#5, Drano Series
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More in the Drano Series:
An Amended Complaint
Based on the Deprivation of Parental Rights
Sexual abuse with a pink sponge during bath time. . . . Sexual abuse with a Day-Glo dinosaur glowing in a broom closet. . . . Sexual abuse in Batman and Robin's cave and the Batmobile. . . . Such is the sexual abuse found by sex-abuse evaluators and so-called mental-health professionals. Well, they're being sued.
There are some anomalies in the Amended Complaint below. The original Complaint was filed with the intent of suing certain entities, but it was then requested by attorneys who were working two companion cases to hold off a while in suing those entities . . . for fear their backs would stiffen in the other cases.
* * *
Read the pleadings below. Everyone who is outraged by judges abrogating their responsibilities, please
blow your horns continuously as you pass the location of each and every courthouse, particularly in Massachusetts,
write to each and every representative and senator, particularly in Massachusetts,
write Letters to the Editors, particularly in Massachusetts,
call each radio and television station, particularly in Massachusetts,
call each judge's lobby, particularly in Massachusetts, and ask, "Have you earned your paycheck, benefits, and future pension?"
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION: 00-CV-11048-REK
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Theodore S. Brown
James Linnehan
Jane & John Does
Plaintiffs
v.Eli Newberger
Children's Hospital
Amy C. Tishelman
Barbara Cohen
Brockton Division of the
District Court Department
of the Trial Court of Massachusetts
Mass. Dept. of Social Services
Eileen Kern
Sandra Fyfe
Christopher Salt
Jack McCarthy, Jr.
John and Jane Smiths
Defendants
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AMENDED COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND ON ALL COUNTS
INTRODUCTION Theodore Brown ["Brown"] of Maine and James Linnehan ["Linnehan"] of Massachusetts in their capacities as individuals and on behalf of other similarly situated persons hereby assert the following claims against the defendants in the above-entitled action: (1) NEGLIGENCE, (2) INTERFERENCE WITH PARENTAL RIGHTS, (3) VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. 1983 (AGAINST BROWN), (4) VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. 1983 (AGAINST LINNEHAN), (5) FEDERAL AND STATE (M.G.L. c. 12, sec. 11I) CIVIL RIGHTS (AGAINST BROWN), (6) FEDERAL AND STATE (M.G.L. c. 12, sec. 11I) CIVIL RIGHTS (AGAINST LINNEHAN), (7) DEFAMATION, (8) CIVIL RICO, (9)) BREACH OF CONTRACT, (10) NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, (11) INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, (12)VIOLATION OF G.L. c. 93A.
JURISDICTION
1. Jurisdiction of this court arises under 28 U.S.C. secs 1331, 1337, 1343(a), and 1367(a); 42 U.S.C. secs. 1983 and 1985; and 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968.
2. Jurisdiction of this court for the pendent claims is authorized by F.R.Civ.P. 18(a), and arises under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction as set forth in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
PARTIES1
1. Theodore Browns Facts . 5
James Linnehan Facts
16
(1) NEGLIGENCE
22
(2) INTERFERENCE WITH PARENTAL RIGHTS
23
(3) VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. 1983 (AGAINST BROWN)
26
(4) VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. 1983 (AGAINST LINNEHAN) 27
(5) FEDERAL AND STATE (M.G.L. c. 12, sec. 11I)
CIVIL RIGHTS (AGAINST BROWN) .
28
(6) FEDERAL AND STATE (M.G.L. c. 12, sec. 11I)
CIVIL RIGHTS (AGAINST LINNEHAN)
30
(7) DEFAMATION.
31
(8) CIVIL RICO
32
(9) BREACH OF CONTRACT
34
(10) NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
35
(11) INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
36
(12) VIOLATION OF G.L. c. 93A
37 3. Plaintiff Theodore Brown ["Brown"] is a natural person residing at 127 Athens Road, Harmony, Somerset County, Maine, United States of America; was a resident of Maine during all relevant times of this action; and is the biological father of Charlotte and Theodore S. Brown, Jr. ["TJ"]. [FACTS AS TO BROWN, page 5.]
4. Plaintiff James Linnehan ["Linnehan"], is a natural person residing at 19 Vermont Street, Salisbury, Essex County, Massachusetts, 01952, United States of America; was a resident of both Maine and Massachusetts during all relevant times of this action; and is the biological father of Brenden Linnehan. [FACTS AS TO LINNEHAN, page 16.]
5. John and Jane Does are plaintiffs -- mothers, fathers, and children -- who were evaluated or were alleged to be evaluated by Eli Newberger and his Family Development team at Children's Hospital. They number in the 100s.2
2 The questions of law and fact raised by the claims of the named plaintiffs are common to and typical of those raised by the claims of the putative class members. The harms suffered by the named plaintiffs are typical of the harms suffered by persons similarly situated.6. Defendant Children's Hospital is a nonprofit corporation located on Longwood Avenue in Boston, Suffolk County, Massachusetts, United States of America.7. Defendant Eli Newberger is a natural person residing at 92 Evans Road, Brookline, Norfolk County, Massachusetts 02146, United States of America.
8. Defendant Amy C. Tishelman is a natural person residing in Brookline, Norfolk County, Massachusetts 02146, United States of America. She was a member of Newberger's team at Children's Hospital and was the member who interviewed the younger of the Brown children.3
3 Mary Renée Leder and Kim McNamara were also members of Newberger's Brown team. Leder and McNamara are not named as defendants in this case, for they did not sign the Newberger team Linnehan and Brown reports.9. Defendant Barbara Cohen is a natural person residing at 32 Condor Road, Sharon, Norfolk County, Massachusetts 02067-2949, United States of America, and then-working at Whitman Counseling Center in Whitman, Massachusetts, United States of America.10. Defendant Brockton Division of the District Court Department of the Trial Court of Massachusetts is located in Brockton, Plymouth County, Massachusetts, United States of America.
11. Defendant Massachusetts Department of Social Services ["DSS"] is a department located at 24 Farnsworth Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02110, United States of America.
12. Defendant Eileen Kern is a natural person residing at 251 Massachusetts Avenue, Arlington, Massachusetts 02474, Middlesex County, Massachusetts, United States of America, and who was employed at New Bedford Child & Family in New Bedford, Massachusetts.
13. Defendant Sandra Fyfe is a natural person residing at 19 Congressional Street, Bristol, Rhode Island 02809, United States of America, and who was employed at the Collis Center in Taunton, Massachusetts.
14. Defendant Christopher Salt is a natural person residing at 196 Sodom Road, Westport, Bristol County, Massachusetts 02790, United States of America, and was appointed by the Bristol County Probate Court (Harper, J.) as an evaluator.
15. Defendant Jack McCarthy, Jr., is a natural person residing at 13 Welby Road, New Bedford, Bristol County, Massachusetts 02745, United States of America, who was a court-appointed evaluator.
16. Defendants John and Jane Smiths are natural persons residing in the United States of America.
17. On or around 20 January 1996 in Somerset County, Maine, Patricia Brown ["Patricia"] filed a divorce action, which Theodore Brown ["Brown"] timely answered.
18. On or around 1 February 1996, Patricia left Maine with the children and went to New Hampshire.
19. Patricia and the children stayed in New Hampshire approximately four months (until mid-June), during which time she lived primarily with Tammy Verboncoeur.
20. Tammy Verboncoeur, the mother of the family that Pat and the children lived with in New Hampshire (2/96-6/96) before moving in with Dell Smith, the sex offender.
21. Verboncoeur never observed any sexualized behaviors in the children.
22. While in New Hampshire, Patricia took herself and the Brown's daughter, Charlotte, to counseling with Philip Mead, Ph.D.
23. Dr. Mead was quite familiar with the Brown family. He had counseled Patricia, Charlotte, and Brown from 1992 until 1994, when they left New Hampshire to move to Maine.
24. Thus in 1996, Patricia and Charlotte were comfortable receiving therapy from him. They did so from February 1996 through sometime in June 1996.
25. Between February and June of 1996, Dr. Mead never witnessed and never was told by Patricia or Charlotte during the four months of counseling about any sexual acting out by Charlotte.
26. On 18 September 1996, at a hearing in Maine on Brown's Motion for Contempt against Patricia, Dr. Mead testified that he is experienced in these matters and would have picked up on it had Charlotte been sexually abused.
27. On June 4, 1996, Patricia took Charlotte and Theodore Steven Brown, Jr. ["TJ"], then around two-and-a-half years old, to Dartmouth Hitchcock Clinic in New Hampshire for a well-child check-up.
28. Patricia mentioned the impending divorce to the physician, but she did not tell him about any sexualized behaviors by the children.
29. The children had no sexualized behaviors while the Browns were all living together as a family in Maine five or six months prior to that or while Brown visited with them after Pat and he separated.
30. And Patricia did not tell anyone else about these alleged behaviors between April and June of 1996 . . . and no one else ever came forward to say that he or she saw either of the children indulging in any of the alleged behaviors.
31. On 28 June 1996, Brown came back from a ten-day Florida vacation -- 18 June 1996 to 28 June 1996 -- with his fiancée (Jan O'Brien) and her children.
32. It was on that day of his return, 28 June 1996, that Patricia, jealous and angry about the relationship, made her first false accusation about Brown sexually abusing the children.
33. On or around 12 July 1996, Patricia Brown made out an affidavit to support her pleading for a temporary restraining order against Brown.
34. On or around 26 July 1996, the day of the 209A hearing, Patricia told the court that the children had been acting out sexual behaviors since April 1996, while they were still in New Hampshire.
35. Despite Brown not being in court (his attorney made only a special appearance), the Brockton District Court issued a temporary restraining order against Brown.
36. Newberger never inquired as to these events surrounding the accusation.
37. During September 1996, in the Somerset County District Court in Maine, Patricia's lawyer presented from Defendant Barbara Cohen a letter addressed to "To Whom It May Concern."
38. The letter asserted that Cohen would be looking for a sexual abuse evaluation; the evaluator finally chosen by Patricia was Eli Newberger, pediatrician and director of the Family Development Program at Children's Hospital.
39. Brown had to sign an admission form and a terms and conditions form, and in return, received a patient card from Children's Hospital before any professional services were rendered.
40. The evaluation of the Brown family by Newberger and his team began on 3 October 1996 4 with an interview of Patricia.5
4 The Newberger evaluation continued through late May or even June 1997, but the complete written report was not given to the Browns until sometime late in August 1997.41. When the evaluation by Newberger and his team began, Charlotte had not made any disclosure of sexual abuse.5 Patricia was also interviewed on 17 October 1996.
42. On 23 October 1996, Patricia made an allegedly frantic phone call to Barbara Cohen and rushed Charlotte to Cohen's office the following day, 24 October 1996.
43. On 24 October 1996, Cohen asked Charlotte to tell her what she told her mother. Charlotte responded, "`Daddy touched my privates when he was washing me in the bathtub,'" and denied all the other accusations that Patricia had alleged came from Charlotte.
44. Later Newberger would write that the referral to his team was "due to concerns about sexual abuse of Charlotte by Mr. Brown." That written statement was both unsupportable and untrue, because of the events described above.
45. On or around 19 December 1996, during the interview with Brown and his fiancée, Brown agreed to Newberger's request of him to have a psychological examination done at Children's Hospital.
46. Newberger then stated to the Brown and his fiancée that in light of the information Brown brought forth to him about Patricia having been in 31 foster homes and having claimed to have been sexually abused as a child, Newberger would be requesting a psychological exam of both Patricia and Brown.
47. The psychological examinations of Patricia and Theodore Brown never materialized.
48. On or around 17 February 1997, the only psychological exam administered in this case was an exam of Brown's daughter, Charlotte Brown, performed by Karen O'Connell of O'Connell & Jacoubs in Brockton, Mass.
49. O'Connell wrote in her report that the only source of the sexual abuse accusations was Pat Brown.
50. O'Connell found no overtly sexualized material in the projective testing of the child Charlotte Brown.
51. Although the O'Connell examination was done while Newberger's evaluation was in progress, the O'Connell examination was not included in his extensive collateral sources.
52. Because the O'Connell examination was not done until eight months after the last visit Brown had with his children, O'Connell determined that Charlotte's feeling of being unsafe was due to her then-present environment with Brown's now-ex-wife and the confessed sexual offender with whom she was then living.
53. Newberger had not set up the promised psychological examinations of both his wife and himself, Brown, on or around 15 April 1997, wrote and inquired of Newberger as to when the psychological exams would take place.
54. Brown also left Newberger several phone messages inquiring the dates of the proposed exams.
55. Brown never received a response from Newberger either to his letter or to his phone messages.
56. Later Newberger wrote, "Charlotte had disclosed to her mother, her therapist, and the DSS that her father "had put a pink thing in her private" while she was in the bathtub and that he had asked her to "kiss his pee-pee."
57. Proof of the untruth of Newberger's statements can be found in the child abuse and neglect report of DSS "Child pointed to her vaginal area and verbalized he [Daddy] touched her when he was washing her with a sponge in the Shower."
58. At the end of that same DSS report, the following appears:
Worker asked her how many times her father did this. Child initially said, "I don't remember to be honest with you." Child went on to say that she forgets because it was a long time ago. She spontaneously reported that "her mommy told Barbara (referring to her therapist) that Daddy made me drink his pee pee."59. The DSS worker wrote of what occurred when she met with the child Charlotte again on 1/31/97:
Worker asked her if that is the truth. Child's response was "For goodness sake no I never said that."Worker asked child about her father touching her while in the shower. She started out by saying that she does not remember if she asked him to wash her or if he just came into the bathroom. She went on to say that he washed her with soap and a pink sponge when she was in the tub and again, "he just washed me." Worker asked her to demonstrate using two of her play dolls what happened when he washed her. She demonstrated one doll washing another doll. She denied he put the sponge inside her vagina or that he used his hands to washed [sic] her body with.60. Newberger and his team fabricated lies for use in their report, which was sent along to two courts.61. Newberger also wrote about TJ's alleged disclosures, but ignored that portion of the DSS report in which TJ originally did NOT accuse Brown, but accused Dell Smith of abuse.
62. Newberger also did not test the three-year-old child for competency.
63. Newberger also failed to inquire about the chldren's then-living arrangements: they were living with an admitted sex offender.
64. After Brown noticed the deficiency in Newberger's performance and in his report and informed Newberger of the sex offender's presence, Newberger ignored Brown and failed to publish a corrected report.
65. Newberger later admitted that he was aware of DSS's ongoing investigation which was occurring concurrently with his and his team's evaluation.
66. Newberger later admitted that the DSS report was completed prior to Newberger's team report being completed.
67. Newberger failed to consider that the DSS report contained an abundance of information about Dell Smith.
68. Newberger later admitted that he and his team ignored the information about Dell Smith, though they were in communication with DSS.
69. DSS failed to inform any of the parties that Dell Smith was a confessed child sex-offender. DSS only told Dell Smith to inform Patricia, with whom he was living.
70. Upon receiving the complete section 51B investigative report by DSS, Brown learned about Dell Smith and immediately informed Newberger, who ignored the new information and put Brown's children in jeopardy by not revealing the same to Patricia and by not considering that fact when submitting his team's final evaluation.
71. Newberger and his team breached their professional obligation by failing to make the most rudimentary inquiries of the children's living environment: they had been sleeping unguarded across the hall from a known and admitted sex offender, Dell Smith, who turned himself in to the authorities after having sexually molesting his own daughter from her birth for years.
72. Newberger and his Children Hospital team failed to inquire about current living conditions of the children believed to be being sexually abused. That failure is sufficiently far below the standard of care required of the ordinary or average physician.
73. Newberger failed to consider that TJ's allegation was made with absolutely no context, either spatially or temporally . . . and that the child's speech was very difficult to understand, even when he was seen in Boston some six months later.
74. Newberger failed to consider that TJ's difficulty with articulation, difficulty in understanding the questions being put to him by the therapists, TJ's problems with perceptive language, as well as expressive language, whether there was some delay in his speech development which would affect how he processed events around him, or how he was able to share them with adults.
75. Newberger and his team offered an opinion based on the limited amount of data they got from TJ.
76. Newberger's and his team's attempts to do any sort of cognitive assessment in Boston were met with total lack of cooperation by TJ.
77. Newberger and his team failed to check TJ's recall for other events that might have occurred around the time of the alleged abuse, whether he had any concept of colors or of numbers.
78. Newberger and his Children's Hospital's team attempted to cover up their knowledge of the sex offender, Dell Smith.
79. Newberger, individually, and the team, as a whole, failed to act in such a way to accomplish their stated purpose for evaluating the Brown family.
80. Newberger has admitted that he saw no conflicts in the reports of collaterals.
81. The collaterals' accounts conflicted with Newberger and his team's conclusions.
82. Brown sent Newberger letters from Dr. Mead and told him how to get in touch with Mead. Newberger ignored Brown's information.
83. Newberger also failed to contact Tammy Verboncoeur, with whom Patricia and the children lived in New Hampshire.
84. Newberger and his Children's Hospital team had a preexisting bias and prejudgment.
85. When the team members came across data which was inconsistent with abuse, the team members either ignored or misstated or misinterpreted or discounted or explained away the data and assassinated Brown's character.
86. In contrast, everything Brown's then-wife Patricia said was taken as gospel by Newberger, who declared her a "genuine concerned mother."
87. Given the inconsistencies of Patricia Brown's statements, which the team members could have recognized had they tried to learn them, it can only be concluded that they bestowed that status on her only because her misrepresentations and untruths helped the team find abuse where no abuse by Brown existed.
88. The team observed Ms. Brown interact with Charlotte and TJ individually to obtain information about the quality of the maternal-child relationship.
89. Newberger and his team failed to conduct observation sessions between Brown and either of the children.
90. The team was predisposed to concluding that Brown had sexually abused the children and that even a supervised visit with their father might cause undue risk of psychological harm.
91. There being no evidence to support such a conclusion, the conclusion of the team was unfounded.
92. Barbara Cohen ["Cohen"], the children's therapist, did not question either Patricia Brown or the children about their then-current living conditions.
93. According to Cohen, DSS later informed her that Dell Smith, the sex-offender, was living with Patricia and the children.
94. Cohen admitted that she finally met Dell Smith at Whitman Counseling.
95. Cohen learned that TJ called Dell Smith "Daddy."
96. Cohen knew that Dell Smith was a sex-offender.
97. Whitman Counseling Center knew that Dell was a sexoffender.
98. Dell Smith received sex-offender therapy at Whitman Counseling.
99. Whitman Counseling center failed to inform DSS that Dell Smith was living with the Brown children, one toddler and one six-year old.
100. DSS knew that TJ called Smith "Daddy" and that Dell was a sex-offender.
101. Neither Cohen nor Whitman Counseling Center nor DSS nor Patricia Brown informed Brown that Dell was a sex-offender.
102. Newberger and his team did nothing to correct their report when they learned that Dell Smith was a sex-offender.
103. Newberger and his team did nothing to protect the children when they learned that Dell Smith had been and was still living with the children.
104. Defendants Children's Hospital, Eli Newberger, Amy C. Tishelman (and others on his team), Barbara Cohen, and Whitman Counseling Center ignored the DSS report which contained the statement in which Charlotte, when asked if daddy made her touch his peepee, said, "I never said that. That's gross."
105. Defendants Children's Hospital, Eli Newberger, Amy C. Tishelman (and others on his team), Barbara Cohen, and Whitman Counseling Center never put any weight on the fact that Dell had a prior DSS record of sexually offending against a child.
106. Newberger and the team never looked into the then-current living arrangements with Dell Smith in his household.
107. Newberger and the team never considered as an alternate hypothesis that the children's then-current living environment contributed to their tantrums and defiance, agitation, hypervigilance, and aggression in a way that was consistent with tremendous anxiety and upheaval.
108. Defendants Children's Hospital, Eli Newberger, Amy C. Tishelman (and others on his team), Barbara Cohen, and Whitman Counseling Center never tested or examined TJ for his competence to testify to sexual matters and to the stage of development of his memory or his cognitive development.
109. Newberger did not have enough information about the household that Charlotte and TJ were living in, to support the conclusions they made.
110. Newberger and his team did not do any assessment of the then-current living situation, or what might be going on within the new family, to account for any of the symptoms or their perpetuation.
111. Newberger and his team made no inquiry into mother's then-current sexual practices or what the children might be exposed to in the house by way of parental nudity, television, videos.
112. Defendants Children's Hospital's, Eli Newberger's, Amy C. Tishelman's (and others on his team), Barbara Cohen's, Whitman Counseling Center's predisposition led to improper "interviewer bias."
113. Before interviewing Brown, Newberger had had his mind made up that Brown was the perpetrator and attributed to Brown words that Brown had not said.
114. The mother ["Robyn"] of Linnehan's son, Brenden, left Maine with the boy while a court order allowing Linnehan visitation was operative.
115. Defendant Christopher Salt ["Salt"], a Massachusetts-court-appointed evaluator, held to his belief that Robyn had "justification" to disobey the Maine court order by fleeing and hiding with Brenden in Massachusetts.
116. Once here in Massachusetts, the initial assessment of Brenden and his mother, Robyn, was conducted by Defendant Eileen Kern in March 1988 at New Bedford Child Family Services.
117. The first court-ordered sexual-abuse assessment was at the Collis Center, which Eileen Kern recommended to Judge Harper.
118. At the Collis Center, during May and June 1988, Defendant Sandra Fyfe, M.S., met with Brenden and with Robyn, and the Executive Director, Thomas "Tom" Tanguay, a licensed social worker, met with Linnehan. Although four therapists recommended that Linnehan be allowed visitation with his son, Fyfe wrote the report and included the recommendation that he not be allowed visitation -- with or without supervision -- with his son. Fyfe had no reasonable suspicion that Brenden had been sexually abused by anyone, including James Linnehan.
119. The second court-ordered "parenting" assessment was also ordered by Judge Harper. Both Robyn and Linnehan were interviewed twice.
120. Salt also concluded that Brenden feared men, and that since there was no male around except Linnehan, Linnehan had to be the perpetrator of the suspected sexual abuse.
121. Salt further insisted that even though "there was no diagnosis of sexual abuse, the possibility is not to be eliminated."
122. Salt also concluded that Brenden's fear and anxiety about his father had been confirmed, and that Brenden had undergone a traumatic experience and now suffered from post-traumatic stress."
123. Without any proof of sexual abuse, Salt recommended that Linnehan be denied visitation.
124. There was no reliable data either in Salt's report or in the case as a whole to support his conclusion that the child had been sexually abused; the only data were the self-serving notes of the mother, Robyn.
125. Salt's rendition of the facts in the Linnehan case is a gross knowing and intentional misstatement of fact: i.e., Salt never considered that Robyn and Linnehan's son, Brenden, shared an apartment for about three months with one Joseph Fitzgerald, who was the tenant of record, and Salt knew it -- that Robyn and the divorced Fitzgerald "dated a few times and have remained good friends."
126. Salt conducted two evaluations: one in 1988 and the other in 1992.
127. Salt lied in his report of 5 January 1992 to Judge Harper: he wrote that Reuben Ferreira had acknowledged that Brenden's visiting Linnehan "might well be detrimental." Salt's statement was false because Salt never spoke to Ferreira.
128. Also despite not having any reasonable suspicion or any proof of sexual abuse, Defendant Eileen Kern filed a 51A report, DSS social worker Robert Mendez interviewed Brenden, Robyn, and Linnehan.
129. Later, DSS social worker Paul Gagnon interviewed the father, the mother, and the son, and produced an assessment summary.
130. The third court-ordered "psychological evaluation" of both Robyn and Linnehan (not Brenden) was, as suggested by Attorney Deborah Wolf (Brenden's attorney), conducted by Defendant Newberger.
131. Linnehan had to sign an admission form and a terms and conditions form, and in return, received a patient card from Children's Hospital before any professional services were rendered.
132. Newberger was the director of a Family Development Center at Children's Hospital.
133. Newberger was also on the Governor's Blue Ribbon Commission on Foster Care and received numerous federal grants.
134. Newberger focused on Brenden rather than on the goal of bringing father and son together again.
135. Linnehan's son, Brenden, was interviewed an excessive number of times, so that by the time Newberger saw him, the child's memory had been irreversibly contaminated.
136. In the Linnehan case, the team consisted of a licensed psychologist, (Dr. Merrill Berger), a post-doctoral psychology fellow (Dr. Maureen O'Brien) and Newberger, a pediatrician and Chief of the Program.
137. Although the Newberger evaluation of the Linnehan family occurred between approximately 27 February 1992 and 8 May 1992, the Newberger evaluation has been used as the basis for denying Linnehan any contact whatsoever with Brenden every day through the present.
138. The sexual evaluation performed by Newberger and his team was signed by Newberger and issued on 8 September 1992.
139. The sexual evaluation report contributed significantly to Linnehan's not being able to visit with his son during the eight years since 1992.
140. The Newberger report was deficient.
141. The Newberger report was relied upon by the Probate & Family and Juvenile courts as well as by the quasi-judicial defendants, and, of course, by Robyn and her lawyers to deny Linnehan visitation with his son in 1992.
142. Two years later, in 1994, the Newberger report was relied upon again by a court-appointed evaluator, Defendant Jack McCarthy, as the basis for again recommending that Linnehan not be allowed visitation with his son.
143. In the following year, also, in 1995, the Newberger report was relied upon still again by court-appointed evaluator Jack McCarthy as the basis for recommending that Linnehan not be allowed visitation with his son.
144. And then yet again, in 1998, the Newberger report was relied upon by court-appointed evaluator Jack McCarthy when recommending that Linnehan not be allowed visitation with his son.
145. The Newberger report was relied upon by court-appointed evaluator Jack McCarthy to recommend that Linnehan's parents, enneagenarians, as recently as in 1999, not be given court permission to see their grandson.
146. The court (Judge Harper, having been assigned to sit as Probate & Family Court Justice) accepted McCarthy's recommendation at all times.
147. At all relevant times since 1992, there was an absence of any evidence of misconduct by James Linnehan.
148. At no time did James Linnehan have an opportunity to confront his accusers.
149. Moreover, the mother, Robyn, is still embroiled in the divorce from Michael Sylvia ["Michael"], who was a widower with two children at the time he married Robyn, then pregnant for a second time out of wedlock. (When Robyn Gerry birthed Brenden, she was unwed.6
6 When she later married, she became Robyn Gerry Sylvia. She is now evidently using the surname Gerry-Sylvia.) She moved seven times with the minor children. Her divorce has been ongoing since 1994 in Bristol County Probate & Family Court, where it was assigned Docket No. 94D-1058-D1.150. Newberger did not recognize and/or acknowledge Robyn's two out-of-wedlock pregnancies or her lifestyle during the critical times after the end of Linnehan and Robyn's relationship.151. Robyn also accused Michael of sexually abusing his two children (her stepchildren) and the child she and Michael had together, Justin.
152. Brenden is now being denied not only only his biological dad but also his stepdad.7
7 Brenden, too, has had a constitutionally protected interest in being with his biological father. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; M.G.L.A. Const. Pt. 1, Art. 10.153. Neither Newberger nor anyone else who performs thorough work has done a follow-up of Robyn Gerry-Sylvia or Brenden Linnehan.88 Newberger and/or members of his team have also not followed up on the other children they evaluated.154. Defendant Jack McCarthy, the ever-present court-appointed therapist, rubber-stamped Newberger's deficient evaluation and predetermined conclusions, said nothing of Robyn's separation and stormy marriage, and used Newberger's report as his only source of information to make his recommendation that Linnehan not be allowed to visit with or have any communication with his son.155. Newberger's stated purpose of the evaluation was to determine the veracity of the allegations of abuse of Brenden by Linnehan.
156. Newberger's goal required him to act as a jury.
157. Newberger and his team did not investigate the conflicting information from collateral sources.
158. The areas of conflict regarded: Brenden's home life, visitation or no visitation, the circumstances out of which the false allegations arose, the significance of the Linnehan's MMPI examinations, conflict over whether sexual abuse occurred.
158. Newberger and his team considered none of the conflicts in the case history.
159. Newberger and the team did not conduct observation sessions between Linnehan and his son, Brenden. '
160. At the time Newberger's team saw Brenden, there was no way they could determine the truth of what happened.
161. Brown and Linnehan repeat and reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 160 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth.
161. The natural defendants had a duty to act in accordance with the standards of their professions.
162. Defendants who have not held themselves out as specialists owed their respective clients the duty to exercise a degree of care and skill of the average qualified practitioner.
163. Defendant Newberger and his Children's Hospital team (which included Defendant Tishelman), who have held themselves out as specialists owed their respective clients the duty to exercise a degree of care and skill above that of the average qualified practitioner.
164. Defendants negligently breached their duty to plaintiffs.
165. The defendants who violated their duty to exercise a degree of care and skill of the average qualified practitioner are liable to their respective clients for any reasonably foreseeable loss caused by their negligence.
166. The defendants who violated their duty to exercise a degree of care and skill above that of the average qualified practitioner are liable to their respective clients for any reasonably foreseeable loss caused by their negligence.
167. The negligence by defendants caused plaintiffs harm and injury by depriving them of a relationship with their children, as well as aggravation, humiliation, embarrassment, harm to reputation, and emotional or mental distress.
168. By reason of the conduct of Defendants, plaintiffs suffered harm and actual and consequential damages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demands judgment, including interest, against Defendants in an amount deemed by judge or jury to be just, fair, and appropriate.
In 1996, the Supreme Court of the United States held that parental termination proceedings "are among the most severe forms of state action." M.L.B. v. S.L.J., ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996).
The object of the proceeding is "not simply to infringe upon [the parent's] interest . . . but to end it"; thus, a decision against the parent "work[s] a unique kind of deprivation." Lassiter Department of Social Services. of Durham County, 452 U.S. [18], at 27, 101 S.Ct. [2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981)]. For that reason, "[a] parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision . . . is . . . a commanding one." Ibid.
[A] termination decree is "final and irrevocable." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (emphasis in original). "Few forms of state action are both so severe and so irreversible." Ibid. [In Santosky,] [a]s in Lassiter, the Court characterized the parent's interest as "commanding," indeed, "far more precious than any property right." 455 U.S. at 758-759, 102 S.Ct. at 1397.
Although both Lassiter and Santosky yielded divided opinions, the Court was unanimous in its view that "the interest of parents in their relationship with their children is sufficiently fundamental to come within the finite class of liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Santosky, 455 U.S. at 774, 102 S.Ct. at 1405 (Rehnquist, dissenting).
It was also the Court's unanimous view that "[few consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural family ties." Id. at 787, 102 S.Ct. at 1412. M.L.B., 117 S.Ct. at 564-65. The corollary of this observation
and the holding of M.L.B. is that proceedings in which the state seeks to permanently deprive parents of all rights with respect to their child are subject to the closest constitutional scrutiny. "The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded [a litigant] . . . is influenced by the extent to which he may be condemned to suffer a grievous loss.'" Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758, quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397. U.S. 254, 262-63, 90 S.Ct.1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), and Joint Antifascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951).A parental termination proceeding is "barely distinguishable from criminal condemnation in view of the magnitude and permanence of the loss" it entails. M.L.B., 117 S.Ct. at 565.
Such proceedings, therefore, must follow procedural guarantees of fairness and reliability which are not required in other kinds of civil proceedings, where only property interests are at stake. Santosky, supra. Proof of grounds for termination by preponderance of the evidence is insufficient. In Linnehans' case, not even was that standard reached.
10 Deprivation of parental rights. Plaintiffs also invoke in this complaint the First, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
170. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiffs had a right under the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions not to be deprived by the government of his constitutionally protected interest in being with their children. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; M.G.L.A. Const. Pt. 1, Art. 10.
171. Plaintiffs have had a right under the state and federal constitutions to unsupervised visitation with and shared legal custody11 of their minor children.
11 "`The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.'" Youmans v. Ramos, 429 Mass. 774, 777 n. 7 (1999), quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982).172. Plaintiffs have been denied visitation, supervised or unsupervised, with and shared legal custody of their minor children."The rights of parents to the care, custody and nurture of their children is of such character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions, and such right is a fundamental right protected by [the First] amendment and Amendments 5, 9, and 14." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (l965).
173. Where there was no medical or psychiatric evidence or any clear and convincing evidence against Plaintiffs, where the Plaintiffs were not examined as to their suitability and/or fitness to visit with their children, and where the Plaintiffs have been denied the right to visit their children12 until the present based on the deficient reports of Eli Newberger and divers others, including, but not limited to, Jack McCarthy, they have been unlawfully denied their right under both the state and federal constitutions to visit with their children and share in their custody.13
12 In some Plaintiffs' cases, the denial occurred despite earlier recommenda- tions to the court by divers psychologists and case managers in favor of visitation between Plaintiffs.WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Brown and Linnehan demand judgment against the respective Defendants for injunctive relief and actual, special, compensatory, in an amount deemed at time of trial to be just, fair, and appropriate.13 Adoption of Gwendolyn, 29 Mass.App. Ct. 130, 132 (1990), citing Santosky, 455 US at 747-748 (clear and convincing evidence also applies to custody cases). In re Ian, 46 Mass.App.Ct. 615, 616 (1999), in which the court held that lower court's decision based on whether the visits were "therapeutically appropriate" was improper or "faulty legal standard": "`The judge's findings in a custody proceeding must be specific and detailed so as to demonstrate that close attention has been given the evidence and such findings must prove current parental unfitness clearly and convincingly.' . . . `The requisite proof must be strong and positive; it must be full, clear and decisive.'" Id., cites omitted.
"`The same standard of clear and convincing evidence controls the decision to terminate a parent's visitation rights as it does the decisions concerning parental unfitness in both care and protection and adoption proceedings.'" Id. at 620 (cite omitted).
174. Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 173 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth.
175. At all times relevant herein, the conduct of all Defendants were subject to 42 U.S.C. secs. 1983 and 1988.
176. As of 29 March 1996, Theodore Brown had a temporary order of visitation with his children pending divorce.
177. Notwithstanding the Maine temporary order and that Massachusetts not having jurisdiction over the children (they had not lived in Massachusetts for six months), Brown's then-current wife, Patricia Brown, sought and obtained a restraining order from the District Court in Brockton, Massachusetts.
178. On or around 26 July 1996, the temporary restraining order was extended indefinitely pending the outcome of the divorce in Maine.
179. Thus, under the alleged color of state law and the unlawful threat of imprisonment should he have violated the unlawful Massachusetts restraining order, Brown was threatened, intimidated, and coerced into not enforcing his right under the Maine order of visitation with his children.
180. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendant court, Brown was intimidated and put in continuing anxiety that he would never see his children again -- which, indeed, has happened -- and has suffered damages including but not limited to the aforesaid damages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Brown demands judgment against Defendants Children's Hospital, Eli Newberger, Amy Tishelman, Department of Social Services, Barbara Cohen, and Whitman Counseling for injunctive relief and actual, special, compensatory, and punitive damages in an amount deemed at time of trial to be just, fair, and appropriate, and attorney's fees and costs.
181. Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 180 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth.
182. At all times relevant herein, the conduct of all Defendants were subject to 42 U.S.C. secs. 1983 and 1988.
183. As of 1988, James Linnehan had a temporary order of visitation with his child.
184. Notwithstanding the Maine temporary order for visitation, the mother of Linnehan's child sought and obtained a restraining order from the District Court in New Bedford, Massachusetts.
185. The temporary restraining order was extended indefinitely.
186. Linnehan was never given an opportunity to confront his accusers.
187. Thus, under the alleged color of state law and the unlawful threat of imprisonment should he have violated the unlawful Massachusetts restraining order, Linnehan was threatened, intimidated, and coerced into not enforcing his right under the Maine order of visitation with his child.
188. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendant court, Linnehan was intimidated and put in continuing anxiety that he would never see his son again -- which, indeed, has happened -- and has suffered damages including but not limited to the aforesaid damages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Linnehan demands judgment against Defen- dants Children's Hospital, Eli Newberger, Department of Social Services, Eileen Kern, Sandra Fyfe, Christopher Salt, Jack McCarthy for injunctive relief and actual, special, compensatory, and punitive damages in an amount deemed at time of trial to be just, fair, and appropriate, and attorney's fees and costs.
CIVIL RIGHTS (AGAINST BROWN) 189. Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 188 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth.
190. At all times relevant herein, the conduct of all Defendants were subject to the federal and state civil rights acts.
191. Defendants Children's Hospital, Eli Newberger, Amy Tishelman, Massachusetts Department of Social Services, Barbara Cohen, and Whitman Counseling interfered with or attempted to interfere with Plaintiffs' exercise and enjoyment of their rights secured by the state and federal constitutions or laws of the United States and/or the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and/or the state of Maine.
192. As of 29 March 1996, Theodore Brown had a temporary order of visitation with his children pending divorce.
193. Notwithstanding the Maine temporary order and that Massachusetts not having jurisdiction over the children (they had not lived in Massachusetts for six months), Brown's then-current wife, Patricia Brown, sought and obtained a restraining order from the District Court in Brockton, Massachusetts.
194. On or around 26 July 1996, the temporary restraining order was extended indefinitely pending the outcome of the divorce in Maine.
195. Thus, under the alleged color of state law and the unlawful of imprisonment should he have violated the unlawful Massachusetts restraining order, Brown was threatened, intimidated, and coerced into not enforcing his right under the Maine order of visitation with his children.
196. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendant court, Brown was intimidated and put in continuing anxiety that he would never see his children again -- which, indeed, has happened -- and has suffered damages including but not limited to the aforesaid damages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Brown demands judgment against Defendants Children's Hospital, Eli Newberger, Amy Tishelman, Department of Social Services, Barbara Cohen, and Whitman Counseling for injunctive relief and actual, special, compensatory, attorney's fees and costs of the litigation in an amount deemed at time of trial to be just, fair, and appropriate.
CIVIL RIGHTS (AGAINST LINNEHAN) 197. Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 196 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth.
198. At all times relevant herein, the conduct of all Defendants were subject to the federal and state civil rights acts.
199. Defendants Children's Hospital, Eli Newberger, Depart- ment of Social Services, Eileen Kern, Sandra Fyfe, Christopher Salt, Jack McCarthy interfered with or attempted to interfere with Plaintiffs' exercise and enjoyment of their rights secured by the state and federal constitutions or laws of the United States and/or the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and/or the state of Maine.
200. As of 1988, James Linnehan had a temporary order of visitation with his child.
201. Notwithstanding the Maine temporary order for visitation, the mother of Linnehan's child sought and obtained a restraining order from the District Court in New Bedford, Massachusetts.
202. The temporary restraining order was extended indefinitely.
203. Linnehan was never given an opportunity to confront his accusers.
204. Thus, under the alleged color of state law and the unlawful of imprisonment should he have violated the unlawful Massachusetts restraining order, Linnehan was threatened, intimidated, and coerced into not enforcing his right under the Maine order of visitation with his child.
205. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendant court, Linnehan was intimidated and put in continuing anxiety that he would never see his son again -- which, indeed, has happened -- and has suffered damages including but not limited to the aforesaid damages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Linnehan demands judgment against Defendants Children's Hospital, Eli Newberger, Department of Social Services, Eileen Kern, Sandra Fyfe, Christopher Salt, Jack McCarthy for injunctive relief and actual, special, compensatory, attorneys' fees and costs of the litigation in an amount deemed at time of trial to be just, fair, and appropriate.
206. Brown and Linnehan repeat and reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 205 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth.
207. Defendants made and/or published one or more false statements which were intended to impeach Plaintiffs' honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation.
208. The statements were, for all intents and purposes, including, but not limited to, the following:
a. the letters written by each Defendant regarding the respective209. Plaintiffs are not public figures.
cases,b. the statements in the reports denigrating the Plaintiffs.
210. The statements imputed to the plaintiffs the commission of a crime, the affliction of a loathsome disease or unchastity, or defamed the plaintiffs in their trade, business or profession.
211. The defamatory statements resulted in liability to the plaintiffs.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Brown and Linnehan demand judgment against Defendants for injunctive relief and actual, special, compensatory, in an amount deemed at time of trial to be just, fair, and appropriate.
212. Brown and Linnehan repeat and reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 211 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth.14
14The elements of a civil conspiracy are: (1) two or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) an agreement on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful overt acts; and (5) damages that are a direct result of those acts. Breach of a duty of loyalty satisfies the unlawful act element of a civil conspiracy claim.213. In furtherance of their object, defendants did two or more predicate acts against the plaintiffs. Those unlawful overt acts include, but are not limited to, the following:a. communicating by telephone and letter their biased presumptions, their flawed and specious conclusions and opinions to each other and to third parties not named in this action, that Brown and Linnehan had sexually abused their respective children;214. The pattern was to receive income from future services which had been made mandatory when sexual abuse -- true or not -- was found: to wit, when abuse was alleged and supported by specious conclusions, the defendants recommended counseling or the continuation of counseling by their respective agencies for the children, counseling for the parents, batterer or anger-management programs, sex-offender programs, testing, multiple evaluations, repeated testing, and so on -- out of which has grown multi-billion-dollar sex abuse industry.b. by suggestively and improperly questioning the children until the children allegedly accused the fathers;
c. by rubber-stamping each other's decisions that Brown and Linnehan had sexually abused their respective children;
d. by, in some cases, actually changing the conclusion in their written reports from "not supporting" to "supporting" the occurrence of sexual abuse;
e. by, in some cases, not performing the entire promised evaluation but nevertheless charging the accused parent or the medical insurer or the state or federal government -- depending on which program was involved -for the deficient evaluation.
215. The rubber-stamping was a well-documented conspiracy; for example, the mental-health professionals recommended evaluations by Defendants Newberger and his Children Hospital team and in the cases of Brown and Linnehan actually changed the written notes and/or reports from unsupported to supported to conform with Newberger's and his team's inevitable finding of sexual abuse.
216. Newberger wrote his standard letter -- prior to even conducting his deficient evaluations -- recommending that visitation be suspended because it would cause irreversible psychological trauma to the children.
217. The defendant mental-health professionals attached Newberger's letter to motions in divers courts to suspend visitation.
218. The courts, relying on Newberger's impressive credentials, suspended the visitation without due process.
219. The plaintiffs were not allowed to confront their accusers in a court of law before they were deprived of their relationships with their children.
220. The course of action was as described above.
221. The defendants agreed on the object or course of action.
222. The opinions of competent collateral mental-health professionals -- i.e., those who were not in the loop -- were deliberately and intentionally ignored in both the Brown and Linnehan underlying cases.
223. Plaintiffs suffered damages that are a direct result of those acts.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against Defendants for injunctive relief and actual, special, compensatory, and punitive damages, attorney's fees, costs, expenses, and interest in an amount deemed at time of trial to be just, fair, and appropriate.
224. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 223 above with he same force and effect as if herein set forth.
225. Plaintiffs have performed all of their legal obligations required under any contract or agreement, to wit, to pay -- directly and/or indirectly through their private and public medical insurance or benefits programs -- for services to be rendered on their and their children's behalf by the doctors and mental health professionals.
226. Defendants breached the promised services by not performing them.
227. As a result, Plaintiffs did not receive the benefits of their bargain.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against Defendants for actual, special, compensatory, in an amount deemed at time of trial to be just, fair, and appropriate.
228. Brown and Linnehan repeat and reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 227 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth.
229. Defendants continually negligently inflicted emotional distress on the Plaintiffs.
230. Defendants had a continuing affirmative duty to perform their professional services in such a manner as not to inflict emotional distress on the Plaintiffs.
231. Defendants breached their duties to the plaintiffs.
232. The plaintiffs never interfered with the defendants' obligations under the above-described duties.
233. Plaintiffs suffered not only physical symptomatologies but also, as a consequence of the physical injury, mentally by Defendants' breach of duty.
234. Plaintiffs were, are, and, with a high degree of likelihood, will continue to be inflicted with emotional distress due to the negligence of Defendants.
235. As a result of the Defendants' negligent conduct, Brown and Linnehan have suffered and will continue to suffer physical symptomatologies, pain, anguish, severe emotional trauma, embarrassment, and humiliation.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment, including interest, jointly and severally against the defendants in an amount deemed by this Court to be just and fair and in any other way in which the Court deems appropriate.
236. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 235 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth.
237. Defendants intentionally and deliberately inflicted emotional distress on Brown and Linnehan by negligently performing their duties, by defaming the plaintiffs, by suggesting to the plaintiffs' children and others that the children had been sexually abused by fathers, by finding or conspiring to find sexual abuse where there was none, by interfering with their parental rights,by interfering with their civil rights.
238. As a result of the Defendants' extreme and outrageous conduct, Plaintiffs were, are, and, with a high degree of likelihood, will continue to be emotionally distressed due to the intentional exclusion.
239. As a result of the Defendants' extreme and outrageous conduct, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer mental pain and anguish, severe emotional trauma, embarrassment, and humiliation.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment, including interest, jointly and severally against the Defendants in an amount deemed by this Court to be just and fair and in any other way in which the Court deems appropriate.
240. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 239 above with the same force and effect as if herein set forth.
241. At all times mentioned herein, Defendants Newberger and Children's Hospital and the other defendants were subject to the provisions of G.L. c. 93A, and the rules and regulations of the Attorney General promulgated thereunder.
242. At all times mentioned herein, the wilful and knowing acts by the defendants were per se unfair and deceptive practices.
243. The conduct of Defendants was as follows:
a. Defendants held out their professional credentials and licenses as guarantees that their services would be performed in accordance with the standards of their respective professions;244. The letter which Newberger sent to Maine counsel and to be filed in the Brown case in Maine recommended that Brown not be allowed to visit with or have any communication with his children on the grounds that they would suffer psychological harm should visitation or communication take place was an unfair and deceptive act in contravention to G.L. c. 93A, s 2(c), which authorizes the Attorney General to promulgate regulations defining unfair and deceptive practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.b. the defendants anticipated that the courts would rely on their professional credentials and licenses find against the plaintiffs;
c. the defendants anticipated that the plaintiffs would rely on their professional credentials and licenses -- which the plaintiffs did.
245. That letter, written prior to any interviews or investigation or analyses were conducted, had no basis in fact or in law for its dissemination.
246. The letter sent to Attorney Deborah Wolf on 11 May 1992 and to be filed in the Linnehan case recommended that Linnehan not be allowed to visit with or have any communication with his child on the grounds that he would suffer psychological harm should visitation or communication take place was an unfair and deceptive act in contravention to G.L. c. 93A, s 2(c), which authorizes the Attorney General to promulgate regulations defining unfair and deceptive practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.
247. That letter, written prior to any interviews or investigation or analyses were conducted, had no basis in fact or in law for its dissemination.
248. That Children's Hospital allowed Newberger to conduct his program so grossly negligently and maliciously is an unfair and deceptive act. Children's Hospital through Richard Bourne, the hospital's general counsel, was well aware of Newberger's unethical and unprofessional practices, inasmuch as Bourne began at the hospital as a disciple of Newberger as well as a co-author with Newberger of various publications. This is another unfair and deceptive act.
249. The practice of rubber-stamping by one caseworker of another caseworker's findings is an unfair and deceptive practice.
250. That a psychologist such as Jack McCarthy would use no other resource but Newberger's report as the basis of a recommendation to deprive a parent of visitation with his or her child is an unfair and deceptive act. In this McCarthy did so repeatedly over many years . . . even when the child was unwilling to be interviewed by McCarthy.
251. That social workers or psychologists or a so-called mental-health worker such as Barbara Cohen or Eileen Kerr or change their own recommendations in order to agree with and confirm Newberger's deficient report are unfair and deceptive acts.
252. That Sandra Fyfe should disregard the work of more highly trained and experienced psychologists and write a final report contra the recommendations of those psychologists and pass it off as if they were in agreement with her is an unfair and deceptive act.
253. That DSS failed to inform any of the parties that Dell Smith was a confessed child sex-offender. DSS only told Dell Smith to inform Patricia, with whom he was living. Such conduct put the Brown children in jeopardy of being sexually abused by Dell Smith. They are still living in such jeopardy. Such conduct is an unfair and deceptive act.
254. Similarly, Whitman Counseling Center, where Barbara Cohen worked, also withheld knowledge of who Dell Smith was. Whitman had that knowledge because Dell Smith had to attend counseling at Whitman Counseling Center because he had sexually abused his own daughter for years. Such conduct is an unfair and deceptive act.
255. Plaintiffs have been caused to go to considerable expense to protect their constitutional rights and to suffer considerable economic and non-economic damages, including, but not limited to, actual monetary damages, including attorneys' fees and costs, and emotional distress of the highest order.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against the respective defendants with interest for actual and consequential damages, including multiple damages, and attorneys' fees, interest, and costs, which are still accruing, in an amount deemed by judge or jury to be just, fair, and appropriate.
Respectfully submitted,
PLAINTIFFS,
By their attorney,
25 September 2000 Barbara C. Johnson
Barbara C. Johnson, Esq.
6 Appletree Lane
Andover, MA 01810-4102
978-474-0833
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