I.  Nature of the Action of the trial court 
    from which review is sought  . . . . . . . .      1

II.  Statement of Issues of Law Raised by the 
     Petition   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     3

III. Statement as to Whether a Party Has Filed, 
     Served, or Intends to File a Motion for 
     Reconsideration in the Trial Court . . . . .     4

IV.  Statement of Relief Requested  . . . . . . .     5
 
 

Civil Docket, Johnson v Johnson et al, 
ESCV2006-00332  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  APP-1

Summary Judgment M.R.C.P. 56, (27 October 2011) . APP-33

Findings, Rulings and Order for Entry of 
Judgment (27 October 2011)  . . . . . . . . . . . APP-34

Emergency Motion to Reconsider and Vacate the 
Order of 12 August 2011 (17 August 2012). . . . . APP-37

     Exhibit A, Proposed Order  . . . . . . . . . APP-43

Mother’s Reply to Defendants’ Combined Opposi-
tion to Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Recon-
sider and Vacate August 12, 2011 [Sic] Order 
and Emergency and Imperative Motion to 
Supplement Pretrial Argument (19 August 2012) . . APP-44 

Emergency Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse Judge 
Robert A. Cornetta (15 October 2011)  . . . . . . APP-50

Emergency Plaintiff’s Motion to Continue Trial 
Until After Pretrial Matters are Acted Upon by 
This Court and Not Summarily Denied or Ignored 
(16 October 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APP-52

Emergency Plaintiff’s Motion to Allow Atten-
dance at Summary Judgment Hearing by Telephonic 
Conference as Done on 12 August 2011
(16 October 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APP-54 

Emergency Plaintiff’s Motion for Court to Pro-
vide to Mother Johnson Free of Charge Tran-
scripts of Hearings Before Judge Cornetta
Since August 2011 (27 November 2011)  . . . . . . APP-56 

Emergency Motion to Reconsider Plaintiff’s Mo-
tion for Court to Provide to Mother Johnson 
Free of Charge Transcripts of Hearings Before 
Judge Cornetta Since August 2011 (9 December 
2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APP-58

Excerpt (slightly abridged) from  Mother’s pend-
ing PETITION FOR CERTIORARI PURSUANT TO M.G.L. c. 
249, § 4, docketed as SJ-2011-0412  . . . . . . . APP-60

Table 1, an excerpt from multiple pleadings 
filed in the Trial Court [MOTHER’S STATEMENT OF 
FACTS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS/PLAINTIFFS-I
N-COUNTERCLAIM’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT on APP: 261, 263] and in the Appeals 
Court [APP: 293, 296, 461]  . . . . . . . . . . . APP-68

Table 2 and Figure 1,  excerpts from multiple 
pleadings filed in the Trial Court [MOTHER’S 
STATEMENT OF FACTS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFEN- DANTS/PLAINTIFFS-IN-COUNTERCLAIM’S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT on APP: 261, 263] and 
in the Appeals Court [APP: 293, 296, 461] . . . . APP-69
 
 

Essex, ss.                                    A.C. No. 20l2-J-_____
 

Barbara C. Johnson,
                    Plaintiff/Appellant 

Marc I. Johnson, individually and 
as Trustee, H. Yvonne van Bodengraven 
a/k/a Yvonne Johnson, 
                    Defendants/Appellees 

I.  Nature of the Order and Action of the trial court 
    from which review is sought

Petitioner Barbara Johnson [“Mother”] requests interlocutory review of an order entered into the docket on 7 March 2012 by Judge Robert A. Cornetta, sitting by appointment by CJAM Robert Mulligan, without approval of the Governor’s Council and possibly without being sworn in under the judicial oath.

On 27 November 2011 and 9 December 2011, Mother moved this court to provide to her free of charge transcripts of two hearings before Judge Cornetta, specifically, of 12 August 2011 and 20 October 2011.

On 7 February 2012, Judge Cornetta disposed of Mother’s motion by writing:
 

Motion (P#157) No action is taken on the re-
quest inasmuch as the telephonic hearing was 
not recorded but only witnessed by Clerl's of-
fice staff - all parties participated in the 
same with the Court 3/7/2012 (Robert A. Cor-
netta, Justice). Notices mailed 3/7/2012

Background: The underlying action arose out of a dispute over whether Mother had a life estate in the subject 4-room Andover property and whether Defendants, her son Marc and his wife Yvonne, should have been allowed to evict Plaintiff and sell the cottage.

Between 1987 and 2006, when this action arose, Mother provided $298,999.89 to Marc and expended approximately $60,000 in cash and kind to maintain, repair, and update the property.  The sum of $258,999.89 constituted Mother’s equitable basis for remaining in the property (purchased for $220,000 in 1987). 

Mother paid both rent and the mortgage [see Tables 1 and 2, and Figure 1, showing the rents paid by her (the rent varied unbeknownst to her) [APP:68-69].

Yet, despite Mother’s advance payments for her occupancy—–whether deemed rent or payment for a life estate—–on 10 March 2009, Judge John Lu both granted Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, thus precluding Mother from bringing her case to trial, and evicted Mother, who was 74 years old. She is now 77. 

Mother’s entitlement to trial if quantum meruit should be appropriate was the basis upon which the Appeals Court panel (Lenk, Brown, Mickey, JJ.) remanded the case in May 2011.

Because the unfavorable decision in the underlying action was, in Mother’s opinion, a result of political retaliation (explicitly unaddressed by the appellate panel), the offending retaliation continued in Lawrence after remand. Judges Lu and Billings were replaced by Judge Cornetta, who has done everything to assure that Mother would not be treated with fundamental fairness and get the trial granted by the Appeals Court.

The facts explaining the extraordinary lengths to which Cornetta’s court went in order to deny Mother her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection are included in considerable detail in Mother’s pending PETITION FOR CERTIORARI PURSUANT TO M.G.L. c. 249, § 4, docketed as SJ-2011-0412.  An abridgment of those facts are included in the Appendix [APP:60-67] for the convenience of this court.

II.  Statement of Issues of Law Raised in the Petition

1. Where there is no court record of the two hear-
   ings relied upon by Judge Cornetta in his 
   granting of Defendants’ motion for summary 
   judgment, the court did not have jurisdiction,  
   and thus made Cornetta’s order of October 2011 
   void ab initio. 

2. Where the grant of summary judgment was void 
   ab initio, the case must be remanded for trial 
   by jury.

III. Statement as to Whether a Party Has Filed, Served, or Intends 
     to File a Motion for Reconsideration in the Trial Court

Mother has neither filed nor served nor intends to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the Trial Court. The law does not require the doing of a useless or hollow or futile act.\1/ Judge Cornetta both filed and caused notices to be sent on 19 March 2012 of his “Findings and Ruling” for the order of 7 March 2012 [APP:31-32]. It was by happenstance that Mother randomly checked AOTC’s online docket sheet on 28 March 2012 to learn if anything had been filed by Defendants and learned of Cornetta’s latest Findings. 

In his belated Findings, Cornetta stated Mother had not included in her affidavit of indigency “publishing income” from the books she had published.\2/  That information was not required by the form.  Mother had no obligation to file the Supplement.  

Her income has been below the state and federal poverty levels for years, even when including royalties from Amazon and CreateSpace(formerly BookSurge).\3/  

On 9 January 2012, the new book was published as an ebook not as a paperback. If and when the new book sells, mother will receive royalties 60 days following the month in which the sales occur.  Both books are self-published.\4/ 
 

IV. Statement of Relief Requested
    Plaintiff prays this court:
 

a. to vacate the order of 28 October 2011 granting Defendants’ 
   summary judgment precluding a trial of the underlying action, 

b. to deem the Essex Superior Court in Lawrence and presided by 
   Judge Robert A. Cornetta between 12 August 2011 and 28 October 
   2011 to be without jurisdiction over the underlying action on 
  the grounds that it was not a court of record, 

c. to deem the orders arising out of the hearings of 12 August 
   2011 and 20 October 2011 to be void ab initio, 

d. to grant Plaintiff attorney’s fees,\5/  and 

e. to remand, for the second time, with an order that discovery
   (maliciously and unconstitionally denied by three presiding 
   judges-—Lu, Billings, and Cornetta) and trial by jury be
   allowed. 

Respectfully submitted,
Barbara C. Johnson
Barbara C. Johnson
4 April 2012 /s/ barbjohnson74@gmail.com
Barbara C. Johnson, Pro Se
Apdo #404-4013
Alajuela, Atenas, Atenas
20501-Costa Rica
barbjohnson74@gmail.com

 1.     Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 107-108 (1977); D. Federico Co. v. New Bedford Redev.  Authy., 9 Mass.App.Ct. 141, 143-144 (1980).  
  
 2.    The first book was published in August 2009; the second, on 9 January 2012.  The first detailed affidavit Mother submitted to the trial court was rejected by Cornetta.  She had used the 6-page application form supplied by the United States Supreme Court. That form, updated, had been accepted by both the Commonwealth’s Supreme Judicial and Appeals courts. Mother had not known that the Superior Court form existed. When the blank application was not received by Mother [P156, 2/6/12] a friend living in the Commonwealth provided it; then Mother filled and submitted it.  The trial court denied receiving it.  And on it went.  Mother re-sent the form to court; no itemization or supplement to the form was required.  

 3.    She received no royalties in August and September 2011 and none in January through March 2012.

 4.    Because Mother has had no money to advertise her books, they are known essentially only by friends.  She asked her son Marc, a defendant in the underlying case, to give her seed money.  He refused.  

The publishing industry has changed in recent years.  Unless one is a nationally recognized figure, authors, whether self-published or not, must do their own marketing. That is an arduous, time-consuming task.  One must write articles and expand one’s image on social networks, in an effort to make one’s name known in the general public.  In 2009 and 2010, Mother was frequently a guest on diverse Internet radio talk shows, and was thus able to supplement her social security income by enough to allow her to buy food.  As the book aged, sales decreased.  Not residing in the States prevented Mother from scheduling book-signing appearances and speaking tours.

 5.    Pro se litigants may be entitled to Attorney fees and costs under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Award Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, as amended 42 USC 1988.

I hereby certify that on this day I emailed a true and accurate copy of the above pleading and attachments and served by “first-class” mail on opposing counsel of record, Kenneth J. Rossetti, Esq., Barton & Rossetti, P.C. 2 Haven Street, Suite 204. Reading, MA 01867. 

Barbara C. Johnson
___________________________
Barbara C. Johnson
4 April 2012  

Essex, ss.                                                                                A.C. No. 20l2-J-

__________________________
Barbara C. Johnson,

Plaintiff/Petitioner

Marc I. Johnson, individually
and as Trustee, H. Yvonne van
Bodengraven a/k/a Yvonne 
Johnson,

Defendants/Respondents

 
Remanded by Appeals
Court: No. 2010-P-0471

Superior Ct. at Lawrence,
No. 06-332-C

Consolidated and formerly
Superior Ct. at Lawrence,
No. 2006-01263-C

Lawrence District Ct.,
No. 0618-SU-0067

Plaintiff/Petitioner Barbara C. Johnson [“Mother”] submits this memorandum in support of her Petition for Interlocutory Review of an order that makes assembly of the record impossible.  Mother filed a timely notice of appeal after receiving decision of summary judgment in favor of Defendants/Respondents.

Mother also filed (1) an affidavit of indigency (several times, several forms) and (2) two motions (original and one to reconsider) seeking the Commonwealth to pay for the tapes and transcripts of two hearings referenced in Judge Cornetta’s Findings, Rulings and Order for Entry of Judgment, dated 27 October 2011.

The two hearings were on 12 August 2011 and 20 October 2011. The August 12th hearing was a teleconference. The October 20th was not. Cornetta denied Mother leave to make a telephonic appearance on October 20th. In effect, the October 20th hearing was an ex
parte hearing. His decision after that hearing was memorialized on 27 October 2011. In it, he included so-called facts that were never in evidence, were solely from Cornetta’s own errorful and unsupported miscalculations, and in doing so, usurped a jury’s rights. Given that Cornetta’s unwillingness to produce a tape that might or might not exist, his bogus dollar figures and dates might have arisen from the defendants or their defense counsel during the ex
parte summary-judgment hearing. In toto, since August 12th, Cornetta’s conduct has been sufficient proof of the dangers of a judge being appointed to a case to achieve a predetermined result, usurping the job of a jury, and causing the court to become a court not of
record.

Cornetta denied Mother’s motion for tapes and transcripts of both hearings on the grounds that there was no record of the “telephonic hearing,” which was the August 12th hearing. If that was true, why did he not allow Mother’s motion and produce the tape of the ex parte summary judgment hearing?

On 19 March 2012, twelve days after the decision and order of 7 March 2012 issued on Mother’s motion, Judge Cornetta entered “Findings and Ruling,” allegedly in support the March 7th order. But his findings are fallacious––as described infra.

Despite Cornetta’s efforts in mid-March to disguise speciously his admission that his order denying Mother’s motion is meritless, it remains that there appears to be no record of either of those hearings. That deficiency caused his court to lose jurisdiction as of August 12th over Johnson v. Johnson et al. Given the lack of jurisdiction over that case, the summary-judgment decision and order of October 27th is void ab initio.

Further, Cornetta might not be appropriately called a “judge.” He evidently was appointed by CJAM Mulligan and thereby bypassed approval of the Governor’s Council (which is the public’s only opportunity to participate in a judicial appointment). Although a statute appears to give the CJAM the right to appoint a judge from one department into another, that statute is vague, and itself may be deemed unconstitutional. It is vague in that it neither provides for the transferred judge to be sworn in under oath nor be evaluated by the Council for suitability in experience, education, training, and knowledge to sit as a superior court judge. Mother’s petition pursuant to M.G.L. c. 249, § 4, details documentary facts proving that Cornetta is either not intellectually capable of serving in that capacity or, alternatively, a coconspirator with the unnamed co-conspirators identified in Mother’s petition docketed as SJ-2011-00412 (page 37) and her appellate brief, 2010-P-0471—the conspiracy being to retaliate and politically discriminate by wrongfully using judicial powers against Mother.

ARGUMENTS

1. Where there is no court record of the two hearings relied upon by Judge Cornetta in 
    his granting of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the court did not have 
    jurisdiction,  and thus made Cornetta’s order of October 2011 void ab initio.

A court of record is a court, or tribunal, which must meet the following criteria:

1. generally has a seal (in England and some states)
2. has the power to fine or imprison for contempt
3. keeps a record of the proceedings
4. holds a proceeding
5. is independent of the magistrate (judge)

COURTS OF RECORD are those whose acts and judicial
proceedings are enrolled, or recorded, for a perpetual
memory and testimony, and which have power
to fine or imprison for contempt. Error lies to
their judgments, and they generally possess a
seal. COURTS NOT OF RECORD are those of inferior
dignity, which have no power to fine or imprison,
and in which the proceedings are not enrolled or
recorded.

“A court of record is a judicial tribunal having attributes and exercising functions independent of the person of the magistrate designated generally to hold it.” Jones v. Jones, 188 Mo.App. 220, 175 S.W. 227, 229 (1915), citing Ex parte Thistleton, 52 Cal. 220, and Bucher v. Thompson, 7 N.M. 115, 32 Pac. 498 (1893). A court of record is also a proceeding according to the course of common law, its acts and proceedings being enrolled for a perpetual memorial. Ex parte Gladhill, 8 Metc. Mass. 171, per Shaw, C.J. See also Ledwith v. Rosalsky, 244 N.Y. 406, 155 N.E. 688, 689.

Logically, therefore, when Cornetta intentionally failed\1/ to comply with the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure and common law, he was but a private man without discretionary power over the parties in the underlying action. That is, Cornetta’s private court was a court not of record. 

\1/ Cornetta’s failure re Superior Court Rule 9A was called to his attention in Mother’s pleadings. His failure to allow Mother to appear telephonically at the summary judgment hearing was a violation of fundamental fairness and common law. See page 12, infra, for discussion of “the denial of fundamental fairness [is] shocking to the universal sense of justice.” Betts v. Brady, 1942, 316 U.S. 455, 462, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 1256, 86 L.Ed. 1595. His intentional scheduling of the first day of trial on the same day as the summary judgment hearing both precluded giving Mother an opportunity to prepare for trial if the summary judgment was denied, and was malicious if allowed, given that he knew Mother would have to fly a few thousand miles at considerable expense from Costa Rica for a short hearing in Lawrence, Mass. See Vaks v. Ryan, infra, where it defines Mass.R.Civ.P. Rule 6(c).

A party to a proceeding in a court not of record has in most cases a right to demand a new trial, to wit, a trial de novo, in a court of record. This is not an appeal, as such, but a new proceeding which completely supersedes the result of the prior trial.

“Where there is no jurisdiction over the subject matter, there is, as well, no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction.” Joyce v. U.S., 474 F.2D 215, 219 (3rd Cir. 1973), citing F.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). Joyce was cited by Magistrate Judge Robert C. Collings in Lowry v. U.S., 958 F.Supp. 704, 714 (D.Mass. Feb. 12, 1997) (NO. CIV.A. 91-11233-MLW) for other reasons. “A departure [by a court] from those recognized and established requirements of law, however close apparent adherence to mere form in method of procedure, which has the effect [of] depriv[ing] one of a constitutional right, is an excess of jurisdiction.” Wuest
v. Wuest, 127 P.2d 934, 937, 53 Cal.App.2d 339, 346 (1942).

Even if a court has or appears to have subject matter jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction can be lost. A few of the many major reasons which apply to this case and why subject matter jurisdiction is lost follow:

• a judge does not follow statutory procedure, Armstrong v Obucino, 300 
   Ill. 140, 143, 133 N.E. 58 (1921),\2/

\2/ “Discovery and pretrial motions, including motions
pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12, 15, 19, 20 and 56, and such other motions as may be prescribed by the court, shall be filed, marked and caused to be heard by such date unless the court permits otherwise for good cause shown.”). See also Rule 9A(c)(3) of the Rules of the Superior Court (“Presumptive Right to a Hearing. Requests for hearings on the following motions will ordinarily be allowed: ... Summary Judgment (Rule 56)....”). Vaks v. Ryan, +supra and infra.

• unlawful activity of a judge or undisclosed conflict of interest. Code 
  of Judicial Conduct,

• violation of due process, Johnson v Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct.
  1019 (1938)(denial of habeas corpus reversed and remanded; the court
  has power to inquire with regard to the jurisdiction of the inferior court,
  either with respect to the subject matter or to the person, even if such 
  inquiry involves an examination of facts outside of but not inconsistent
  with the record); Pure Oil Co. v City of Northlake, 10 Ill.2d 241, 245, 
  140 N.E.2d 289 (1956) (ordinance was invalid as a denial of due 
  process); In re Estate of Wells, 983 P.2d 279, (Kan. App. 1999) 310 
  N.W. 2d 502, (Minn. 1981); Lange v. Johnson, 204 N.W.2d 205 (Minn.
  1973)(where a court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or
  acted in a manner inconsistent with due process,the judgment is void),

• where public policy is violated, Martin-Tregona v Roderick, 29 
  Ill.App.3d 553, 331 N.E.2d 100 (1st Dist. 1975); Vaks v. Ryan, 2012 
  Mass.App.Div. 17, 2012 WL 194398 (Jan. 18, 2012, NO. 
  11-ADMS-10007)  (party was entitled to opportunity to be heard 
  before new judge reconsidering earlier cross-motions for summary 
  judgment),

• fraud upon the court, In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill.App.3d 393
  (1962).

Where the court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law, and the entry of the summary judgment order violated due process, the judgment is void. U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14. Triad Energy Corp. v. McNell, 110 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). F.R.Civ.P. Rule 60(b)(4); Klugh v. U.S., 620 F.Supp. 892 (D.S.C. 1985); Eckel v. MacNeal, 628 N.E.2d 741 (Ill. App. Dist. 1993); Matter of Marriage of Hampshire, 869 P.2d 58 (Kan. 1997); Jaffe and Asher v. Van Brunt, S.D.N.Y.1994, 158 F.R.D. 278.

The void judgment has no legal force or effect whatever; it is an absolute nullity. Given that Mother’s rights were affected, she may attack its invalidity directly or collaterally whenever and wherever it is interposed. In re Estate of Steinfield, 630 N.E.2d 801, certiorari denied. See also Steinfeld v. Hoddick, 513 U.S. 809 (Ill. 1994). City of Lufkin v. McVicker, 510 S.W. 2d 141 (Tex.Civ.App., Beaumont, 1973). In re Marriage of Parks, 630 N.E.2d 509
(Ill.App. 5 Dist. 1994). 

Other courts offer a fuller definition of a void judgment:

A void judgment which includes a judgment entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter the particular judgment, or an order procured by fraud, may be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally, provided that the party is properly before the court. 

The void judgment is devoid of any potency because of jurisdictional defects. Ward v. Terriere, 386 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1963).

A "final" but void order can have no preclusive effect. "‘A void judgment [or order] is, in legal effect, no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one.' [Citation.]"  Bennett v. Wilson, 122 Cal. 509, 513-514, 55 P. 390
(1898).

A void judgment is one which, from its inception, was a complete nullity and without legal effect. Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 14 A.L.R. Fed. 298 (1st Cir. (Mass.) 1972).

A void judgment may also be vacated at any time. Matter of Marriage of Welliver, 869 P.2d 653 (Kan. 1994). Hobbs v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 485 F.Supp. 456 (M.D. Fla. 1980). Holstein v. City of Chicago, 803 F.Supp. 205, reconsideration denied 149
F.R.D. 147, affirmed 29 F.3d 1145 (N.D. Ill 1992). Rubin v. Johns, 109 F.R.D. 174 (D. Virgin Islands 1985). Stidham V. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152 (Ind. 1998).
 

A void judgment is one which, from its inception, is and forever continues to be absolutely null, without legal efficacy, ineffectual to bind the parties or to support a right, of no legal force and effect whatever, and incapable of enforcement in any manner or to any degree.

A judgment shown by evidence\3/ to be invalid for want of jurisdiction is a void judgment or at all events has all attributes of a void judgment, City of Los Angeles v. Morgan, 234 P.2d 319 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1951).

 \3/ Evidence real or fabricated.

A void judgment is a judgment, decree, or order entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction of
the parties or of the subject matter, or which lacks the inherent power to make or enter the
particular order involved. State ex rel. Turner v. Briggs, 971 P.2d 581 (Wash.
App. Div. 1999). Cockerham v. Zikratch, 619 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1980).

While voidable orders are readily appealable and must be attacked directly, a void order may be circumvented by collateral attack or remedied by mandamus. Sanchez v. Hester, 911 S.W.2d 173, (Tex.App., Corpus Christi, 1995).

When the sense of fairplay is shocking, due process is violated. Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234, 246, 80 S.Ct. 297, 303-304 (1960). 
 

[The] identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest
that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. See, e. g., Goldberg v.
Kelly, supra, 397 U.S., at 263-271, 90 S.Ct., at 1018-1022.

In the instant case, (1) Mother’s private interest has been affected by the lower court’s action, (2) Mother has been erroneously deprived of her financial interests, (3) the Commonwealth’s interest in retaliating and politically discriminating against Mother is against public policy. Because of the Ouellet case, in which Cornetta’s decision was overturned, he had to have learned the proper procedure. Therefore it can be circumstantially proven that Cornetta was acting with forethought of retaliation and discrimination, which were, in Mother’s opinion and as voiced in both her appeal, 2010-P-0471, and petition, SJ-2011-00412, the acts of Judges Lu and Billings, making Cornetta’s acts continuances of the judicial conspiracy “proved” – albeit not addressed – in the original appeal.

2.  Where the grant of summary judgment was void ab initio, the case must be 
     remanded for trial by jury.

Relief from void judgment is available when the trial court lacked either personal or subject matter jurisdiction. Dusenberry v. Dusenberry, 625 N.E. 2d 458 (Ind.App. 1 Dist. 1993).
When a rule providing for relief from void judgments is applicable, relief is not discretionary matter, but is mandatory. Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, (Colo. 1994).

A party to a proceeding in a court not of record has in most cases a right to demand a new trial, to wit, a "trial de novo," in a court of record. This is not an appeal, as such, but a new proceeding which completely supersedes the result of the prior trial.  See Box v. Talley, 1 Va.App. 289, 338 S.E.2d 349, Va.App., January 07, 1986 (NO. 0282-85) citing Walker
v. Department of Public Welfare, 223 Va. 557, 563, 290 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1982)(citations omitted) (“an appeal. . . from a court not of record . . . annuls the judgment of the inferior tribunal as completely as if there had been no previous trial ... and that such a trial de novo in the circuit court grants to a litigant every advantage which would have been his had the case been tried originally in such court”).
 

Respectfully submitted,
Barbara C. Johnson
Barbara C. Johnson
/s/ barbjohnson74@gmail.com
Barbara C. Johnson, Pro Se
Apdo #404-4013
Alajuela, Atenas, Atenas
20501-Costa Rica
barbjohnson74@gmail.com

I hereby certify that on this day I emailed a true and accurate copy of the above pleading and attachments and served by “first-class” mail on opposing  counsel of record, Kenneth J. Rossetti, Esq., Barton & Rossetti, P.C. 2 Haven Street, Suite 204. Reading, MA 01867.
 

Barbara C. Johnson
___________________________