is a quasicriminal proceeding, 2. that whether or not the disciplinary proceeding is quasicriminal, Johnson – and other lawyers similarly situated -- confronted by the BBO is entitled to a trial by jury, 3. that the Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers are unconstitutional,  4. that Plaintiff is entitled to the full sweep of due process rights as well as to her rights under the First Amendment, 5. that §§ 9(1), 9(2), and 9(3), the immunity provisions, of Massachusetts SJC Rule 4:01 are unconstitutional, 6. that the settlement provision of § 10 of Massachusetts SJC Rule 4:01 is unconstitutional, 7. that Rule 1.5 of the M.R.Prof.C. is unconstitutional, 8. that Johnson seeks additional equitable relief from the BBO, the OBC, and the Commonwealth, such as severe sanctions against Chair Carpenter and SHO Phillips for their incompetence, lawlessness, and deliberate indifference to the clearly established and secured constitutional rights of Johnson, and if within the power of this court, instructions to the SJC to replace Carpenter with someone else forthwith as Chair of the BBO,  9. that the defendants have violated § 1983 by depriving Johnson, without due process of law, both of her right to her property and of her right to equal protection of the laws, 10. that the defendants have violated § 1985(3) by conspiring to violate Johnson’s constitutional civil rights,  11. that the defendants have violated § 1983 by preventing or aiding in preventing the violation of Johnson’s constitutional civil rights, and by knowingly, recklessly, or with gross negligence failing or refusing to do so, and  12. that Daniel Crane has defamed plaintiff when speaking to a reporter, 13. that the BBO has defamed plaintiff by publishing on its website that disciplinary proceedings were pending, 14. that the plaintiff be awarded judgment against all the defendants, jointly and severally, for actual, general, special, compensatory damages in the amount of $15,000,000 and further demands judgment against all defendants, jointly and severally, for punitive damages\42/ in an amount to be determined by the jury, plus the costs of this action, including attorney's fees,  42 "Punitive damages are recoverable in sec. 1983 suit where defendant's conduct is motivated by an evil motive or intent, or where it involves reckless or callous indifference to plaintiff's federally protected rights). Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 50-51 ((1983); Clark v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4, 14 (1st Cir. 1983). Miga, supra at 355. 15. that the plaintiff be awarded judgment, including interest, against Daniel Crane and the BBO for defamation in an amount deemed by this Court to be just and fair and  16. that the plaintiff be granted such other relief deemed to be just and fair and in any other way in which the Court deems appropriate.                                                    PLAINTIFF BARBARA C. JOHNSON, Pro se     22 December 2003                               _____________________________________                                                             Barbara C. Johnson, Esq.                                                              6 Appletree Lane                                                             Andover, MA 01810-4102                                                              978-474-0833                                                              B.B.O. #549972     PLAINTIFF'S VERIFICATION  The undersigned, being duly sworn, deposes and says that I am the Plaintiff herein, and have read the foregoing pleading filed on my behalf, and the facts stated therein are true.     22 December 2003                                  _____________________________                                                              Barbara C. Johnson, Esq.  Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 22nd day of  December 2003.                                                               ______________________________                                                              Notary Public

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Barbara C. Johnson, Attorney at Law 6 Appletree Lane, Andover, Massachusetts 01810-4102 Phone 978-474-0833