#90A, Part I -- Drano Series
Count One of Bar Counsel's
Petition for Discipline of Barb
and Her Side of the Story Interwoven in BlueA Battle in the War between Barb
and
the Office of Bar Counsel and the Board of Bar Overseers
The Board of Bar Overseers is the adjudicatorial arm. General Counsel of the BBO reports to the Board.
The Office of Bar Counsel is the prosecutorial arm.
Bar Counsel of the BBO reports to the SJC.
However, before a Petition for Discipline is sent out,
the OBC needs the approval of the BBO.
This three-part answer has become the official Amended Answer to the Bar's Petition as of August 22, 2003. The Assistant Bar Counsel did not like the original version that had been tamed down by Attorney Lynch because it had some typographical errors in it. So I decided to file this unexpergated edition!!! Am waiting for the smoke to come out of her engine!
Barb's FORMERLY Official Answer to the Bar may be found at drano90-barbs-answer-to-obc-petition-for-discipline.htmCOMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
BOARD OF BAR OVERSEERS______________________
BAR COUNSEL B.B.O. File No. C2-01-0091
Petitioner C2-01-0090
C2-00-0078
v. C2-98-0580BARBARA C. JOHNSON
Respondent
______________________PETITION FOR DISCIPLINE
AND
DRAFT ANSWER TO PETITION INTERWOVEN IN BLUE
WITH JURY DEMAND1. This petition is brought pursuant to Rule 4:01, § 8(3), of the Rules of the Supreme Judicial Court and Sections 3.13(2) and 3.14 of the Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers.
1. No answer required.2. The respondent, Barbara C. Johnson, Esq., is an attorney duly admitted to the Bar of the Commonwealth on December 22, 1987.2. Admits.3. From at least 1999 to date, the respondent has owned and maintained an Internet web site at the address http://www.falseallegations.com.3. Admits.4. Since at least 1999, the respondent has posted on her web site, among other things, information regarding allegations of child sexual abuse and copies of pleadings in her own and other cases involving allegations of such abuse.4. Admits.5. Since at least 1999, the respondent has used her web site as a vehicle to solicit legal business and to advertise and sell her legal services, including answers to "simple questions," various types of "consulting services" at hourly rates, and "legal representation" pursuant to written fee agreements.5. Respondent denies that she uses her "web site as a vehicle to solicit legal business." She admits that she uses the web site to "sell answers to "`simple questions,'" and "various types of `consulting services' at hourly rates." She informs website visitors that she provides "`legal representation' pursuant to written fee agreements.'" Respondent also states that her website was and still is intended to be a giving back to the people who have been victimized by the courts and who cannot afford legal representation. The website was only one of several steps Respondent took to effect her intended retirement for many reasons from the practice of law.Count I 6. Paragraphs 2 through 5 are realleged and incorporated by reference.
6. No answer required.7. Since 1999, the respondent has represented John Jones (a pseudonym) in matters related to Jones's minor child, William (a pseudonym).7. Admits.8. William was born in 1985. From and after 1988, William was the subject of a care and protection proceeding (C & P action) in the Bristol County Juvenile Court (juvenile court). The C & P action was based on allegations that William had been sexually, physically and emotionally abused by Jones.8. Respondent admits so much of ¶8 that states "William was born in 1985. From and after 1988, William was the subject of a care and protection proceeding (C & P action) in the Bristol County Juvenile Court (juvenile court)." Respondent is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the facts in the remainder of ¶8 and calls upon Petitioner to prove the same.9. At all times relevant to the petition for discipline, Juvenile Court Standing Order No. 1-84 provided that[a]ll juvenile court case records and reports are confidential and are the property of the court. Reports loaned to or copied for attorneys of record, or such other persons as the court may permit, shall be returned to the court after their use or at the conclusion of the litigation, whichever occurs first. Said reports shall not be further copied or released without permission of the court.9. Notwithstanding that no answer is required, Respondent does not know the history of the Standing Order and calls upon Petitioner to prove that it has been the same during all relevant times of this petition.10. At all times since 1988, all pleadings, reports and other court records for William's
C & P action have been under impoundment in the juvenile court pursuant
to Juvenile Court Standing Order No. 1-84.10. Respondent is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the facts in ¶10 and calls upon Petitioner to prove the same.11. The respondent has never appeared for Jones in the C & P action and has never been an attorney of record in that action. The juvenile court has never authorized the respondent to receive or possess any juvenile court reports on file in that action or to copy or release any, such reports without permission of the court.11. Respondent admits so much of ¶11 that states that "respondent has never appeared for Jones in the C & P action and has never been an attorney of record in that action," and given that the court has held one or more hearing and issued one or more orders regarding Respondent without her being given notice, being present or a party or an intervenor or a necessary party to any action in that court, Respondent calls also Petitioner to prove the same.12. From and after 1988, William was the subject of a paternity proceeding instituted by Jones (paternity action) in the Bristol County Probate and Family Court.12. Respondent denies the statement of facts as written in ¶12. Notwithstanding the denial, Respondent states that William was the subject a proceeding not only for paternity but also for custody. Without the demand for custody of the child, the Probate and Family Court would not have had exclusive jurisdiction over Jones's action13. From 1988 to March 1998, G. L. c. 209C, § 13, provided as to paternity actions thatall complaints, pleadings, papers, documents, or reports filed in connection therewith, docket entries in the permanent docket and record books shall not be available for inspection, unless a judge of the court where such orders are kept, for good cause shown, shall otherwise order....Effective March 31, 1998, the statute was revised to provide, with one exception not relevant to this case, that the listed records for proceedings commenced after the effective date would not be impounded except by affirmative order.13. Notwithstanding that no answer is required for a conclusion of law, Respondent states that the revised statute applies to paternity and custody actions under that chapter.14. At all relevant times, the Bristol County Probate and Family Court (probate court) has applied the revisions to G.L. c. 209C, § 13, prospectively only and has maintained under impoundment all records in paternity actions that were initiated before March 1998, whether those records were filed before or after the effective date of the
statutory change.14. Notwithstanding that no answer is required for ¶14, Respondent states that the conclusion of law is fallacious and calls upon Petitioner to prove the same,15. At all times since 1988, all pleadings, reports and other court records for Jones's paternity action have been under impoundment in the probate court pursuant to G.L.
c. 209C, § 13, as in effect when the action was filed and as applied by the probate court.15. Notwithstanding that no answer is required for ¶15, Respondent states that the conclusion of law is fallacious and calls upon Petitioner to prove the same,16. In 1989, Jones's custody and visitation rights were terminated, and sole legal and physical custody of William was awarded to his mother, Jane Doe (a pseudonym). Periodic requests by Jones between 1991 and 1998 to restore custody or visitation were denied.16. Respondent does have sufficient information to form the belief that Jones's visitation rights were terminated in Juvenile Court without any due process such as a hearing at which he could confront accusers and/or defend himself, and that Jones's repeated efforts for a decade to obtain review and redetermination under chapter 119 by a process with the indicia of due process were also denied.17. Jones and Jane were never married to each other. Jane married Robert Brown
(a pseudonym) in 1989. Jane and Brown had a child, David Brown (a pseudonym), in 1990. Jane and Robert Brown subsequently separated and are now divorced.17. Respondent has sufficient information to form a belief that the facts as stated in ¶17 are false, but she also has facts to form a belief that they are true. Respondent states that the reason the facts are in dispute is because Jane Doe is a liar and, yes, a perjurer, and that the Petitioner has maliciously chosen to use whichever of Jane Doe's lies are most convenient for Petitioner to use in this petition. The contradictory lies (which Respondent cited on her website) out of which Susan Strauss Weisberg has chosen a selected few for her and the Bar's for use in their petition are the following: [Note: Barb's counsel softened the words in blue.]18. Since about 1990, William has lived with Jane and David and has been known in his community as William Brown.
(a) that in 1994, Jane Doe told her own divorce lawyer, Moira Tierney, that William born out of a marital union between herself and Jones: "I assumed complete responsibility for raising [Brown's] children and my child from a previous marriage" [see ¶6 of Jane's affidavit, filed on 11 July 1994 in the Doe-Brown case in Bristol County Probate & Family Court];As to the remainder of ¶17, Respondent avers that she has learned the following :(b) that Jane Doe told Brown, her husband, that William was born out of a marital union between herself and Jones [see Doe-Brown divorce file in Bristol County Probate & Family Court;
(c) that in 1988, Jane Doe told Christopher Salt that she had "no live-in boyfriend" [CS 7/1/88 report at 25], causing Salt to write, with the exception of Mr. Fitzgerald, who babysat William, "there appears to be no significant males in [William's] life other than Mr. [Jones]." Id. at 3;
(d) that in her affidavit filed in the Bristol County Probate & Family Court in New Bedford, Jane claimed to have married Brown on "August 28, 1988 after living together for approximately two years" [Jane's affidavit at 1];
(e) that in 1992, Jane Doe told Eli Newberger, a doctor at Children's Hospital, that she had married Robert Brown "in August 1988," [EN 9/8/92 report at 4, ¶2].
(a) that David Brown was also conceived out of wedlock but born in it,(b) that Jane and Robert Brown were separated by 1991, re-united for a short period, and then separated again,
(c) that in 1994, Jane initiated divorce proceedings, which resulted in a judgment nisi in November 2001,
after seven arduous years;(d) that on page 2 of Brown's affidavit filed in the divorce case, he corroborates Jones's assertions: "My wife has moved with her son [William] at least seven or eight times." Neither the Juvenile nor the Probate & Family Courts cared. They never allowed Jones to give or take evidence.
18. Respondent has sufficient information to form a belief that William has lived with his mother, Jane, and his half-brother David, and has been known not in one community but in seven or eight or more communities as William Brown.19. Prior to about the spring of 2000, the respondent came into possession of copies of impounded reports in the C & P action that were the property of the juvenile court.19. Respondent denies the statement of facts as written and calls upon Petitioner to prove the same.20. Prior to about the spring of 2000, the respondent came into possession of reports by a psychologist who had treated William and Jane and other records containing privileged, confidential and personal information of a highly sensitive nature about William, David and Jane.20. Respondent has sufficient information to form the belief that the statement of facts in ¶20 is false and calls upon Petitioner to prove the same. Further,21. In May 2000, the respondent filed a complaint for modification and an amended complaint for modification for Jones in the paternity action. The respondent then(a) Respondent also calls upon Petitioner to name the psychologist and to produce the alleged reports, which Respondent believes are non-existent;(b) If the alleged psychologist is an individual named Jack McCarthy, then Respondent also states that the so-called report(s) are but letters to one or two attorneys and "To Whom It May Concern" of only a few lines in length. Respondent;
(c) If the alleged psychologist is McCarthy, then Respondent has sufficient information to form the belief that McCarthy did NOT treat William, and did, in fact, see William only one time for a few minutes with his mother Jane;
(d) Respondent denies possessing reports from McCarthy containing privileged, confidential and personal information of a highly sensitive nature about William, David, and Jane. Respondent only has copies of a few short letters containing purposefully false information and bills sent to Jones for alleged services;
(e) Respondent has never known any more about David than his date of birth and information as to whom his father is, and has never inquired of any potential source. of David.
knew that the probate court records for the paternity action were impounded.21. Respondent admits that she filed a complaint for modification and an amended complaint for modification for Jones, but denies that they were filed in a paternity action. She states that they were filed in a paternity and custody action. As to the remainder of ¶21, Respondent denies the statement of facts as written and calls upon Petitioner to prove the same.22. In May 2000, the respondent commenced an action on behalf of Jones and another client in the United States District Court (federal action).22. Admits.23. In or about the fall of 2000, the respondent posted on her web site a copy of her amended complaint for modification in the paternity action. The amended complaint for modification was then under impoundment. The respondent posted the amended complaint for modification in violation of G.L. c. 209C, §13, as in effect when the paternity action was filed and as applied by the probate court.23. Respondent admits that she posted on her web site a copy of her amended complaint for modification for Jones, but denies that it was filed in a paternity action. She states that it was filed in a paternity and custody action. As to the remainder of ¶23, Respondent not only denies the statement of facts and calls upon Petitioner to prove the same, but also disagrees with the conclusion of law which Assistant Bar Counsel Weisberg reached.24. The amended complaint for modification as posted set forth privileged, confidential and highly personal information, the dissemination of which to the general public would be actually or potentially harmful or embarrassing to William, David and Jane. The respondent had no substantial purpose in posting this information on her web site other than to embarrass or burden Jane or her children.24. Respondent denies and calls upon Petitioner to prove the same.25. In or about late 2000 or early 2001, the respondent posted on her web site a copy of a report by the psychologist who had treated William and Jane. That report as posted set forth privileged, confidential and highly personal information, the dissemination of which to the general public would be actually or potentially harmful
or embarrassing to William and Jane. The respondent then knew that neither Jane nor anyone authorized to consent for William had granted permission to release this or any other report by the psychologist to the public at large. The respondent had no substantial purpose in posting this information on her web site other than to
embarrass or burden Jane or her children.25. Respondent both denies that she ever posted on her website a copy of a psychologist's report on any individual and denies the facts alleged in the remainder of ¶25.26. Between about late 2000 and February 2001, the respondent posted other materials on her web site about William, David and Jane, including her pleadings in the federal action and pleadings from Jane's divorce action. Those materials set forth privileged, confidential and highly personal information, the dissemination of which to the general public would be actually or potentially harmful or embarrassing to William, David or Jane. The respondent had no substantial purpose in posting this information on her web site other than to embarrass or burden Jane or her children.26. Respondent admits posting materials and Jane and her children, including the amended complaint Jones's affidavit, federal-court pleadings, and Doe-Brown divorce pleadings, but denies the alleged facts in the remainder of ¶26 and calls upon Petitioner to prove the same.27. The amended complaint for modification, federal pleadings and other materials posted by the respondent on her web site between about the fall of 2000 and February 2001 contained direct quotations from and summaries of the contents of reports under impoundment in the juvenile court, including:27. Respondent admits posting certain materials on her website but calls upon Petitioner to prove that they were impounded.A. a 1988 affidavit by the social worker who had reported the sexual abuse allegations against Jones pursuant to G.L. C.119, §5 IA, and whose agency initiated the C & P action;27A. Respondent denies posting materials from an affidavit of Eileen Kern, who reported the sexual abuse allegations against Jones pursuant to G.L. C.119, §5. Respondent has no knowledge of an affidavit by Kern written at that time.B. reports to the court in 1988 and 1992 by the social worker appointed pursuant to G.L. c. 19, §§21 and 24, to investigate the allegations;27B. Respondent admits she quoted the phrases in red and summarized the so-called social worker for all intents and purposes as follows:Salt drew no negative conclusion from [Jane] having left Maine with [William] while a court order allowing [Jones] visitation was operative [CS, depo at 13-17]. Instead, he [Christopher Salt] held to his belief that [Jane] had "justification" to disobey the Maine court order [CS, depo at 15, lines 7 and 4] by fleeing and hiding with [William] in Massachusetts [CS depo at 16].
To Christopher Salt, [Jane] claimed to have "no live-in boyfriend" [CS 7/1/88 report at 25], but Salt knew this to be untrue, viz., Salt knew that [Jane] and [William] shared an apartment for about three months with Joseph Fitzgerald, who was the tenant of record [id. at 17]. [Jane] and the divorced Fitzgerald, Salt wrote, "dated a few times and have remained good friends" [id.] and with the exception of Mr. Fitzgerald who baby-sat [William] , "there appears to be no significant males in [William's] life other than Mr. [Jones]" [id. at 25].
Salt's conclusion that [Jones] had to be the perpetrator of the suspected sexual abuse because there was no male around except [Jones] and because [William] feared men was specious [CS 7/1/88 report at 25; CS depo at 28].
Salt further insisted that even though "there was no diagnosis of sexual abuse, the possibility is not to be eliminated. His fear and anxiety about his father had been confirmed[;] he had undergone a traumatic experience and now suffered from post-traumatic stress" [CS depo at 34].
By 1991, Salt updated his report -- a "parenting" assessment -- and submitted it to the court in January 1992. [Since Respondent wrote this, she received the docket sheet from the OBC and it is not clear that the report was ever filed in court.] Again Salt recommended that [Jones] be denied visitation with his son [CS 1/5/92 report at 16]. The court accepted Salt's recommendation.
The complaints allegedly made by [William] were communicated to Salt by [Jane] and not by [William] . Salt irrationally accepted as truth [Jane] 's assertion that [William] at 6 years of age believed that his therapist (Ferreira) conspired with [Jones] so that [Jones] could take him to his house. And given that his assignment was to investigate the parents, it was grossly negligent to accept without a visit to [Jane] and [William's] home environment [Jane] 's assertion that "her husband Michael is very important to [William] and that Michael treats her son as if he were his own" [CS 1/5/92 report at 2; also 15].
Specifically Salt himself lied in that report of 5 January 1992 to Judge Harper: he wrote that Reuben Ferreira had acknowledged that [William's] visiting [Jones] "might well be detrimental." Salt's statement was false because Salt never spoke to Ferreira at that time.
Salt's goal, it appears, was to continue to win favor with a judge (now retired) from whom he had received 30 or 40 assignments for reports [CS depo at 8-9]. Of the 60 court investigations that Salt had performed in two-and-a-half years [id. at 8], he found abuse in all but three [id. at 10] and all were done for the Bristol County Juvenile Court "except for one or two" [id. at 8].
28. The amended complaint for modification, federal pleadings and other materials posted by the respondent on her web site between about the fall of 2000 and February 2001 identified William as ""William Jones," identified Jane and David by name, and disclosed their home address. The respondent characterized Jane in her postings as a perjurer who had conceived both her children out of wedlock and then falsely accused both fathers of sexual abuse. The postings described, among other things, the history and details of the abuse allegations against Jones, the identities of therapists who had evaluated or treated William, the particulars of his evaluations and therapy, and the therapists" findings concerning the abuse and ensuing trauma to William. The respondent derived all or substantially all that information from the juvenile court reports and other records under impoundment in the juvenile or probate courts and from the reports of William's treating psychologist.Respondent further states that the Juvenile Court rule "only imposes a requirement of confidentiality on the [records], and not on witnesses or persons outside the [court]." In re Enforcement of Subpoena, 436 Mass. 784, 797 (2002). "Nothing in the impoundment order prevents the witness from "speak[ing] publicly about the proceedings before the commission and about these proceedings." Id.C. reports to the court in 1988 by the social workers and other clinicians who conducted court-ordered sexual abuse and parenting assessments;An order impounding the papers filed with this court in this matter is not a gag order on the witness or a prior restraint on his speech, and he has in fact spoken out publicly concerning this matter on many occasions without repercussion. His desire to speak out, however, does not compel this court to open its files on the matter.In re Enforcement of Subpoena, 436 Mass. 784, 797 (2002). Therefore Respondent's summarizing events is violative of any rule or regulation or statute. Indeed, Respondent was simply exercising her free-speech rights, and it is the Bar Counsel who is attempting to interfere with those rights of the Respondent.27C. Respondent denies on the grounds that other than Salt, there were in 1988 no "social workers and other clinicians who conducted court-ordered sexual abuse and parenting assessments."D. a 1992 report to the court by a social worker from the agency that had initiated the C&P action;27D. Respondent denies on the grounds that she knows of no 1992 report from DSS nor of a 1992 report from the nonprofit corporation for which the mandatory reporter, Eileen Kern, worked. Kern claimed in the U.S. District Court case that she had nothing to do with the "Jones" case after 1988.E. a 1992 report by a pediatrician and his team of psychologists who had evaluated William pursuant to a court referral. The respondent disseminated that quoted and summarized material in violation of Juvenile Court Standing Order No. 1-84.27E. Respondent denies on the grounds that the so-called evaluation by the team headed by the charlatan of the multibillion dollar sexual-abuse industry, Eli Newberger, was not filed in any court by him, a fact relied upon by Newberger in the U.S. District Court case to assert that there could be no state action. Therefore Juvenile Court Standing Order No. 1-84 simply does not apply.28. Respondent answers the allegations in ¶28 as follows:29. The respondent never obtained or sought relief from impoundment in the juvenile or probate courts or court permission to post any impounded material from the C & P or paternity actions on her web site.(a) Respondent admits posting on her website the "amended complaint for modification, federal pleadings and other materials," but does not recall the dates of so doing.(b) Respondent admits identifying "William as `William Jones,'" a name by which he was NOT known in any Massachusetts community in which he lived with his mother. She also admits identifying "Jane and David by name, and disclos[ing] their home address."
(c) Respondent admits "characteriz[ing] Jane in her postings as a perjurer who had conceived both her children out of wedlock and then falsely accused both fathers of sexual abuse."
(d) Respondent denies that "[t]he postings described, among other things, the history and details of the abuse allegations against Jones."
(e) Because William was never evaluated or treated by any therapist, whether properly credentialed or competent or not, Respondent denies identifying any "therapists who had evaluated or treated William, the particulars of his evaluations and therapy, and the therapists" findings concerning the abuse and ensuing trauma to William."
Respondent strongly contends that viewing a child for 30 minutes, give or take 15 minutes, does NOT constitute evaluation or therapy -- despite the family court judiciary repeatedly and reprehensibly denying parents their children based upon the recommendations in reports, written or oral, presented by shingle-hangers who spent only that amount of time with the parentectomized children.(f) Respondent denies that she derived all or substantially all that information from the juvenile court reports and other records under impoundment in the juvenile or probate courts and from the reports of William's treating psychologist, on the grounds that it is unclear that any report other than possibly Salt's was filed in juvenile or any other court and that William had NO treating psychologist.
29. Respondent admits that she never sought or obtained anything from Juvenile Court, for she was never an attorney of record in that court. Respondent also admits that she never sought permission to post anything on her website because any material she posted was already open to the public pursuant to G.L. c. 209C, sec. 13, as amended 31 March 1998.30. From about January 2001 through about April 2,2001, Jane was a candidate for elected town office.30. Respondent has sufficient knowledge and information to form the belief that "Jane was a candidate for elected town office" until 3 April 2001, the same date of her complaint against Respondent with the Bar, not 2 April 2001. Respondent has no information regarding when Jane announced her candidacy and calls upon Petitioner to prove the same.31. In about February 2001, the respondent posted on her web site an array of photographs provided by Jones, including photographs of William between the ages of about one and three. The effect of posting the photographs was to identify William further as the subject of the previous postings. The respondent had no substantial purpose in posting those photographs other than to embarrass or burden William or Jane.31. Respondent admits that she "posted on her web site an array of photographs provided by Jones, including photographs of William between the ages of about one and three." Respondent denies the remainder of the allegations in ¶31.32. On or about February 18, 2001, the respondent placed a special announcement
on her web site of the posting of William's photographs. In that announcement, the respondent identified William as 'William Brown," identified Jane by name as his mother, described Jane as an "out-of-wedlock morn" running for public office in their town, identified the town, and specifically invited the residents of that town to read the respondent's other web postings about William, David and Jane. The respondent maintained that announcement on her web site in the same or substantially similar form through about early April 2001. The respondent had no substantial purpose in posting the announcement other than to embarrass or burden William, David or Jane.32. Respondent admits (a) that she posted photographs of the infant and toddler William, (b) that she announced the candidacy of Jane for public office in Fairhaven, but does not recall how long the announcement remained on her website, and (c) that Jane was an ""out-of-wedlock morn."33. In about early April 2001, the respondent amended her special announcement about William's photographs to describe Jane as an "out-of-wedlock morn" who had lost her town election. The respondent retained the announcement on her web site in the same or substantially similar form through about May 2001. The respondent had no substantial purpose in retaining the modified announcement other than further to embarrass or burden William, David or Jane..Respondent admits (d) that she might have identified William as William Brown at some point, but that she changed the name when it was called to her attention. Respondent does not recall in which file the name William Brown appeared or when she changed it.
Respondent denies the remainder of the allegations in ¶32.
33. Respondent admits announcing on her website that Jane lost her bid for public office in Fairhaven. That fact was merely added to the pre-existing facts already on the site. Respondent denies the remainder of the allegations in ¶33.34. In April 2001, Jane and William, through his attorney, Deborah Wolf, filed requests with the Office of Bar Counsel to investigate the respondent. In their requests for investigation, Jane and William objected to the respondent's dissemination of impounded, confidential and personal information about them on
her web site and demanded the removal of the materials. The respondent received copies of the requests for investigation in due course and submitted responses. The respondent did not remove any of the material.34. Respondent admits she received notice of complaints to the OBC by Jane and by Deborah Wolf. Respondent denies that she received notice of a complaint by William; if she did, she did not recognize it as such. Respondent admits that she submitted responses. Respondent admits that she "did not remove any of the material" and also states that she was not requested to remove any material, likely because such a request would have been an unlawful exercise of censorship by the Commonwealth and violative of Respondent's First Amendment rights.35. On or about May 1, 2001, the juvenile court issued an order requiring among other things, that Jones and his agents, including specifically the respondent, remove from the respondent's web site all materials under impoundment in the juvenile court and deliver all copies of juvenile court records the court forthwith. Jones and the respondent were served with copies of that order on or about May 7,2001, and the respondent had actual knowledge of the order as of that date.35. Respondent answers ¶35 as follows:36. Neither Jones nor the respondent complied with the juvenile court's order of(a) Jones is not a party to this petition,(b) Jones has no control over Respondent's website,
(c) Respondent was never a party, an intervenor, or a third party to any action in Juvenile Court,
(d) Respondent was not properly served with a copy of that order; instead, on 1 May 2001, an unscrupulous private attorney FAXed Respondent a copy of the order, which can be seen on Respondent's website at http://www.falseallegations.com/drano34-juvenile-ct-order.htm,
(e) on 7 May 2001, Respondent was served with a pleading which, although entitled "Verified Complaint for Equity Relief," was not legally cognizable as a Complaint and in which neither Jones nor Respondent is named as a defendant,(f) Respondent has never been inside New Bedford Juvenile Court, has never filed an appearance in a case in New Bedford Juvenile Court, has never been served with a Complaint filed against her in New Bedford Juvenile Court,
(g) thus the Juvenile Court has no personal jurisdiction over Respondent or subject-matter jurisdiction over what is on her website. No pleadings from the Juvenile Court are or ever have been on the website,
(h) Juvenile Court has no jurisdiction over torts,
(i) on 29 May 2001, Respondent wrote the New Bedford Juvenile Court. Some excerpts follow from the letter, which appears in entirety on her website at
http://www.falseallegations.com/drano37-impoundment-Lawton.htm
and which is incorporated as if set forth herein by reference:Respondent denies the remainder of the allegations in ¶35.
4. The document which was served upon me has no summons and (b) is not a Complaint. It does not comport with any known set of rules of civil procedure, and most certainly not with the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. 5. The complaint served on me does not contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Mass.R.Civ.P. Rule 8(a)(1).
6. The complaint served on me is not simple, concise and direct, as Mass.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(1) requires. The purpose is to inform a defendant of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
7. The complaint served on me does not set out the facts in sepa- arately numbered paragraphs, as required under Mass.R.Civ.P. 10(b). Vigor v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Co., 101 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1939). Newman v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, et al., 115 F.R.D. 341 (D. Mass. 1987); see also Mmoe v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 393 Mass. 617 (1985) (dismissal of a complaint for failure to meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8 is, as Rule 41(b)(2) provides, a matter of discretion for the judge and defendants are entitled to the proper exercise of that discretion). Kuehl v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 8 F.3d 905 (1st Cir. 1993) (plaintiff ordered to submit amended complaint conforming to the concise pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 8(a)(2)).
8. The absence of numbered paragraphs makes it impossible for me to answer the complaint in accordance with the rules.
9. The facts in the complaint are not set out clearly, unequivocally and directly so as to enable me to respond directly and intelligently. Coburn v. Moore, 322 Mass. 204 (1948); Stoney v. Soar, 322 Mass. 408 (1948).
10. The complaint is verbose, argumentative, redundant, and contains material that is both impertinent and scandalous. Martin v. Hunt, 28 F.R.D. 35 (D.Mass. 1961).
11. Claims founded on separate transactions or occurrences must be stated in separate counts. Mass.R.Civ.P. 10(b). Feutz v. Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co., 85 F.Supp. 418 (E.D. Mo. 1949).
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16. Courts may impound documents under certain circumstances, but that an order has issued which commands me to do something without either a proper complaint being filed and a hearing with all the indicia of due process is of some consternation. Such a hearing would, of course, only be possible in a court with both subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over me.
17. I understand from Ottoway that I can bring suit to vacate the impoundment order, but then that buys a suit for the Juvenile Court. I would suggest, with all due respect for the court, that the court go to my site and see if there is anything there which the court believes it has a right to order removed, or references to documents which it believes it has the authority to impound.
18. In Ottoway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 551 (1977), the Supreme Judicial Court pondered "how one might go about asserting the alleged illegality of an impoundment order entered in an action to which one was not a party" and answered, "a publisher has standing to maintain suit to vacate an impoundment order entered in a separate action." Of course, in Ottaway, the SJC was dealing with the Superior Court and not Juvenile, and came out four-square in favor of the "general principle of publicity": "it is only in a clearly meritorious case that impoundment can be contemplated." This is not one of them.
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21. Given that the purpose of the statutes designed to protect juveniles who are subjects of litigation and not their mothers, and there is nothing on my website which would stigmatize [the child] (he is not even known in his community as "William Jones"], there is neither reason nor justification to issue an impoundment order. To call documents "in from the cold" after so many years raises other issues . . . all beyond the intended scope of this letter.
***
23. "Publicity prevents abuses of a single judge's power." Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. 846, 855 (1980), citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-270. This "`general principle of publicity', . . . [which] governs judicial proceedings in this Commonwealth," was affirmed again in H.S. Gere & Sons, Inc. v. Frey, 400 Mass. 326, 329 (1987).
We adopted this requirement of a showing of overriding necessity, in part, because of the great public interest in disclosure of all information relevant to misuse of authority and official wrongdoing.H.S. Gere, 400 Mass. at 332, citing George W. Prescott Publishing Co. v. Register of Probate for Norfolk County, 395 Mass. 274, 279-280.Moreover, "[a]ny limitation on protected expression must be no greater than is necessary to protect the compelling interest that is asserted as a justification for the restraint." George W. Prescott Pub. Co. v. Stoughton Div. of Dist.Court Dept. of Trial Court, 428 Mass. 309, 311 (1998), quoting Care and Protection of Edith, 421 Mass. 703, 705 (1996).
It is apparent that any order seeking to enjoin speech must be based on detailed findings of fact that (a) identify a compelling interest that the restraint will serve and (b) demonstrate that no reasonable, less restrictive alternative to the order is available." See also Oklahoma Publ. Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 97 S.Ct. 1045, 51 L.Ed.2d 355 (1977) (reversing court order enjoining media from publishing name or photograph of eleven year old boy accused of delinquency by reason of murder).Prescott, 428 Mass. at 311, cites omitted.Thus, on the facts here, there being no lawful basis to prohibit me from putting public records on my website or to prohibit me from exercising my First Amendment rights, I can rest on the statement that I did not publish any material or quote any sentences or parts thereof which I know to be privileged, confidential, or otherwise protected.
It would be, of course, very helpful to both her client Robyn and me if Deborah Wolf would advocate her client's claim in a clear, concise, and simple manner without overstating details and losing the forest for the trees.
Respondent also states that it is "`no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the press, and of speech, is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action.'" Nebraska Press Association et al. v Stuart, Judge, et al., 427 U.S. 539, 1976.SCT.42322 at ¶47 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, quoting Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931). See also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
May 1, 2001. The respondent knowingly disobeyed that order. To date, the
respondent has not returned to the juvenile court the records that belong to the Court.36. Respondent states that the Juvenile Court had neither personal jurisdiction over Respondent or subject-matter jurisdiction over her website. Therefore Respondent had no legal obligation to follow Judge Mark Lawton's order.37. At least by about May 7, 2001, the respondent knew that the juvenile court reports quoted or summarized on her web site were under impoundment and that her continued possession and dissemination of those reports violated Standing Order No. 1-84.Respondent further states that the Bar Counsel's inclusion of or reference to Jones here is inappropriate, unlawful, unfair, deceptive, and indicative of the prevalent absence of his rights to due process in that court.
But more than that, Respondent had a moral obligation not to follow the unlawful order. See the Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal (1950).
The Nuremberg tribunal held that the defendants could not escape responsibility for these acts by pointing to their domestic law obligations; they had a privilege under international law to violate domestic law in order to prevent the ongoing crimes against humanity that their country was perpetrating through them. Id. We echo this explanation.United States v. Maxwell, 254 F.3d 21, 2001.C01.0000266 at par. 54 <http://www.versuslaw.com> (2001). Respondent contends that although Bar Counsel invokes Juvenile Court Standing Order No. 1-84 to justify his petition against Respondent, that Order allows the perpetuation of crimes against humanity by overriding our state and federal constitutional rights to due process and the equal protection of our laws.Respondent therefore did not, of course, comply with the offending order. She chose the moral, the high road. She had learned of the unscrupulousness of the Harper court and was obligated to make the lack of any due process whatsoever in the Juvenile Court since 1988 known to the public. The nexus between Jones having lost his son for 15 years and perhaps forever and Harper's unscrupulousness was clear.
But for that Standing Order allowing secrecy, coupled with judge-made judicial immunity allowing judges to scoff at the moral obligation to act responsibly and be accountable, Juvenile Court Justice Ronald Harper's arrogance against Jones was enabled and his unscrupulous and malicious acts were hidden from public scrutiny. He was able to perpetuate a crime against humanity in the penumbra of a Kangaroo Court sanctioned not by the people but by some politically appointed committee at some time in the recent past.
In the context of the Jones case, Standing Order No. 1-84 is too broad to accomplish the stated goal of privacy. There are less onerous alternative means, means which are narrowly tailored tailored to serve a compelling State interest, to accomplish the desired privacy.
And Respondent knew and knows that Jones is not the only parent victimized by unscrupulous and court-sanctioned malicious and corrupt acts hidden by Standing Order No. 1-84.
So Respondent's moral choice was clear. She had to stand on the side of Principles, to stand against judicial crimes against humanity. She had to risk again being called bombastic by a sitting justice for invoking the Nuremberg Principles. She had not been spouting bombast. She was facing the stark reality of the absence of justice in our courts, particularly those dealing in domestic issues. She had to act in the moment.
Justice Harper's choice was also clear. He had a moral choice [See Principle IV of the Nuremberg Tribunal]: to follow due process or do the reprehensible act of denying any indicia of due process, such as a hearing to Jones, and keep the fact deep-sixed in the darkness defined by the Standing Order. He morally abused his discretion, if not legally abused it.
Like Harper, Justice Lawton and the Bar Counsel and any agent of his have had a moral choice: to apply the Standing Order or to allow disclosure, or sunshine, of the unscrupulous acts of the Harper Court and make the judiciary take responsibility for the unconscionable conduct of the Juvenile Court in the Jones case.
If the Nuremberg Principles, particularly Principle IV, which addresses crimes against humanity, apply to member states of the United Nations, to which Secretary of State Colin Powell announced on Meet the Press (9 February 2003) he would hold the body politic in Iraq, why should they not apply also to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts? Certainly the maintenance of judicial independence must fall in the face of a crime against humanity.
37. Respondent denies the statement as written in ¶37, for she did not publish any Juvenile Court reports on her website. She does admit publishing the quotes noted in ¶27 above. The exact quotes ae comprised of the following words and phrases, none of which can be deemed sufficient to "embarrass" or "burden" Jane or William as Bar Counsel contends:38. From and after about May 2001, the respondent added further postings to her web site that disclosed impounded, privileged or otherwise-confidential information about William and Jane. The respondent had no substantial purpose in posting the additional materials other than to embarrass or burden William, David or Jane.(a) "justification" [CS, depo at 15, lines 7 and 4]What was embarrassing to Jane was Respondent's published opinion after reviewing all the pleadings, some of which were written by Jane herself or on her behalf by her lawyer, that Jane is both manipulative and a liar. Respondent is entitled to publish her own opinions, and they were expressed not in bad faith or with malice but to further the truth and expose both the contamination by Jane of the judicial process and the corruption of justice in the Jones case.(b) "no live-in boyfriend" [CS 7/1/88 report at 25],
(c) "dated a few times and have remained good friends" [CS 7/1/88 report at 17],
(d) "there appears to be no significant males in [William's] life other than Mr. [Jones]" [id. at 25].
(e) "there was no diagnosis of sexual abuse, the possibility is not to be eliminated. His fear and anxiety about his father had been confirmed[;] he had undergone a traumatic experience and now suffered from post-traumatic stress"[CS depo at 34].
(f) "parenting"
(g) "her husband Michael is very important to [William] and that Michael treats her son as if he were his own" [CS 1/5/92 report at 2; also 15].
(h) "might well be detrimental" [CS 1/5/92 report]
(i) "except for one or two" [CS depo at 8].
Respondent further states that she did not know about Standing Order I-84 prior to receiving the FAX from Attorney Deborah Wolf of Judge Lawton's ex parte order, for she had had no Juvenile Court experience and therefore had had no need to become familiar with it. When she became aware of Standing Order I-84, she recognized that as a lawyer she was charged with having had constructive notice of it.
But she admits that it was to her more important morally and legally to have full disclosure and public scrutiny of an unscrupulous court than to be blindly obedient to a Standing Order that indiscretely eclipsed sunshine in the court arena.
In fact. Standing Order I-84 is conceptually outdated: "[I]in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 104 S.Ct. 2199, (1984), the Supreme Court applied the right of access doctrine to the fruits of pretrial civil discovery." George W. Prescott Pub. Co. v. Register of Probate for Norfolk County, 395 Mass. 274, 281 (1985). This is exactly the the type of material Respondent was using in Jones's other cases. The "impound- ment of materials uncovered during pretrial civil discovery . . . was permissible, under the First Amendment, only if based "on a showing of good cause." Seattle Times at 2209-2210( not sanctioning automatic impoundment).
Here, in a domestic relations case in which the party-wife is a public figure, "the First Amendment requires that [Standing Order I-84] permit interested parties to challenge the routine impoundment of these records." Prescott, 395 Mass at 281, citing Seattle Times, 104 S.Ct. at 2209-2210. "Moreover, when such a challenge is made, the trial judge is required either to make sufficient findings which justify the impoundment,... or to grant public access to the documents." Prescott Pub. , 395 Mass. at 281, citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Riverside County, 464 U.S. 501, 104 S.Ct. 819, 824 (1984).
A sound judicial discretion in this context requires a showing by the party seeking impoundment of "good cause" and a determination by the court that the scope and duration of an order impoundment is no greater than necessary.Converge, LLC v. Hickox, No. 01-5005-L2, 2001 WL 1692072 *2 (Mass.Super. Dec. 27, 2001) (Agnes, J.), citing H.S. Gere & Sons v. Frey, 400 Mass. 326, 329 (1987) (Impoundment Rules 2 and 7 requires motion for impoundment accompanied by affidavit, hearing, and showing of "good cause").And here, Respondent did not challenge the Order in Juvenile Court because, first, she was unfamiliar with the Order, and even had she known of it, she, second, would have concluded a challenge would have been futile. She was aware, however, that it is well-settled that "[j]udicial proceedings are subject to the `general principle of publicity.'" New Bedford Standard- Times Pub. Co. v. Clerk of Third Dist. Court of Bristol, 377 Mass. 404, 410 (1979).
There is, in sum, a general principle of publicity, strong although not absolute, regarding Court records and proceedings, a principle rooted in the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the Commonwealth, the common-law and the Trial Court Uniform Rules on Impoundment Procedure.Demeo v. Geoghan, 2001 WL 1902397, (Mass.Super. January 5, 2001) (McHugh, James, III, J.), citing Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 546 (1977), quoting Commonwealth v. Blondin, 324 Mass. 564, 571 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 984 (1950).Respondent adds that the Standing Order not only cannot pass "the test of `strict scrutiny' that is to be applied to statutes that implicate fundamental liberty interests" [Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 668 (2002) (dissenting, Sosman, J.)], it also cannot pass the rational basis test for upholding the Standing Order in the face of the total absence of due process and equal protection in the history of the Jones' cases. Doe v. Commissioner of Transitional Assistance, 437 Mass. 521 (2002) (rational basis, rather than strict scrutiny, is the standard of review which governs an equal protection challenge to a state statute).
38. Respondent shall move for a more definite statement regarding the statements in ¶38, which is too broad and vague for Respondent to respond to intelligently. Therefore Respondent neither admits not denies, for she does not know to which postings Bar Counsel is referring.39. On or about December 13, 2002, bar counsel notified the respondent that formal disciplinary proceedings would shortly be instituted against her and that the disciplinary charges would involve, among others, the Jones matter. At that time bar counsel cautioned the respondent against posting on her web site or otherwise disseminating any confidential information without prior authorization.39. Respondent denies that Bar Counsel has notified her of anything. Respondent has never had any direct communication, either telephonically or in writing, with Bar Counsel Daniel Crane.40. On or about December 19, 2002, the respondent posted on her web site her answers to the requests for investigation filed by Jane and Wolf, with William's name only redacted. In those postings the respondent republished impounded, privileged, confidential and highly personal information about William, David and Jane. The respondent had no substantial purpose in posting the additional materials other thanRespondent has, however, had oral communication regarding the "Jones" matter with Assistant Bar Counsel Susan Strauss Weisberg ["Weisberg"], but has no independent memory of the dates on which they spoke.
Weisberg often told Respondent that she would finish her investigation soon, and when asked by Respondent -- checking on the new status of the charges -- whether charges were going to issue, Weisberg on several occasions said, in words for all intents and purposes, "I did NOT say that charges would issue."
So Respondent denies that she received notice directly OR indirectly from Bar Counsel, as alleged in the Petition, "that formal disciplinary proceedings would shortly be instituted against her and that the disciplinary charges would involve, among others, the Jones matter."
Respondent denies as written the statement that "[a]t that time bar counsel cautioned the respondent against posting on her web site or otherwise disseminating any confidential information without prior authorization." First, Daniel Crane never cautioned Respondent about a thing. And although evasive and noncommital and consistently maintaining that the decision to bring charges would not be hers, Weisberg sounded friendly, and to Respondent's complaints that the Bar's actions were excessively time-consuming and were interfering with her obligations to other people, Weisberg was sympathetic. Respondent at all times, therefore, held out hope that charges would not be brought.
Weisberg's tone and manner became increasingly hostile after Respondent's positions against judicial immunity and for court reform became publicly known during Respondent's recent gubernatorial campaign. In fact, after the campaign, Weisberg's friendliness came to an end and she sounded, instead, hellbent on bringing charges.
As to the postings to which the Petition refers: Respondent shall move for a more definite statement regarding the statements in ¶39, which is too broad and vague for Respondent to respond to intelligently. Therefore Respondent neither admits not denies, for she does not know to which postings Bar Counsel is referring.
Respondent does admit that Weisberg was concerned about the photographs of Jones' child when he was an infant. Respondent does remember saying that she herself could not imagine how a child in a train engineer's costume and riding a plastic train or a child eating birthday cake, or that pictures of the Jones family in church or on the ski slopes would be offensive.
to embarrass or burden Jane or her children.40. Respondent admits that "[o]n or about December 19, 2002, the respondent posted on her web site her answers to the requests for investigation filed by Jane and Wolf, with William's name only redacted." Respondent denies the remaining averments in ¶40.41. Except for the special announcement, the respondent has failed to remove any impounded, confidential or personal information about William, David or Jane from her web site to date.41. Respondent admits that except for removing the announcement of Jane Doe's loss of the election when the news became stale, she has not removed any other material relating to John Jones, Jane Doe, William Jones, Robert Brown, and Christopher Salt..42. By disseminating impounded material from the C & P and paternity actions, failing to return to the juvenile court impounded reports belonging to the court, and failing to remove impounded material from her web site, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. 8.4(d) and (h), as set forth in ¶128 below.42. No answer is required for what is a conclusion of law. Notwithstanding that the statement is a conclusion of law, Respondent calls upon Petition to prove that she engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice and/or engaged in any other conduct that adversely reflects on her fitness to practice law.43. By knowingly disobeying the juvenile court's May 1,2001 order and engaging in knowing violations of Juvenile Court Standing Order No. 1-84 and G.L. c. 209C, §13, as applied, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(c) and 8.4(d) and (h), as set forth in ¶128 below.43. No answer is required for what is a conclusion of law. Notwithstanding that the statement is a conclusion of law, Respondent calls upon Petitioner to prove that Respondent knowingly disobeyed an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists, which Respondent clearly asserts, i.e., that she owed no valid obligation to the Juvenile Court where Juvenile Court had indulged for a decade in the unscrupulous practice of denying Johnes both due process and equal protection of the laws. She further asserts that her valid obligation was to the state and federal constitutions and to stare decisis where it is well-settled that that the public is entitled to scrutinize the judicial process where the conduct of the court is unscrupulous.44. By disseminating information about William, David and Jane on her web site with no substantial purpose other than to embarrass or burden them, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 4.4 and 8.4(h), as set forth in paragraph 128 below.Respondent further calls upon Petition to prove that she engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice and/or engaged in any other conduct that adversely reflects on her fitness to practice law.
44. No answer is required for what is a conclusion of law. Notwithstanding that the statement is a conclusion of law, Respondent calls upon Petitioner to prove that Respondent disseminating information on her website had no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden William, David and Jane, or used methods to obtain evidence that violated the legal rights of William, David and Jane, and/or engaged in any other conduct that adversely reflects on her fitness to practice law.For Count II, click here.
For Count III, click here.
These are the rules the Bar Counsel said I violated. Canons and Rules
Rule 1.5 Fees129. Prior to January 1, 1998, the Canons of Ethics and Disciplinary Rules violated(a) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee. The factors to be considered in determining whether a fee is clearly excessive include the following:Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and lhe skill requisite to perform the legal service properly,(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer,
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal confidential information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to cany out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).Rule 1.9 Conflict of Interest: Former Client(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation.Rule 1.15 Safekeeping Property(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formeriy was associated had previously represented a client
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter, unless the former client consents after consultation.
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained in the State where the lawyers office is situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person. Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of the receipt, maintenance, and disposition of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer from lhe time of receipt to the time of final distribution and shall be preserved for a period of six years after termination of the representation.Rule 1.16 Declining or Terminating Representation(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any firnds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.
(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property in which both the lawyer and another person claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved.
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.Rule 3,4 Fairness to Opposing Party and CounselA lawyer shall not
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists;Rule 4.4 Respect for Rights of Third PersonsIn representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.
Rule 8.4 Misconduct
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation;(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
(h) engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his or her fitness to practice law.
by the respondent provided as follows:CANON ONE A LAWYER SHOULD ASSIST IN MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION.
DR 1-102 Misconduct
(A) A lawyer shall not(5) Engage m conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.
130. At all times relevant to this petition, the provision of S.J.C. Rules 4:01 violated by the respondent provided as follows:CANON SIX A LAWYER SHOULD REPRESENT A CLIENT COMPETENTLY.
DR 6-101 Failing to Act Competently.
(A) A lawyer shall not:(I) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
CANON SEVEN A LAWYER SHOULD REPRESENT A CLIENT ZEALOUSLY WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
DR 7-101 Representing a Client Zealously.
(A) A lawyer shall not intentionally:(3) Prejudice or damage his client during the course of the professional relationship, except as required under DR 7-102(B).S.J.C. RULE 4:01
BAR DISCIPLINESection 10. Refusal of Complainant to Proceed; Compromise; or Restitution.
... A lawyer shall not, as a condition of settlement, compromise or restitution, require the complainant to refrain from filing a complaint, to withdraw the complaint, or to fail to cooperate with the bar counsel.