#179, Drano Series

  

Reply Brief -- Combined -- to the Appellees' Combined Brief Against Barb's Appeal of the Judgment of Disbarment and the Appeal of the Judgment of Contempt including cover and Table of Contents

  

  NOTE

A REPLY brief must have a GREY cover.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT for the Commonwealth   ______________________________________________   Unconsolidated CASE NO. SJC-2006-09820 CASE NO. SJC-2006-09866 ______________________________________________       In re BARBARA C. JOHNSON Defendant/Appellant     __________________________________________________     On Appeal from Judgments and Orders of Single Justice Francis X. Spina in Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County BD-2006-039   __________________________________________________   Combined REPLY BRIEFS OF BARBARA C. JOHNSON DEFENDANT/APPELLANT   _________________________________________________ Barbara C. Johnson, Esq Defendant/Appellant, pro se B.B.O. #549972 (pending appeal) 6 Appletree Lane Andover, MA 01810-4102 978-474-0833

TABLE OF CONTENTS   Table of Authorities .............................  iv Constitutions ....................................   v Statutes .........................................  vi Rules ............................................  vi Treatises ........................................  vi Miscellaneous ....................................  vi   #1.    OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 3 ........    1 #2.    OBC/BBO’s Omission, at 3 n. 3 .............    2 #3.    OBC/BBO’s Omission, at 3 ..................    2 #4.    OBC/BBO’s Misstatements, at 4 .............    3 #5.    OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations and Omissions,        at 4 ......................................    3   #6.    OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations        and Omissions, at 5 .......................    4 #7.    OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 5 n. 5 ...    5 #8.    OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at  5-6 .....    5 #9.    OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 6-7 ......    6 COUNT ONE #10.   OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 8 ........    6 #11.   OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 9 ........    7 #12.   OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 9        and 12-13..................................    8 #13.   OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 10 .......    9 #14.   OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 10 .......   10 #15.   OBC/BBO’s Mendaciousness, at 10 ...........   10 #16.   OBC/BBO’s Error of Interpretation        of c. 209C, §13, an Issue of First        Impression, at 10, 10 n.9, and 11 .........   10 #17.   OBC/BBO’s Bald Assertions,        at 11 and S.A. 77-78 ......................   10 #18.   OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations,        at 11-12, 12 n. 10 ........................   13 #19.   OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 12 .......   14 #20.   OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 13 .......   15 #21.   OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentation, at 13-14 .....   15 #22.   OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentation, at 14 ........   15 COUNT TWO #23. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentation, at 14 ..........   16 #24. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentation, at 15-16 .......   16 #25. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentation, at 17 ..........   17 #26. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentation, at 17 ..........   18 #27. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentation, at 18 ..........   18 COUNT THREE #28. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 18-19 ......   19 #29. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 19-21 ......   19 #30. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentation, at 25 ..........   20   #31. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 30 n. 14 ...   20   #32. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 36-40 ......   20 ARGUMENTS ........................................   21   1.    Johnson’s constitutional rights were violated       in the disciplinary proceedings mot only by       the absence of due process and equal protection        but also by structural bias ....................  21   2.    Johnson had sufficient evidence of selec-       tive enforcement for sustain a claim of       violation of her right to equal protection       on a class-of-one theory.  Given her fear       to go forward in a trial from which the       public was unlawfully excluded——her fear       arising from the SHO hearing officer’s       habit of interfering with the reporter’s       ability to make a full and unredacted tran       script of the hearings——Johnson was       deprived of her right to present       evidence at a hearing that not only had       only the appearance of a fair hearing,       but was fair .............................     24   3.    Johnson had a constitutional right to cause the service of her trial subpoenas for witnesses and documents.  The distinction between exclusive and non-exclusive (illustrative) lists is deceptive: the statute, c. 233, §8, and the common law say one thing, but the boards and the legislative history say another  .........    27    4.   Johnson had a constitutional right to post information regarding her cases in order to educate the public about the corruption she perceived in the ton may be seen in Drano #37 <http://www.falseallegations.com/drano37- impoundment-Lawton.htm>; Lawton had neither personal jurisdiction over Johnson nor subject- matter jurisdiction.  See page 9, supra, for Johnson’s detailed response to Lawton’s order,        and page 15, supra ...........................   33   5.    Issue preclusion or the use of offensive collateral estoppel was improper and deprived Johnson of her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection ..................................   35   6.     For all the reasons argued both in her brief on appeal of the judgment of contempt and in this Reply brief, there was clear error law committed in adjudicating Johnson in contempt .........................   36   Issue 1: Jt. of Contempt ..................    36 Issue 2: Jt. of Contempt ..................    39 Issue 3 and 4: Jt. of Contempt ............    40 Issue 5: Jt. of Contempt ...................   42 Issue 6 and 7: Jt. of Contempt .............   43 Issue 8: Jt. of Contempt ...................   43   CONCLUSION .......................................   43 Mass.R.A.P. 16(k) Certification ..................   44   Certificate of Service ..........................    44   TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig, 368 F.3d 49 (C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 2004) ........ 40-42 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) .............................  29 Bloom v. City of Worcester, 363 Mass. 136 (1973) ............................  30   Brash v. Brash, 407 Mass. 101 (1990).............................  42   Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961) .............................  21 Commonwealth v. Cronk, 396 Mass. 194 (1985) ...........................   40 Com. v. King, 374 Mass. 5 (1977) .......................  26, 28-29   Dominick v. Dominick, 18 Mass.App. Ct. 85 (1984)  .................  40, 42 Ex parte Wall, 107 US. 265 (1882) ..............................  22 Goldstein v. Board of Registration of Real Estate Brokers & Salesmen, 3 Mass.L. Rptr. 576, 1995 WL 809927, No. CA942700 (Super. Ct. April 27, 1995) (Toomey, J.)  ................................. 31-32 Hook v. Dubois, 1996 WL 1353321, No. 946337 (Mass. Super. 1996)(Cowin, J.) .....    29   Huber v. Huber, 408 Mass. 495 (1990) ...........................   41 Hunter v. State of Oregon, 306 Or. 529, 761 P.2d 502 (1988) ...............   25 In re Gatti, 330 Or. 517 (2000) .............................   25   In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S.Ct. 1222 (1968) .............   24   Karen L. O'Connor v. Mark C. O'Connor, 61 Mass.App.Ct. 1109, 2004 WL 1237742 (2004) (unpublished) ...........   26   Kelley Marine Transport Corp. v. Boston Sand & Gravel, 2 Mass. L.Rptr. 545, 1994 WL 879516 (Super.Ct. 1994).................   31 LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606 (2nd Cir.1980) cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981)...............   28   Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 371 Mass. 186 (1976) ...........................   29   Matter of Kenney, 399 Mass. 431 (1987) ...........................   24   Matter of Morad, 20 Mass. Att'y Disc. R. 417 (2004) .............   27   Matter of Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. (R.I.), 1986) ..........   38 Matter of Tobin, 417 Mass. 81 (1994) ............................   24 Matter of Tobin, 417 Mass. 92 (1994) ......................  24, 27-28 Murphy v. Dept. of Correction, 429 Mass. 736 (1999) ...........................   28 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) ............................   26   People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996) .....................   23-24   Sacher v. United States, 843 US. 1 (1952) ...............................   21 Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944) ..............................   29 Teague v. Alexander, 662 F.2d 79 (D.C.Cir.1981) .....................   28 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) ............................   29 U.S. v. Providence Journal, 485 U.S. 693 (1988) ............................   39 Wayte v. U.S., 470 U.S. (Cal.) 598 (1985) .....................   26   Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) .............................   24   Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) ........................   26, 29                        CONSTITUTIONS United States Constitution Bill of Rights .................................   22 First Amendment ..........................  14, 33-35 Fourteenth Amendment ....................   25-26, 29 Oregon Constitution Article I, § 20 (Equal Protection Clause) ......   25                                                         STATUTES   G.L. c. 30A, State Administrative Procedure ..     32 G.L. c. 30A, §12 .............................  32-33 G.L. c. 112, §87AAA ..........................  31-21 G.L. c. 209C, §13 ............................  9, 15 G.L. c. 233, §8 ........................... 27-28, 30 RULES Mass.R.Dom.Rel.P. 62(d) .........................  42 Mass.R.Dom.Rel.P. 62(g) .........................  41 Mass.R.Dom.Rel.P. 69 ...........................   42 Standing Order 1-84 ........................... 8, 15 S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 10 .........................   18 BBO Rule 3.2 ..................................    32 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6 (a) ...................      18 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.9(c)(l) and (2)...........     18   TREATISES 68 Mich. L.R. 603, 611 (1969-70) ............. 19, 22 H. Drinker, Legal Ethics 11-51 (1953) ..........   22 Potts, Disbarment Procedure, 24 Texas L. Rev. 161 (1946) .....................  22 MISCELLANEOUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE SINGLE JUSTICE, published at  http://www.sjccountyclerk.- com/singjusprpr.html.............................  36   Wall St. J., April 28, 1969, at I, col. 1 .......  22

Now comes Barbara C. Johnson, Esq., [“Johnson”] and replies to the Office of Bar Counsel’s\[1]/ appellee brief seeking affirmation of the judgment of disbarment issued on 9 August 2006.     As grounds for her reply, Johnson states that the OBC’s opposition contains critical misrepresentations, omissions, and specious conclusions, i.e., conclusions based on mythical or false facts, of which many are serious or extreme and of which some are convoluted and general.  Given that this extraordinary “spaghetti”——aka “buckshot”——approach has been taken by the OBC and the BBO to deprive Johnson of her livelihood, Johnson has, as a result, to address each and every one of these offenses lest her silence be used against her.  #1. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 3:  FALSE:  that “the respondent had wrongfully disseminated   confidential and private information.”   TRUE:  This is a bald assertion.  Neither the OBC nor the BBO identified in the Petition, the Board Recommendation, the Information, or at the sham trial one word, phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph, file, or URL on which such dissemination occurred. Johnson’s two Motions for a More Definite Statement of Counts I and II of the Petition for Discipline were summarily denied [S.A. Vol. I, Paper 47, 8/29/03, and Paper 68, 9/09/03].   FALSE:  that Johnson included in the alleged dissemination “information identifying by name a minor child and a mentally disabled adult as victims of alleged sexual abuse, in the course of legal representation.”  TRUE:  “Johnson absolutely did not identify both boys as victims of sexual abuse by their respective fathers.  She did identify Jane as a mother who falsely accused both fathers of sexual abuse of their children” [J’s Br. at 22].  Reprehensively, Jane has never been punished for making false allegations.  Were the OBC remark true, why did the OBC/BBO and the judge not identify the location of the dissemination?   FALSE:  that “Bar counsel used pseudonyms in . . . counts [I and II] for the subjects of the information” and implied that he used a pseudonym for Count III.  TRUE:   Weisberg did not use a pseudonym for Johnson’s client in Count III, for “Lily” told Weisberg that she was against what the OBC and BBO were doing to Johnson.  See Petition ¶¶100-101, 104-111, 114, 116-117, 119, 127 (15 of the 27 paragraphs comprising Count III).  That use was malicious, for the OBC/BBO knew that the client is a self-employed geologist and that use of her name would hurt her professional reputation.   #2. OBC/BBO’s Omission, at 3 n. 3: OBC/BBO omitted Johnson’s reason for not using pseudonyms, to wit, because the evidence had true names. Having learned she would be given no opportunity to proffer evidence, she included much of the evidence in her Answer. #3. OBC/BBO’s Omission, at 3:  Johnson’s counsel, Lynch, who at that time was also representing Kevin Curry, withdrew in June 2003 because Lynch and Weisberg had a secret meeting.  Because neither Lynch nor Weisberg would reveal the substance of that meeting, Johnson concluded that they were unlawfully making a deal to “give” Johnson up in exchange for getting Curry of the OBC/BBO hook. #4. OBC/BBO’s Misstatements, at 4: Johnson opposed the motion for protection and impoundment on the grounds that it failed to meet the well-established standards for either a protection or an impoundment order [App. Vol. II, Tab 54, J’s Opp., dated 8/26/03, 22 pages].  A protective order entered after trial without Johnson having notice of the motion or an opportunity to oppose it. The OBC/BBO chides Johnson for not appealing the pretrial and posttrial orders.  It would have been futile to appeal (as Weisberg contends she should have), for this Court controls and supervises the OBC/BBO. #5. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, Omissions, at 4: The OBC/BBO failed to cite to Johnson’s 45-page opposition [S.A. 3, Paper 56, 8/29/03] to the pretrial motion to preclude Johnson from contesting factual issues.  Further, contrary to the OBC/BBO’s assertion, factual issues had not been litigated in the district court and there was never prior contempt proceedings against her in that court.  In that court, Johnson was found summarily in contempt of a March 3d order that never existed.  Ten months later, the district court judge, unable to produce the alleged March 3d order, changed the basis of the illegal contempt finding. That the appeal, well-written and well-argued by Johnson’s counsel, was unsuccessful was proof that any appeal would have been futile: the appeals court simply rubber-stamped an evil decision that had no basis whatsoever in either fact or law.\[2]/ #6. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations and Omissions, at 5: The OBC/BBO failed to identify one word, phrase, clause, sentence, or paragraph in their exhibits that constituted confidential or private or privileged information.  Therefore, without any idea as to what fabrications were intended to be offered, and not being allowed to conduct discovery (one of the issues of which the MBA Task Force complained),\[3]/ Johnson chose to list each person named in the OBC’s proposed exhibits so that they could be called to testify if necessary [S.A. 4-5, Papers 87. 108, 122].  She also supplied witness summaries [S.A. 5, Paper 125].  Johnson attempted to narrow the issues and reduce the number of her proposed witnesses, but the BBO denied Johnson’s Motion for Bar Counsel to Write Paragraph Summaries of the Purpose of Introducing Each of 101 Documents [S.A. 4, Paper 96, 11/6/03]. That the number of witnesses reached several scores illustrates was a result of the BBO Special Hearing Officer [“SHO”], Herbert Phillips, denying Johnson’s motion seeking written summaries of the relevance of the documents the OBC intended to offer [S.A. 5, App.Vol. II, Tab 121, Paper 121, 11/18/03] and quashed all her trial subpoenas.               #7. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 5 n. 5:  Johnson did, indeed, receive over time several deliveries of documents purporting to be intended exhibits.  They were sometimes numbered and sometimes not.  Never was there a list <>as to what the contents were.  Never were they in the same order.  Her requests for document lists was rebuffed.\[4]/  #8. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at  5-6:  On Monday before Thanksgiving, with the trial scheduled for the following Tuesday, the SHO intentionally delayed issuing even a few of the subpoenas sought by Johnson, giving her the holiday weekend to have them served.  Johnson had requested the issuance almost a month earlier [S.A. 4, Paper 89, 11/4/03].  As stated, SHO Phillips then quashed all Johnson’s subpoenas at the opening of trial. The legal issue of whether Johnson or the SHO were correct about her rights to cause subpoenas to be served is one of first impression and is argued at her App. Brf, 48-49 and at Issue 3, infra. #9. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 6-7:   During her Opening Statement, SHO Phillips repeatedly told Johnson that she was violating an order that commanded her to use pseudonyms.  That was untrue.  Weisberg informed him that there was no such order, and SHO Phillips ignored even her.  Weisberg omitted those facts in her brief [J’s Brf, 14 (Fig. 2), 52-53].  SHO Phillips unlawfully ordered the public attendees to leave the room.  Johnson justifiably left with the public [J’s Brf, 13 (Fig. 1)]. COUNT ONE #10. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 8: Johnson’s website is falseallegations.com. Johnson abhors lies and when they are used to falsely accuse people of unlawful or immoral acts, she abhors them even more.\[5]/ Such accusations are life-changing and most often devastating emotionally and financially.  There is a need to assist people in coping with the unspeakable challenges facing them when such false allegations arise. Thus, Johnson designed falseallegations.com to be an educational website, providing basic information to people at no charge.  Her Drano Series is comprised for the most part of pleadings.\[6]/  Elsewhere on her site are the seeds of a section in which she elaborates on unscrupulous actions by judges.\[7]/ #11. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 9:  FALSE:  Weisberg’s iteration of Jane’s history is untrue.   TRUE:  The date of Jane’s marriage to Robert Brown changed according to whom Jane was speaking.  According to their divorce records, they lived together only for a year and a half before Jane moved out.  After a period of time, Jane returned to Robert, but by 1994, she left his home for good.  Although Jane represented to the courts that her marriage provided William with a stable home life, that was untrue.  Robert’s affidavit reveals that when Jane left, she lived in as many as seven different locations with the children.  The Browns’ contentious divorce flourished for seven years.  In Jane’s divorce complaint, she identified William as a son from a previous non-existent marriage. Because nothing in the divorce record shows that Robert controverted that fact, one may infer that she lied to him, too, about a prior marriage.   William was born out of wedlock and his half-brother was conceived out of wedlock.  She unilaterally changed William’s surname to Brown.   #12. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 9 and 12-13:  FALSE:  that “[b]efore starting these actions, the respondent had obtained, from sources other than the court, copies of impounded reports on file in the care and protection.”  TRUE:  In actual fact, because Johnson had done no Juvenile Court work and was unaware of Standing Order 1-84, although as a lawyer she is deemed as to have known of it.        Of the people sued in the federal court (Drano Series #5), only one was court-appointed: Investigator Christopher Salt.  Other than Salt, none of the report writers was court-appointed.  Only the Salt and Fyfe reports had been filed in Juvenile Court. Of course, she had no access to the Juvenile Court docket sheet.\[8]/     Significantly, the docket sheet produced by Weisberg is a recently fabricated computerized docket sheet.  It is not a copy of the original docket sheets.  It should not have been accepted as evidence by SHO Phillips, nor entered into an appendix either in the single-justice session or in this Court.  It is neither valid nor reliable.  Any of the reports which Weisberg claims was filed in Juvenile Court could have been added to the computerized docket sheet to bolster the OBC case.\[9]/  Given that Judge Lawton’s order commanded Johnson to return unidentified documents to the Juvenile Court when she had never been in or gotten or taken documents from that court, had never represented any party in his court, the order was transparently invalid on its face, and was not cured by a recently computerized version of docket sheets of an action that was open between 1988 and 1991 or 1992, roughly from 15 to 19 years ago. Weisberg further asserts that Johnson should have appealed Judge Lawton’s order.  Given that Johnson was not a party to a case in his court, it did not have personal jurisdiction over Johnson, and she had no standing to appeal.  Johnson relies on for support and incorporates herein by reference J’s Br., 6-7, 55-59 and exhibits cited there. #13. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 10: FALSE:  that Christopher Salt’s deposition was taken under the Juvenile Court caption. TRUE:   The deposition was taken under the Probate & Family Court custody and paternity caption (c. 209C case) [J’s Br. at 18].  The significance of this action is detailed in Issue 1 of J’s Br. at 35-40.  Section 13 had been amended, making all c. 209C files public records and impounded only upon a showing of good cause.  No attempt was made to show good cause.  It is, however, well-settled that impounded records may be used in later pleadings, such as was the case here.  The quotes were minimal and harmless [J’s Br. at 21-22].\[10]/   #14. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 10: See the discussion of the court-appointed investigator and the psychologist's report at J’s Br. at 18-19, 21-22. Johnson was well within her authority to bring suit on her client’s behalf against a doctor who, with no evidence whatsoever, falsely concluded that William had been sexually abused by his father.  There was also no evidence whatsoever from William, Jane, or David that the pleadings in federal court “actually or potentially embarrass[ed] or [were] detrimental to William, Jane or David.”  See Issue 3 in J’s Br. at 44-47. #15. OBC/BBO’s Mendaciousness, at 10: At J’s Br. at 20, there is direct evidence from Weisberg’s own admission that Johnson did not upload any Juvenile Court documents.  Therefore, contrary to Weisberg’s malicious, malignant mendacity, Johnson did not disseminate any of them, with or without court permission. #16. OBC/BBO’s Error of Interpretation of c. 209C, §13, an Issue of First Impression, at 10, 10 n.9, and 11:  See Issue 1 in J’s Br at 35-40 and the legal authorities and evidentiary citations there. #17. OBC/BBO’s Bald Assertions, at 11 and S.A. 77-78: FALSE: that “the materials included quotations from and summaries of the contents of court-ordered sexual abuse assessments, clinical reports, and other reports under impoundment in the juvenile court.”  TRUE:  Weisberg failed to identify (1) a word,        clause, phrase, sentence, paragraph that        offends or (2) a document that is not a        public record:

 

Link  to  Drano	Identification of Pleading	Johnson’s Comments
5	An Amended Complaint Based on the Deprivation of Parental Rights:  Suit against doctor, court investigator, mental-health counselor, psychologist,  social worker, trial court and child protective service	There are three quotes, which are in the margin.\[11]/
9	Opposition to Motion to Dismiss on Immunity Grounds	The summaries and quotes here appear in the margin.\[12]/  William Jones was identified by the name given to him upon birth, NOT the name by which he was known in his diverse communities.
12	Opposition to Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Grounds of Sovereign Immunity: A Creative Look at Its Unconstitutionality.  It Could Change the Way Massachusetts Treats Its Citizens	There are NO summaries of and NO quotes from any of the reports of the defendants in the federal action.
17	Opposition to Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings	There are NO quotes from any report here.   A summary appears in the margin.\[13]/
20	Jim Linnehan's Affidavit in Support of His Opposition to Sandra Fyfe's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings	There are NO quotes from any report here, just the client’s memory, which cannot be impounded.  William Jones is identified as “Ssssss” – “S” being equivalent to “Son.”
21	Opposition to Eileen Kern's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings	There are NO quotes from any report here.   See the margin.\[14]/

 

Eileen Kern, Sandra Fyfe, Eli Newberger, Amy Tishelman, Jack McCarthy were not court-appointed.  There never was any evidentiary hearing.  If anyone filed reports by those people, it was Attorney Deborah Wolf and after Johnson questioned Wolf about her repeated fraud on both the courts and the Commonwealth’s treasury department.\[15]/ McCarthy, the psychologist, never treated the child as originally planned.  He, a young widower, met privately with “Jane,” an extremely exotic-looking woman who traded on her looks to conceive twice out of wedlock.  She then falsely accused both men of child sexual abuse, got custody of the children, and collected child support from both, even after Linnehan’s son had dropped out of school and——\[16]/  Attorney Wolf consistently misrepresented to the court that she had met with the teenager and that the boy feared his father.\[17]/             #18. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 11-12, 12 n. 10: Jane had not been convicted of perjury, but had Jane told lies?  She certainly had.  Did Jane lose her election?  She certainly had.  But writing that a politician lost an election is not a revelation of confidential, private, or privileged information . . .  and is a legitimate use of the press . . .  as is writing that Political Candidate Jane had two out-of-wedlock pregnancies and that she falsely accused both men of child sexual abuse. In sum, the absurdity of Weisberg’s arguments are insubstantial and frivolous and must fail.      As to Johnson using the children’s names:  Johnson had both globally replaced the children’s names and cut them out of .jpg or image files.  For diverse reasons, she missed a few.\[18]/  But was there no intent to harm or embarrass the children.  As to whether the youngsters were embarrassed, we do not know.  They never said they were to anyone that we know of and certainly not in any court of law . . . or at the BBO.  William’s speech was quashed when Johnson’s subpoena of him was quashed.  #19. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 12:   FALSE: that “Jane and William’s attorney filed complaints with bar counsel against the respondent in which they asked for the removal of the information from the respondent's Web site.” TRUE:  Bruce Lider, Jane’s attorney of record, personally denied to Johnson sending a complaint to the BBO.         Deborah Wolf wrote that she had been in 1991 appointed to represent William in the Care & Protection action filed in 1988.  It can be irrebutably presumed that she was not reappointed to represent William during the 10+ years after the case closed.  In or around 2000, Wolf misrepre- sented to Judge McGregor that she represented William.  She did not.  She was representing Jane, with whom she had a special relationship.  Thus Johnson wanted copies of the bills Wolf sent to the Commonwealth for payment for her alleged services to William. When accusing Johnson of uploading impounded Juvenile Court records, Weisberg was parroting Wolf’s complaint.  There is no evidence to support the accusations in Wolf’s letters. Further, it is disingenuous of Weisberg to assert that Johnson had to remove her pleadings in accordance with Wolf’s wishes.  Upon what law does Weisberg rely to conclude that she is allowed to censor Johnson’s website, which constitutes a part of Johnson’s First Amendment right to free expression and political speech.    #20. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 13:  Contrary to Weisberg’s assertion, Johnson did not have actual knowledge of pre-1998 custody and paternity records being impounded.  In fact, Johnson has continuous- ly contended that when she wrote a Complaint for Modification in 2000, the records in a chapter 209C case were public records.  See G.L. c. 209C, §13, as amended and effective in March 1998.  Johnson relies on for support and incorporates herein by reference J’s Br., 11-13, 17, 23, 35-40.  #21. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentation, at 13-14:  Weisberg failed by omission to join the issue of the two void judgments, those of Judges Lawton and McGregor, Standing Order 1-84, and G.L. c. 209C, §13, choosing to write only that Johnson disobeyed them.\[19]/  Given that the OBC/BBO failed to provide Johnson with copies of their 12-volume Appendix, Johnson does not know which documents to which Weisberg is refer- ring.  Despite Johnson’s multiple requests for a list of the documents shuffled and stuffed in diverse boxes, Weisberg never prepared and gave to Johnson a list of the documents transmitted to her. #22. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentation, at 14:  For the fourth year, Weisberg has avoided addressing the missing elements of her charges that Johnson violated certain Canons [J’s Br. 53-55]. Johnson also relies on for support and incorporates herein by reference the arguments set forth in her Motions to Dismiss entered into the BBO docket as Papers 143 through 152 [S.A. 152 and App.Vol. II, Tabs 143-150, 152, and Impounded Vol. VII, Tab 151].\[20]/  COUNT TWO #23. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentation, at 14:  Johnson vigorously denies any intent to embarrass anyone by posting on her website.  She relies on for support and incorporates herein by reference J’s Br., 5, Issue 3, at 44-47.  #24. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentation, at 15-16:  Most of Weisberg’s statements on pages 15 and 16 are irrelevant.  Johnson also disputes the scope, as defined by Weisberg, of the work she did for the “Parkers.”   TRUE:  Although Weisberg contends that Johnson commingled funds, that is not borne out by the findings by an extremely adversarial special hearing officer, Phillips, who wrote: After reviewing the bill and the other evidence presented, I find that Bar Counsel has failed to prove these charges by a preponderance of the evidence. I am not persuaded that the fee charged for the services rendered was clearly excessive, FN26 FN26 In my view, the fact that I might question an hour or two here and there is not sufficient to meet the requirement that a fee be “clearly” excessive nor am I persuaded that the Respondent made intentional misrepresentations to the Parkers about her fees, time and services. In so finding, I note that no testimony was presented in this hearing and thus, I had no opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the Parkers or the Respondent with respect to these issues. (See n.9, supra). . . S.A. 89, ¶53, SHO’s Findings of Fact.     Given the SHO’s finding that Johnson did not owe the Parkers any money, the question became, What money did Johnson commingle?  Johnson claimed she had earned the money before she deposited it into her personal account.  The SHO found she had earned the money.  He was silent as to whether she had earned it before or after she deposited it, but given that the bill shows (1) she had done all but 6 hours of the work for which she billed and (2) she had not only deeply discounted her fees she had also waived the fee for far more than 6 hours of work, there could literally be no commingling [see J’s Br., at 24-25]. Weisberg’s position is that even though Johnson had earned the money she received, where Mary Parker disputed it, Johnson should have waited until the SHO resolved the dispute.  That meant that Weisberg wanted Johnson to wait five years (from 1999 to 2004) to get paid for her work in 1999.  Nowhere does Weisberg or the rule provide that Johnson would get interest.  At the statutory interest of 12 percent, however, money doubles in 6 years.  Therefore, had Johnson waited 5 years to pay herself from the money received, the Parkers would have owed Johnson another $7000 in interest by the time the SHO issued his finding in 2004.  Absurdity knows no boundaries in these circumstances.   #25. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentation, at 17:   Weisberg failed to provide any cites for her legal propositions that a bill is confidential, private, or privileged.  Weisberg also failed to write that the client, Mrs. “Parker,” on behalf of herself and her family, gave Johnson permission to publish their story:  “[S]omeday we’ll see our story on your wonderful educational website” [J’s Br. at 25].  Johnson construed those words as permission to publish. As to the remainder of pages 17 and 19, Johnson replies by incorporating herein by reference her version of the facts in J’s Br. at 24-28 and her legal arguments in J’s Br. at 40-44, which includes her arguments on selective enforcement, discrimination on a class-of-one theory. #26. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentation, at 17:  Where Weisberg failed to identify a word, phrase, clause, sentence, or paragraph that was confidential client information, or how Johnson used a word, phrase, clause, sentence, or paragraph to the disadvantage of any one of the Parkers, or that Johnson used the mysterious information to her own advantage, the OBC’s false allegations that Johnson violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6 (a) and 1.9(c)(l) and (2) must fail.  #27. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentation, at 18:  S.J.C. Rule 4:01, §10 (conditioning settlement or compromise on withdrawal of bar discipline complaint), must fail on the grounds of vagueness and overbroadness.   Further, in the absence of due process, including the right to confront Retired Judge William Simons, whom she had never seen or met or spoken to, no valid and reliable evidence was presented, the charge of violation of S.J.C. Rule 4:01, §10, must also fail. COUNT THREE #28. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 18-19:   FALSE:  “respondent failed to appear for a court-ordered inspection of the defendant's documents.”  TRUE:   Johnson was threatened by opposing counsel, was refused by Concord Police Department a requested private police detail allegedly because she was not a Concord taxpayer, and opposing counsel informed Johnson that he would not allow Burns agency people to escort her to and in the facility.   Weisberg knew all this.  See J’s Answer [App.Vol.I, Tab 46, or Drano #90C, part iii].   FALSE:  “[s]he filed frivolous motions in bad faith to reconsider the inspection order and to depose non-party witnesses outside the presence of defense counsel. (Id.) These motions were denied by the district court judge. (Id.) TRUE:  The motions, modeled after those allowed by Magistrate-Judge Robert Collings in U.S. District Court, were filed and denied in February 1995.  [App.Vol. I, Tab 46, or Drano #90C, part iii].  Continuously challenged by Johnson to produce the non-existent March 3d order of which he found Johnson in contempt on 22 March 1995, and being unable to produce it, Judge Paul McGill decided instead to find frivolous the motions he had denied 10 months earlier [Id.].  The change in December 1995 of the basis of the March 22d contempt finding constitutes a failure of due process and ought to have been reversed.  68 Mich. L.Rev. 603 (1969-1979). Further, even assuming arguendo that the motions were frivolous, the sanction of a contempt finding is inappropriate and unlawful.   #29. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 19-21:     FALSE:  Weisberg uses the smokescreen of recounting orders that Judge McGill amended several times throughout 1995.  TRUE:   For the truth, see Table C following ¶101 in Johnson’s Answer to the Petition [App.Vol.I, Tab 46, or Drano #90C, part iii].  Table C sets out each and every error Judge McGill.  Johnson was given no opportunity to litigate this issue either in Concord District Court or any other court or pseudo-court such as the BBO.  The appeals court decision trampled justice.  In December 1998, Johnson was not jailed because of nonpayment.  The evidence of the reason for jailing was destroyed when the court overwrote the tape of the hearing and the only neutral witness, the clerk, had died.  McGill’s alleged order to pay was written ex post facto and was thus never seen by Johnson before being allegedly issued, and in fact was never seen by Johnson until Weisberg produced it.  The OBC and BBO’s offensive use of collateral estoppel was improper.  Johnson incorporates herein by reference her argument in J’s App. Br., Issue 7, at 59-61.   #30. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentation, at 25:   FALSE:  that Johnson appeared in court on 11 September 2006 on behalf of a client. TRUE:  Johnson appeared in court on 11 September 2006 because she received a written order from the court to be there. #31. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 30 n. 14:   FALSE:  that Johnson made no request under §4.5 of the Board Rules, which permits respon­dents to request subpoenas for the produc­tion of records. (S.A. 124) TRUE:  Contrary to Weisberg’s assertion at A-ee Br. 30 n. 14, Johnson did request subpoenas.  Michael Fredrickson said space would be left for the listing of documents being subpoenaed. See Papers 89-90 108, 125 (summaries explaining purpose of calling witnesses and general descriptions of the documents that would be used for impeachment), in Impounded Vol. VI Tabs 89; Vol. II, Tabs 90 and 108; and Impounded Vol. VI, Tab 125, respectively [S.A.4-5, 146]. #32. OBC/BBO’s Misrepresentations, at 36-40:   TRUE:  No name of any party in the cases underlying Counts I and III of the OBC/BBO Petition’s was or is impounded.  Neither did Johnson disclose impounded material.  Weisberg’s exhibits containing alleged copies of some of Johnson website file were not properly authenticated, and Weisberg never identified what in those pleadings allegedly came from the Juvenile Court.         Count II arose out of an Internet transaction; i.e., Johnson never represented anyone in the subject family.  As such, there were no impoundment orders regarding party names to contest.  Weisberg’s remarks, therefore, that Johnson should have contested orders that are mythical are false representations to this court, and such conduct calls for the disbarment of Weisberg and her superiors, not Johnson.  In short, Johnson has shown every reason “to question the findings or the rule violations.”  They must be disturbed by this appeal.

ARGUMENTS   1.   Johnson’s constitutional rights were violated in the disciplinary proceedings not only by the absence of due process and equal protection but also by structural bias.   The single justice parroted whatever the OBC and BBO wrote and said. He showed no independent judgment.

 

One thing is at once apparent about the pattern of the dis­barment procedure from beginning to end: the adjudication of the case is always in the hands of parties who may be interested. It is not unreasonable to presume that judges and lawyers are interested parties in disbarment proceedings, for they have an in­terest in preserving the good reputation of the legal system. This interest may cause them to be unduly harsh toward attorneys ac­cused of misconduct. On the other hand, in some cases, attorneys may be unduly lenient to their delinquent brethren. Clearly, political factors may exert an influence on bench and bar in disciplining its own members. Probably the most forceful current danger of bias lies in having lawyers or judges of one philosophical view have an un­restrained hand in disciplining lawyers of another view. The pos­sibilities for abuse are obvious and have long been recognized by the courts.⁶³ It is questionable whether "discretion" is a sufficient safe­guard to balance against the manifest possibilities for abuse.

At no time in the disbarment procedure are the facts ascertained by a clearly impartial tribunal. Rather, lawyers and judges control the entire fact-finding, adjudicatory, and reviewing process. In a practical sense, this system allows the injured parties—namely, the bench and bar—to sit in judgment of an accused attorney at all stages of the proceeding. This fact raises doubts as to the fundamen­tal fairness of the procedure, since impartiality of the adjudi­cating tribunal is an essential element of fairness to the accused.⁶⁴

_____________________________________________________________________________________   __

53. It has long been recognized that both contempt proceedings and disbarment
proceedings by their summary character can be convenient vehicles for the bar and
bench to deal with lawyers who champion unpopular causes. Frequently judges warn
that the most careful discretion must be used because this summary power of punish-­
ment is so great. Set Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 148 (1961) (Justice Blade, dis-­
senting); Sacher v. United States, 843 US. 1, 22-23 (1952) (Justice Black, dissenting);
Ex parts Wall, 107 US. 265, 317 (1882) (Justice Field, dissenting). See also Wall St. J.,
April 28, 1969, at I, col. 1.

54. The Supreme Court has recognized that there are some elements to an essen-­
tially "fair trial" which are not enumerated hi the Bill of Rights. See Ratner, supra
note 11, at 1064.

68 Mich. L.R. 603, 611 (1969-70).

       

Disbarment proceedings have traditionally been summary in nature.⁵⁶    But an unfair practice should not be sanctified by custom and usage.⁵⁷

 

68 Mich. L.R. at 612, noting H. Drinker, Legal Ethics 11-51 (1953) and Potts, Disbarment Procedure, 24 Texas L. Rev. 161 (1946).

Contrary to OBC/BBO’s assertion, Johnson has brought forth considerable evidence of conflict or structural bias in the process to overcome the "presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators" in her case: ·       The public was ordered out of the hearing that was to be public; that is, the rule gave Johnson the right to a public trial. ·       The SHO falsely asserted that there was an order commanding Johnson to use pseudonyms at trial.  Because Weisberg had no witnesses, she needed Johnson as a witness.  So when Johnson said she was leaving with the public, Weisberg, hoping to get the SHO to change his mind about excluding the public, admitted to the SHO that there was no such list.  Upon the advice and counsel of Assistant General Counsel Carol Wagner, the SHO, who had already committed to excluding the public, ignored Weisberg’s admission and did not change his order to the public to leave the hearing room.\[21]/ ·           The single justice denied Johnson’s Motion to Stay the Judgment of Disbarment.  Johnson then brought a Motion to Stay the Judgment of Disbarment before the SJC for the Commonwealth.  This Court, too, denied the Motion to Stay, proving that the decision to disbar Johnson had been predetermined, for if there existed the possibility that Johnson could prevail on her appeal, a conundrum would result: Johnson would already have been ordered to withdraw from her cases even though she would be again allowed to practice. ·       Motions filed by Weisberg in this court, the SJC for the Commonwealth, have been allowed immediately without giving Johnson an opportun- ity to oppose.  In contrast, motions filed here by Johnson were not acted upon until Weisberg filed her opposition as much as 10 days later. ·           The SJC’s online docket sheets for 2006-09820 (appeal of judgment of disbarment) and 2006-09866 (appeal of judgment of contempt) show Weisberg’s address being the BBO, the adjudicatory arm of the private entity affiliated with the SJC, not the OBC, the prosecutorial arm.  It shows Acting Bar Counsel Constance Vecchione’s address being the BBO, not the OBC.  Ironically Former Bar Counsel Daniel Crane’s address was shown as being that of both the BBO and the OBC.  ·       Weisberg asserted that the OBC was the appellee, but the SJC’s online docket sheet identified BBO General Counsel Michael Fredrickson, too, as appellee.  The SJC Clerk’s Office is so accustomed to treating both these entities as if they were one and the same that the SJC docket sheets in Johnson’s cases wrongly identify the entity at which each of these people works.     Where “[p]rocedural due process is implicated any time a lawyer's license to practice is even temporarily suspended” [People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d 1, 6 (Colo. 1996)], procedural due process is certainly required.  Given that procedural due process was absent in the instant case, the judgment of disbarment may not stand.   The conclusion that the lawyer disciplinary procedures are not per se unconstitutional, however, “does not, of course, preclude a court from determining from the special facts and circumstances present in the case before it that the risk of unfairness is intolerably high.”    People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d at 5, quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1975).        "The fundamental requisite of due process is an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."  Matter of Kenney, supra, 399 Mass. [431,] 435.  In a disbarment proceeding an attorney is entitled to procedural due process which includes fair notice of the charges and an opportunity for explanation and defense.  Id., 399 Mass. at 436.  In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1225 (1968).   Matter of Tobin, 417 Mass. 92, 102 (1994).  Where Johnson was denied pretrial discovery both in fact and by the Board Rules, and was denied an opportunity to present her evidence and to defend in any way, including the deprivation of an opportunity to examine her accusers, there was an absence of both procedural and substantive due process from the inception of the so-called investigation to this day.  There is authority for the proposition that an administrative agency must grant discovery to a party in a contested case regardless of whether the enabling statute or agency rules provide for it, if refusal to grant discovery would so prejudice the party as to amount to a denial of due process.   Matter of Tobin, 417 Mass. 81, 87 (1994).  This is applicable here.

2.   Johnson had sufficient evidence of selective enforcement for sustain a claim of violation of her right to equal protection on a class-of-one theory.  Given her fear to go forward in a trial from which the public was unlawfully excluded——her fear arising from the SHO hearing officer’s habit of interfering with the reporter’s ability to make a full and unredacted transcript of the hearings——Johnson was deprived of her right to present evidence at a hearing that not only had only the appearance of a fair hearing, but was fair.   In discussing Johnson’s selective- enforcement claim in terms of equal protection, Weisberg quoted cases she found in In re Gatti, 330 Or. 517, 534 (2000), as if they were definitive, but she failed to cite one that was not only helpful to Johnson but debunked Weisberg’s bad-faith argument.  The case was Hunter v. State of Oregon, 306 Or. 529, 533, 761 P.2d 502 (1988).  It held that Article I, §20,\[22]/ of the Oregon Constitution, or the Equal Protection Clause, “prohibits, among other things, prosecution based on ‘impermissible factors such as race or personal animosity or the absence of any standards that could ensure consistency.’”  Personal animosity and the absence of standards that ensure consistency found, without doubt, are rooted in the instant case. Although “the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . does permit the ‘conscious exercise of some selectivity’ in criminal law enforcement as long as the selectivity is not based on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification’ [Com. v. King,  374 Mass. 5, 20 (1977), quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)], “[i]t is well established that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not permit unequal application of impartial laws.”  King, 374 Mass at 20, quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-374 (1886).  “It is appropriate to judge selective prosecution claims according to ordinary equal protection standards.”  Wayte v. U.S., 470 U.S.  (Cal.) 598, 608 (1985).      Had Johnson not been unlawfully deprived of an opportunity to exercise her right to a hearing that even had merely an appearance of fairness, she would have produced evidence such as the following.  For instance, (1) Mark C. O’Connor of Rich, Bilodeau and Flaherty, who was on Johnson’s witness list and was excused by SHO Phillips from having to answer her subpoena duces tecum, was found in contempt but not prosecuted by the OBC.  Karen L. O'Connor v. Mark C. O'Connor, 61 Mass.App.Ct. 1109, 2004 WL 1237742 (June 04, 2004) (No. 02-P-1709) (unpublished)(husband’s appeal of judgment of civil contempt entered on June 28, 2002, against him in the parties' divorce proceedings for failure to pay child support and uninsured medical bills in accordance with the Probate and Family Court's temporary order for support).  Where the scheduled hearing in Johnson’s matter was 2 December 2003, had the subpoena of O’Connor not been quashed, Johnson would have been able to prove that O’Connor was in contempt but not prosecuted by the OBC/BBO. (2) OBC Assistant Bar Counsel Christa A. Arcos’ letter [J’s App-TAB-E, Exh.D], which states that “fee disputes are not generally within the jurisdiction of this office” and (3) Richard Dann’s letter [J’s App-TAB-E, Exh.E], which recounts the misconduct of Attorney Deborah Wolf, and about which misconduct the OBC and BBO did nothing.  And were the records of the OBC and the BBO not secret, and were reciprocal discovery allowed, Johnson would have been able to produce evidence showing that other attorneys who were found in contempt were not prosecuted by the OBC/BBO.

3.   Johnson had a constitutional right to cause the service of her trial subpoenas for witnesses and documents.  The distinction between exclusive and non-exclusive (illustrative) lists is deceptive: the statute, c. 233, §8, and the common law say one thing, but the boards . . . and the legislative history say another.\[23]/     Johnson was deprived of her right to call witnesses at the disciplinary hearing when the SHO quashed her self-issued subpoenas.\[24]/\[25]/  Weisberg relied on Matter of Tobin, 417 Mass. 92 (1994), for the inference that Johnson wanted them to relitigate underlying cases [A-ee Br. 32].  That is not accurate.  Weisberg refused and was not compelled to identify the alleged offending statements.  To be prepared for the unknown at trial, Johnson subpoenaed everyone whose names appear in Weisberg’s proposed exhibits and whose knowledge would be helpful to Johnson at the scheduled hearing. The OBC and BBO contend that c. 233, §8, does not “confer or preempt the subpoena power of agencies deriving their authority from other sources.”  While this might be true——the issue being one of first impression——the statute does not preempt a party from having the right to serve subpoenas in actions in agencies deriving their authority from those other sources.  Such preemption would divide parties into two arbitrary classifica- tions.\[26]/  As noted, supra, “[i]t is well established that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not permit unequal application of impartial laws.”  King, 374 Mass at 20, quoting Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-374. As when the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination found in 1972 that it had a statutory power to issue subpoenas for its hearings but not in the investiga- tory stage prior to finding probable cause, this Court wrote: Where there is a contradiction in the statute, “(i)t is our duty to interpret . . . (if), if possible, so 'as to make it an effectual piece of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound reason.'”  Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimina- tion v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 371 Mass. 186, 190 (1976).\[27]/      By applying common sense and sound reason, this Court allowed the MCAD to issue subpoenas during the investigatory phase even though the MCAD’s enabling statute, c. 6, §56, did not empower it to do so and the MCAD was not explicitly listed in §8 of c. 233.  And by so applying common sense and sound reason, this Court overruled Bloom v. City of Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 144-145 (1973), upon which the OBC/BBO relies.  This is what Johnson seeks now: common sense and sound reason.      The OBC and BBO also contend that the list in §8 of agencies is an exclusive list and that if not, “no amendments would have been necessary.”  A-ee Br, at 31.  Johnson contends that the list in §8 is illustrative and not exclusive.  This Court in Bloom supports Johnson’s position.  This Court said §8 was not comprehensive.  A very different situation would be presented if the Legislature had provided in G.L. c. 233, s 8 (or elsewhere) that witnesses may be summoned to testify only before certain listed local agencies, or if that statute had in some other form of words set forth a restriction on the right to use the subpoena power.     Bloom, at 163.      We see the exercise of the subpoena power by the commission as interfering with no statutory purpose relating to the use of subpoenas by local boards, committees and commissions.  Thus the exercise by the commission of the subpoena power pursuant to the terms of the ordinance is 'not inconsistent with . . . laws enacted by the general court' or otherwise invalid under the provisions of s 13 of the Home Rule Procedures Act.   Bloom, at 164.   The §8 list also illustrates that the procedures for subpoenas apply to diverse entities; e.g., the MWRA, to which Weisberg referred, is not a “state agency.”   Kelley Marine Transport Corp. v. Boston Sand & Gravel, 2 Mass. L.Rptr. 545, 1994 WL 879516 *3 (Super.Ct. 1994).  The MWRA is an “authority” and is, therefore, a “public agency,” not a “state agency,” and certain affirmative action provisions may not be mandatorily applied to it.  Id.  In contrast to Weisberg’s reliance on the single justice’s findings that §8 is inapplicable to the OBC and BBO because those entities are not listed in §8, that the list in §8 is an exclusive list, and that the statute was never amended to add the OBC or BBO to the list therein, Johnson argues that the list is not necessarily exclusive. For example, in Goldstein v. Board of Registration of Real Estate Brokers & Salesmen, 3 Mass.L. Rptr. 576, 1995 WL 809927 * 2, No. CA942700 (Super. Ct. April 27, 1995) (Toomey, J.) (allowing plaintiff's motion for summary judgment), it is written:   General Laws c. 112, §87AAA gives the Board authority to suspend a real estate broker's license.  The statute enumerates twelve (12) grounds upon which the Board may suspend a license. . . .  The statute does not include the loss of an attorney's license as a ground for the suspension of the former attorney's real estate broker's license. . . . There is no provision, such as “including but not limited to,” indicative of non-exclusivity.  There is no intimation that the enumerated reasons for suspension serve only as a list of examples. There is no implication that loss of one's license to practice law may result in loss of one's real estate broker's license.  Thus, the language chosen by the legislative draftsman is wholly devoid of a grant of authority to the Board to suspend a real estate broker's license for the reason presented at bar.   Goldstein, 1995 WL 809927 * 2 (emphasis supplied).  Significantly, although the list in G.L. c. 112, §87AAA, was deemed exclusive, when Johnson was disbarred, she received notice of revocation of licensure from the both the BRREBS and the IRS.  Therefore, to deem a list exclusive is meaningless, as is the OBC’s argument.  One might argue that Goldstein was decided in a superior court and has no value in the scheme of stare decisis.  And one might argue that the BRREBS did not appeal the decision lest it not prevail in a court where stare decisis still had value.  And one might argue that this Court is well-aware that by publication——whether by actual notice or otherwise——of the premature disbarment that the BRREBS and IRS {and perhaps other entities of which Johnson is not yet aware] would revoke her licensure; and by this practice and internal policy, this Court was circumventing the allegedly “exclusive” list. Johnson also argues that, according to BBO Rule 3.2, [e]xcept where inconsistent with these Rules, formal proceedings before . . .  special hearing officers and the Board shall conform generally to the practice in adjudicatory proceedings under Chapter 30A of the General Laws (State Administrative Procedure).   It is therefore arguable that §12 of c. 30A applies to the instant case, despite the word “agency” being used: (3) Any party to an adjudicatory proceeding shall be entitled as of right to the issue of subpoenas in the name of the agency conducting the proceeding. The party may have such subpoenas issued by a notary public or justice of the peace, or he may make written application to the agency, which shall forthwith issue the subpoenas requested. However issued, the subpoena shall show on its face the name and address of the party at whose request the subpoena was issued…   To deem §12 of c. 30A not applicable to the BBO or OBC would be allowing the BBO and OBC to eat their cake and keep it, too.

4.   Johnson had a constitutional right to post information regarding her cases in order to educate the public about the corruption she perceived in the judicial system [J’s  Br. at 26, 55-59].         This case concerns the power of this Commonwealth to circumvent laws against unjustifiable censorship and to punish Johnson for exercising her First Amendment rights to free expression and political speech by depriving her of her livelihood.      Johnson ran in the 2002 gubernatorial election on a platform of court reform and the abolishment of judicial immunity.  Those themes were the essence of her speech.  Within weeks of the election, Weisberg notified Johnson that discipline would be sought because her criticism of judges interfered with the administration of justice.       Weisberg falsely asserted in her OBC brief [at 34] that Johnson published her pleadings in pending cases.  Lawyers legally speak in pleadings to the courts. Johnson’s pleadings in both federal and state courts are public records and may be published, whether or not the cases are pending when first published.\[28]/  None published was or is impounded.      To deprive Johnson of her First Amendment rights, Weisberg complains of Johnson ignoring “impoundment orders” on the grounds that the orders were invalid.  Johnson assumes Weisberg is referring to the orders of Judge Mark Lawton and one other; Weisberg never stated who the other judge was.  \[29]/\[30]/  Johnson’s response to Judge Lawton may be seen in Drano #37  <http://www.falseallegations.- com/drano37-impoundment-Lawton.htm>; Lawton had neither personal jurisdiction over Johnson nor subject-matter jurisdiction.  See p. 9, supra, for Johnson’s response to Lawton’s order, and p. 15, supra. Weisberg’s contention in her brief [at 26] that Johnson had a duty to raise any First Amendment or other objections to the sham impoundment orders through legal means is absurd.  There were no legal means through which Johnson could stop Judge Lawton or the retired judge from doing whatever they were doing.  And certainly neither of them had the authority to censor Johnson’s website.  Moreover, contrary to Weisberg’s assertion, the name of no party to any of Johnson’s cases was impounded or confiden- tial by statute.  And Johnson received and receives no benefit other than that accrued by self-actualization through uploading her pleadings or other documents to her website to help the general populace.

5.   Issue preclusion or the use of offensive collateral estoppel was improper and deprived Johnson of her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.       Issue preclusion was improper here where Johnson had no opportunity to litigate the underlying facts and issues and where the underlying court case and the OBC’s case were based on a fabricated document. FALSE: that “[t]here is no evidence of record to refute its authenticity” [41 n.18]. TRUE:  The OBC moved and the BBO precluded the evidence, and the SHO quashed Johnson’s subpoenas of the culprits and other witnesses and excused one of them in person as they arrived at the hearing on December 2, 2003. 6.   For all the reasons argued both in her brief on appeal of the judgment of contempt and in this Reply brief, there was clear error law committed in adjudicating Johnson in contempt.   Issue 1, Jt. of Contempt: Weisberg failed to address Johnson’s allegations that the so-called administrative proceedings at the OBC/BBO were conducted unfairly and unlawfully [APP-TAB-B2 and APP-TAB-B4].\[31]/  Weisberg also failed to state any of the following grounds upon which bar counsel may petition the single justice to disbar Johnson.  In fact, she could not, for none of these is applicable to Johnson’s conduct. ·        misuse or loss of client funds, ·        neglect of client interests, ·        fraudulent conduct, ·        sanction in another jurisdiction, ·        conviction of a crime and ·        misrepresentation to the court.   PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE SINGLE JUSTICE, published at http://www.sjccountyclerk.com/- singjusprpr.html.   Weisberg failed also to mention Former Speaker of the House Thomas Finneran, who after pleading to the lesser federal felony charge of those for which he was indicted, was given only a temporary suspension.  Weisberg failed to admit that the disposi- tion of Finneran’s case is further evidence of egregious selective enforcement.  It appears that the selective discrep- ancy between this Court’s published-world- wide practices and procedures was motivated by this Court wanting to use the articula- tion of Forked-Tongue Tom Finneran in his new position as a morning radio talk-show host every weekday, a position that gives the appearance of this Court being partnered with WRKO and/or Entercom Boston, LLC, to assure that no criticism of the court and no arguments for court reform and the abolishment of judicial immunity will be heard on the airwaves.  It has been told to Johnson that on Wednesday morning, 21 February 2007, with Wendy Murphy (pro-active feminist of the women-are-always-the-victim school and rabid anti-fathers’ rights attorney) as co-host, Finneran, when discussing on his show\[32]/ the people’s rights in the courts of this Commonwealth, called Johnson “a nut.”  Given that Johnson’s political speech is primarily about the critical need for court reform and judicial accountabil- ity,\[33]/\[34]/ this was slander per se.  The slander with malice, with the intention of damaging Johnson’s reputation and credibility, appears to be a gesture of Finneran’s gratitude to the Court and its affiliated entities, the OBC and BBO, for not disbarring him.        Weisberg also did not comment upon Judge Spina’s changed Findings and Rulings, when he deleted, “There is nothing remotely flimsy or whimsical about the findings of the Board of Bar Overseers as to the respondent's misconduct,” and substituted, “There is nothing facially flimsy or whimsical about the findings of the Board of Bar Overseers that might render the judgment of disbarment transparently invalid.”  Weisberg failed to join Johnson’s legal arguments that because the order required Johnson to surrender irretrievable rights, the judge’s order did not require “blind obedience.” Matter of Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1347 n. 28 (1st Cir. (R.I.), 1986).  The collateral bar rule should not have been applied, and a transparently invalid order may not form the basis for a contempt citation. Weisberg failed to answer the material questions: Where was the alleged psychologi- cal report, who was the psychologist, and who was diagnosed and/or treated?  What amount of money was commingled? In the instant case, where there are no supporting facts, only bald assertions and frivolous pretenses at validity, the judg- ments and orders of disbarment and contempt are anything but proper and the transparent invalidity exception must apply, allowing Johnson to ignore the order of disbarment. “[T]hose subject to a transparently invalid order must make a good-faith effort to seek emergency appellate relief” [U.S. v. Provi- dence Journal, 485 U.S. 693, 698 (1988)], and this is exactly what Johnson did: she timely filed her notice of appeal to seek appellate review of the Order. The judgments of disbarment and contempt against Johnson must be dismissed.  They were contrived, politically——as well as perhaps personally——motivated, unlawful, and unconstitutional, and done with deliberate, reckless or callous indifference to the rights of both Johnson and her clients. Issue 2, Jt. of Contempt:  Weisberg failed to address both the deprivation of Johnson’s clients of their right to have a counsel of their choice represent them and the inter- ference with the orderly prosecution of their cases, as well as deprivation of Johnson of her ability to get compensated for the work she has done for the past few years and of her fundamental right to her profession or property and ultimately of her liberty.      Nor did Weisberg counter Johnson’s argument that where the single justice, unsupported by any law, knowingly and intentionally, deprived Johnson of her rights to the benefit of appealing his ruling and to her property and her liberty, his action is egregiously in excess of his jurisdiction. Issues 3 and 4, Jt. of Contempt:  Weisberg failed to provide an argument worthy of an appeal on the following issues: (1) that where Johnson’s appeal of the Judgment of Disbarment was pending, the single justice no longer had jurisdiction to hear a contempt complaint and (2) that by hearing and deciding the contempt complaint, the single justice deprived Johnson of the benefit of appealing to the full panel of this Court.       Arguing Johnson’s Issues 3 and 4 together, Weisberg cited two cases: Dominick v. Dominick, 18 Mass.App. Ct. 85 (1984) and Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig, 368 F.3d 49 (C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 2004), both for the proposition that the single justice did not lose jurisdiction upon Johnson filing her notice of appeal.  In Dominick itself, the appellate panel wrote: “we invite the attention of the Probate Court and the Legislature to what may have been an oversight in failing to make some provision for the automatic stay of orders such as here involved pending appeal.” Dominick, 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 95. The year after Dominick, this court ruled:  "Once a party enters an appeal ... the court issuing the judgment or order from which an appeal was taken is divested of jurisdiction to act on motions to rehear or vacate."  Commonwealth v. Cronk, 396 Mass. 194, 197 (1985) (emphasis supplied), and cases cited. “The only exception to this rule is the grant of a stay of appellate proceedings by a single justice of an appellate court for the purpose of prosecuting a postjudgment motion.  Huber v. Huber, 408 Mass. 495, 499 (1990) (contempt judgment could not be entered against husband for failure to make installment obligation while appeal was pending).  The Court in Huber, too, addressed the inconsistency between the Domestic Relations rules and those of civil procedure, and wrote:   The absence of a provision in Mass.R. Dom.Rel.P. 62(g) concerning the effect of an appeal on an obligation to transfer money or other assets in division of marital property creates uncertainty. An amendment to rule 62 stating the consequences of an appeal on marital property settlement obligations seems appropriate. Changes in other rules and a conforming statutory amendment may also be appropriate.  We ask the judges of the Probate and Family Court Department to consider these matters.   Huber, 408 Mass. at 500.  Weisberg, we can conclude, is attempting to mislead this Court as to the proper law on this issue.   Thus, where both the full panel and Judge Spina denied Johnson’s motion to stay, and Weisberg did not file a motion to stay, the County Court did not have the required jurisdiction to hear Weisberg’s complaint for contempt, thereby making Judge Spina’s act an act outside his jurisdiction. In Acevedo-Garcia, the First Circuit wrote, “It is true that the filing of a notice of appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction over matters related to the appeal.  But that principle has no bearing on a court's power to hold a party in contempt for violating a court order related to execution on a judgment.”  Id., at 58 (internal citations omitted). In 1990, this Court wrote:   Rule 62(d) provides that an appeal stays execution upon a judgment except as otherwise provided in the rules. It appears that the term "execution" applies only to a judgment for the payment of money. See Mass.R.Dom.Rel.P. 69 (1989); Dominick v. Dominick, 18 Mass.App.Ct. 85, 94, 463 N.E.2d 564 (1984).   Brash v. Brash, 407 Mass. 101, 107 (1990). In the instant case, there was no separate execution order that was violated.  Therefore, the single-justice session had no jurisdiction to hear the OBC/BBO’s complaint for contempt. Issue 5, Jt. of Contempt:  As to the denial of Johnson’s request for more time to comply with the order of disbarment, Weis- berg fell back on the now well-worn-out judicial excuse: she failed to appeal the interlocutory order, i.e., she did not appeal Judge Spina’s interlocutory order regarding the extension of time.  The burden on Johnson to write an appeal for each of the literally dozens of improper denials would have been horren- dous.  How many such appeals would Johnson have written before she would have been zapped with an assortment of sanctions?  One?  Two?  Six?  Nor did Weisberg address the issue of the resulting incarceration. Issues 6 and 7, Jt. of Contempt:  Weisberg failed to controvert Johnson’s argument that where Johnson did not hold the key to the cell door, the contempt was criminal, not civil, and that it was error to deny Johnson a trial by jury, making the finding of contempt a clear error of law and requiring the judgment of contempt to be vacated. Johnson relies on her argument in her appellate brief filed in the contempt action, SJC-2006-09866. Issue 8, Jt. of Contempt:  Weisberg failed to address the issue of what consti- tutes "the practice of law", Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.5.  She failed to controvert Johnson’s argument that the rule is void for vagueness or overbroadness, requiring this Court to reverse the implicit finding that Johnson committed the unauthorized practice of law, and to vacate the Judgment of Contempt. CONCLUSION      This Court must do the honorable thing and both reverse the judgment of disbarment of the single justice and clear Johnson’s name with the same publicity with which its affiliated entities besmirched it.

E N D N O T E S

[1]  Given that the OBC and the Board of Bar Overseers [“BBO”] is actually one and the same entity, Johnson contends that the appellee brief is submitted by the Siamese private entity herein referred to as “OBC/BBO.”   One piece of evidence is that Susan Strauss-Weisberg is identified on this Court’s website at http://www.ma-appellatecourts.org/ display_attorney.php?ano=26570799 as representing the BBO.  Acting Bar Counsel Constance Vecchione is similarly identified.  [2]   That court hid what they did in a Rule 1:28 decision.  In those years, Rule 1:28 opinions were not available in either the law books, Lawyers Weekly, or on Westlaw.com. [3]   Respondent’s Application for Authorization to Take Depositions [App.Vol. I, Paper 17, 6/20/03], which was denied.  Johnson’s letter to Weisberg, 10/6/03, regarding interrogatories and requests for documents. [4]  Carpenter consistently allowed Weisberg’s motions.  The endorsed motions were FAXed to Johnson within minutes.  Similarly, Carpenter——and later the SHO—-con-sistently denied Johnson’s substantive motions, even those outside the scope of her authority under BBO rules.  Therefore it was exquisitely clear that it would be futile for Johnson to file any motion with the BBO and expect it to be allowed.  Carpenter never allowed Johnson a hearing, even on her many motions to dismiss. Carpenter simply endorsed them “Denied” [S.A. 3-6].  [5]  Unfortunately, the police do not bring charges (despite G.L. 269, §13A) against false-accusers.  Neither do the courts sanction or punish false-accusers. These reprehensible and unforgivable false accusations are prevalent and used as weapons in domestic relations cases.  [6]   It is the Drano Series from which Weisberg drew many of her exhibits.  It provides samples of Complaints, instructions about outlining a Complaint, and examples of elements of an assortment of causes of action. It also provides samples of appeals brought in accordance with diverse rules and on diverse grounds in both State and Federal courts.  As we all know, the public chastises judges continually.  Sometimes there is good cause for the chastisement, but all too often, the pro se pleadings are so ill-written that no judge can avoid dismissing the case if the pleading is a Complaint or denying it if the pleading is a motion.  At that point, the judges are in a lose-lose situation because they are sure to be unjustifiably bad-mouthed.  Thus Johnson believes that there is a real need for a website such as hers, to educate the public, but also to criticize the courts when criticism is due. Weisberg, marching to the party’s drumbeat, was deaf to the educational rhythms of Johnson’s website. [7]  Weisberg literally solicited from some of the judges chastised in the seedling section complaint letters against Johnson.  Those complaints are included in the facts of Johnson’s action against Crane, Weisberg, the OBC, the BBO, and the Commonwealth for defamation and the interference with her advantageous and contractual business relationships.       Another of Weisberg’s bad-faith brainstorms led to the file “Judge Allen J. Jarasitis: Judas to Justice” at http://www.falseallegations.com/drano96- judge-jarasitis-judas-to-justice.htm [8]  In fact, she had referred her client to another attorney, who wanted to see the record in order to determine whether he wanted to take the case after Judge Lawton was vacuumed into it by Attorney Wolf, and the Juvenile Court clerk would not even show him the docket sheet.  As a result Johnson’s client was left without an attorney for that case, and, disgusted, did not re-appear in that court. [9]  Attorney Wolf was highly impeachable. When Johnson‘s trial subpoena duces tecum served on Wolf was quashed, Johnson was denied the opportunity to prove this fact. [10]  The quotes are well identified by Johnson at J’s App-TAB-A3, at 69-70, and Drano #154], and at note 12, infra. [11] 121. Salt further insisted that even though "there was no diagnosis of sexual abuse, the possibility is not to be eliminated."  125. . . . Salt knew it -- that Robyn and the divorced Fitzgerald "dated a few times and have remained good friends."  127. Salt lied in his report of 5 January 1992 to Judge Harper: he wrote that Reuben Ferreira had acknowledged that Brenden's visiting Linnehan "might well be detrimental."  Salt's statement was false because Salt never spoke to Ferreira.  [12]       Not a direct quote, a summary: Salt … drew no negative conclusion from Robyn having left Maine with Brenden while a court order allowing Linnehan visitation was in effect [CS depo at 13-17] . A direct quote:  "justification"  [id. at 15, lines 7 and 4] Not a direct quote, a summary: Summary: by fleeing and hiding with Brenden in Massachusetts [id. at 16].                Not a direct quote, an opinion: … Salt's conclusion that Linnehan had to be the perpetrator of the suspected sexual abuse because there was no male around except Linnehan and because Brenden feared men was specious [CS 7/1/88 report at 25; CS depo at 28].FN3 A direct quote:  FN3 . . .  "there was no diagnosis of sexual abuse, the possibility is not to be eliminated. His fear and anxiety about his father had been confirmed[;] he had undergone a traumatic experience and now suffered from post- traumatic stress" [id. at 34].  Not a direct quote, an opinion: There was no reliable data either in Salt's report or in the case as a whole to support his conclusion that the child had been sexually abused; the only data were the self-serving notes of the mother, Robyn [id. at 34-35].  Not a direct quote, an opinion: Notwithstanding the absence of any proof of sexual abuse, Salt recommended that Linnehan be denied visitation with his son [CS 7/1/88 report at 26].   A summary and one word directly quoted:  In 1991, the court ordered Salt to provide an updated report -- a "parenting" assessment -- to the court; this report was submitted to the court in January 1992. Again Salt recommended that Linnehan be denied visitation with his son [CS 1/5/92 report at 16].   A summary and five words directly quoted:  FN4 . . . [Salt] had received 30 or 40 assignments for reports [CS depo at 8-9]. Of the 60 court investigations that Salt had performed in two-and-a-half years [id. at 8], he found abuse in all but three [id. at 10] and all were done for the Bristol County Juvenile Court "except for one or two" [id. at 8].  A direct quote:  "her husband Michael is very important to Brenden and that Michael treats her son as if he were his own" [CS 1/5/92 report at 2; also 15].  [13]  A summary in Drano #17: Sandra Fyfe both introduced the idea of sexual abuse without a clear allegation [last page of her 7/1/88 report] and wrote that the assessment did not confirm a diagnosis of sexual abuse, but then recommended no visitation. [Comp. par. 118.]  [14] Soon after receiving Kern's report, DSS brought a care and protection action in New Bedford Juvenile Court, and Linnehan brought a paternity and custody action in Bristol County Probate & Family Court. . . . It was during the care and protection case that Eileen Kern of New Bedford Child & Family Services recommended to Judge Harper that a sexual-abuse assessment be conducted at the Collis Center. Drano #17. [15] This scenario is (1) the reason Johnson subpoenaed Wolf and certain documents, (2) the reason SHO Phillips refused to issue and quashed Johnson’s subpoena duces tecum to be served on Wolf, and (3) the reason Weisberg did not produce a copy of the original docket sheets of the Care & Protection case.  Weisberg’s case would have been in shambles if Johnson had been given the opportunity to examine Wolf and to scrutinize the requested documents. [16]  Considerably more than that which is set forth here is known about William, but this Reply is not the place to share it.  Brown’s son David left Jane to live with Brown. [17]  A child has no fear of a father whom he believes is long dead. [18]  In Drano #5, the Amended Complaint filed in federal court, William’s true name appears repeatedly. [19]   Johnson discusses McGregor’s order at 37 n. 27, infra. [20]   Weisberg failed to provide a comprehensive Table of Contents for the 12 volumes and although Johnson filed months ago a motion to compel the production of same [Paper #12], the Court has not yet acted on it. [21]   Because the “trial” transcript supplied Johnson by the BBO was severely redacted between pages 57 and 65, Johnson is unable to cite to the page at which Wagner gave Phillips this advice. [22]  Article I, §20. Equality of privileges and immunities: “No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” [23]  Space limitations preclude Johnson from relating the relevant history in this pleading. [24]      Neither Tobin in Matter of Tobin, 417 Mass. 92 (1994), or Morad in Matter of Morad, 20 Mass. Att'y Disc. R. 417, 424 (2004), complained, as Johnson did, of a contempt finding based on a non-existent or later-fabricated document.  In these circumstances, the offensive use of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel was an egregious error or law.  See J’s Br. at 59-61, Issue 7, which Johnson incorporates herein by reference. [25]  Johnson’s purposes in serving subpoenas on the people listed in A-ee Br. 31 n.15 as proposed witnesses are listed beside each person’s name in OBC/BBO’s summary of witnesses [App.Imp.Vol. VI, Tab 125].  [26]  See King, at 25, supra, and Murphy v. Dept. of Correction, 429 Mass. 736, 742-743 (1999).      To make out a claim of selective enforcement, a plaintiff must show that the selection was based on an impermis- sible standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.  Teague v. Alexander, 662 F.2d 79, 83 (D.C.Cir.1981); LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 611 (2nd Cir.1980) cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).  Absent such discrimination aimed at a "suspect class," a plaintiff must show inten- tional or purposeful discrimination.  Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944).  Without an allegation of discriminatory purpose, a mere failure to treat equally all persons is not a denial of equal protection.  See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979).     Hook v. Dubois, 1996 WL 1353321 *3, No. 946337 (Mass. Super. 1996)(Cowin, J.). [27]  In MCAD v. Liberty Mut., this Court also wrote that a board created by statute, has only those powers, duties and obligations conferred upon it by statute and those reasonably necessary for its proper functioning.  Id. at 189.  Where the BBO was not created by statute, the BBO may argue that whatever it does is literally outside the law.  To resolve this conundrum created by a “Board” that could even when it couldn’t under law, common sense and sound reason must be invoked. [28]  Weisberg referenced Impounded Vol. VIII, Ex. 22, 30, 32, but Johnson can identify only one of them.  Exh. 30 is Drano #32, a pleading dated 3/16/01.  Johnson does not know which documents are in Exhs. 22 and 32. [29]   Johnson assumes Weisberg was referring to Retired Judge William Simons, who, on behalf of his son, Richard, a Pittsfield criminal defense lawyer, wrote the alleged order in a letter to Johnson.  Being retired, Judge Simons had, of course, no authority to give Johnson an order.  It was an audacious display of power past.  And acting out his petulance by filing a complaint at the BBO——against Johnson for disobeying his “order”——was perverse.  Of course, it might have been requested by Weisberg, much as Weisberg did with Jarasitis and the other judges [J’s App. TAB-D, Exhs. G and I]. [30]   In her appellate brief, Johnson pointed to Judge Prudence McGregor.  While McGregor allowed Weisberg’s motion, the judge’s order requested nothing of Johnson.  The problem arises from Weisberg failing to name these judges when she makes the statement, forcing Johnson to guess, Who is she talking about?  Here the same problem arises.  Only Lawton and Simons come to mind.  [31]  The Tables of Content to these documents are in J’s APP-TAB-B1 and APP-TAB-B3.  See also Drano #102 <http://www.falseallegations.com/drano102- bbo-star-chamber-92503-forum.htm>, which provides both description and legal context. [32]     Finneran’s 5-10 A.M. program is called “Finneran’s Forum.” [33]  Johnson has also been outspoken regarding c. 209A, arrest-preferred policies, the failure of law enforcement to prosecute crimes under c. 269, §13A, and the annual federal bonuses that have motivated curious court behaviors. [34]    "In a universal time of deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act." -- George Orwell

Respectfully submitted,          13 March  2007                 Barbara C. Johnson, Esq., Pro Se                                            6 Appletree Lane                                           Andover, MA 01810-4102                                            978-474-0833                                            BBO #549972 (pending appeal, SJC                                                                                             bench) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE              I, Barbara C. Johnson, hereby certify that on 13 March 2007 I served a true and accurate copy of the within pleading by first-class mail on opposing OBC counsel, 99 High Street, Boston, MA 02110.                                            13 March 2007                       Barbara C. Johnson, Esq., Pro Se